Quantum Key Recycling with eight-state encoding
(The Quantum One Time Pad is more interesting than we thought)

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Abstract

Perfect encryption of quantum states using the Quantum One-Time Pad (QOTP) requires 2 classical key bits per qubit. Almost-perfect encryption, with information-theoretic security, requires only slightly more than 1. We slightly improve lower bounds on the key length. We show that key length \( n + 2 \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon} + 4 \) suffices to encrypt \( n \) qubits in such a way that the cipherstate’s \( L_1 \)-distance from uniformity is upper bounded by \( \varepsilon \). For a stricter security definition involving the \( \infty \)-norm, we prove sufficient key length \( n + \log n + 2 \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon} + \frac{1}{n} \log \frac{1}{\delta} + \log \frac{\ln 2}{1 - \varepsilon} \), where \( \delta \) is a small probability of failure. Our proof uses Pauli operators, whereas previous results on the \( \infty \)-norm needed Haar measure sampling.

We show how to QOTP-encrypt classical plaintext in a nontrivial way: we encode a plaintext bit as the vector \( \pm (1, 1, 1)/\sqrt{3} \) on the Bloch sphere. Applying the Pauli encryption operators results in eight possible cipherstates which are equally spread out on the Bloch sphere. This encoding, especially when combined with the half-keylength option of QOTP, has advantages over 4-state and 6-state encoding in applications such as Quantum Key Recycling and Unclonable Encryption. We propose a key recycling scheme that is more efficient and can tolerate more noise than a recent scheme by Fehr and Salvail.

For 8-state QOTP encryption with pseudorandom keys we do a statistical analysis of the cipherstate eigenvalues. We present numerics up to 9 qubits.

1 Introduction

1.1 Quantum encryption and key recycling

Quantum physics is markedly different from classical physics regarding information processing. For instance, performing a measurement on an unknown quantum state typically destroys state information. Furthermore, it is impossible to clone an unknown state by unitary evolution [1]. These two properties are very interesting for security applications, since they provide a certain amount of inherent confidentiality, unclonability and tampering detection. Quantum physics also has entanglement of subsystems, which allows for feats like teleportation [2, 3] that have no classical analogue. The laws of quantum physics have been exploited in numerous security schemes, such as Quantum Key Distribution [4, 5, 6], quantum anti-counterfeiting [7], quantum Oblivious Transfer [8, 9], authentication and encryption of quantum states [10, 11, 12], unclonable encryption [13], quantum authentication of PUFs [14, 15], and quantum-secured imaging [16], to name a few. A recent overview of quantum-cryptographic schemes is given in [17].

In this paper we focus on two features that distinguish quantum channels from classical channels:

(i) The possibility of achieving almost-perfect encryption of quantum states, with information-theoretic security guarantees, using a key length that is slightly more than half of the length required for perfect encryption. Perfect encryption, e.g. using the Quantum One Time Pad (QOTP), requires a key of length \( 2n \) to encrypt \( n \) qubits. Dickinson and Nayak [18] showed that key length \( n + 2 \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon} + 4 \) suffices if one only requires that the cipherstate is at most \( \varepsilon \) away from the fully mixed state, in terms of the \( L_1 \)-norm. Aubrun [19] showed that, for a more strict security notion based on the \( \infty \)-norm, key length \( n + 2 \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon} + \log 150 \) suffices.

(ii) The possibility of re-using encryption keys when a quantum channel is used to transmit classical messages. In Gottesman’s unclonable encryption [13] half of the key material can be re-used if a
transmission is successful. Damgård, Pedersen and Salvail [20, 21] introduced a scheme in which the entire key can be re-used. However, encryption and decryption require a quantum computer with circuit depth $O(n^2)$ [22]. Fehr and Salvail [23] recently proposed a scheme which re-uses the entire key and which does not need a quantum computer.

1.2 Contributions and outline

We present a number of new results regarding the use of the QOTP.

- We introduce a new way of encoding a classical bit as a qubit state. The ‘0’ is encoded as the vector $(1, 1, 1)/\sqrt{3}$ on the Bloch sphere, and the ‘1’ as the opposite vector $(-1, -1, -1)/\sqrt{3}$. By acting with the four QOTP encryption operators on our two plaintext states we obtain eight cipherstates that are equally spread out on the Bloch sphere. We refer to this encoding as ‘8-state encoding’.

- We propose a key recycling scheme inspired by [23], but using 8-state encoding. Our scheme is more compact by virtue of the fact that 8-state encoding is a proper encryption, while 4-state and 6-state encoding are leaky. Furthermore our scheme tolerates more noise.

- We study the use of the QOTP with a pseudorandom key, for general states. We model the pseudorandomness as the output of a random function. For $n$ qubits and key length $q$, we construct a random table $T$ of size $2^q \times n$, where the $j$'th row is the key corresponding to seed $j$. The adversary knows $T$ but not the row index $j$.

- We study the pseudorandom-keyed QOTP in the case of 8-state encoding of classical plaintexts. We derive bounds on the moments of the cipherstate eigenvalues; these bounds are sharper than for arbitrary states. We present numerics that show a ‘phase transition’ as the key length crosses over from $q < n$ to $q > n$.

The outline is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the QOTP and security definitions for quantum ciphers. In Section 3 we introduce 8-state encoding and examine its properties. A comparison is given with 4-state and 6-state encoding, regarding conditional entropies of plaintexts and keys. In Section 4 we present our Key Recycling scheme and discuss its security properties. In Section 5 we briefly mention two other possible applications of 8-state encoding: Unclonable Encryption with shorter keys, and the three-pass keyless protocol. The pseudorandom-keyed QOTP results for general states are given in Section 6. In Section 7 we restrict the states to 8-state encoding.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation and terminology

Classical Random Variables (RVs) are denoted with capital letters, and their realisations with lowercase letters. The probability that a RV $X$ takes value $x$ is written as $\Pr[X = x]$. The expectation with respect to RV $X$ is denoted as $\mathbb{E}_x f(x) = \sum_{x \in X} \Pr[X = x] f(x)$. Sets are denoted in calligraphic font. The notation ‘log’ stands for the logarithm with base 2. The min-entropy of $X \in \mathcal{X}$ is $H_{\text{min}}(X) = -\log \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pr[X = x]$, and the conditional min-entropy is $H_{\text{min}}(X|Y) = -\log \max_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pr[X = x|Y = y]$. The notation $h$ stands for the binary entropy function $h(p) = p \log \frac{1}{p} + (1 - p) \log \frac{1}{1 - p}$. Bitwise XOR of binary strings is written as ‘$\oplus$’. The Kronecker delta is denoted as $\delta_{ab}$. The inverse of a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ is written as $\bar{b} = 1 - b$. 


For quantum states we use Dirac notation, with the standard qubit basis states $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$ represented as $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$ respectively. The Pauli matrices are denoted as $\sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_z$, and we write $\sigma = (\sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_z)$. The standard basis is the eigenbasis of $\sigma_z$, with $|0\rangle$ in the positive $z$-direction. We write $1_d$ for the $d \times d$ identity matrix. The fully mixed state in $d$-dimensional Hilbert space is denoted as $\tau_d = \frac{1}{d}1_d$, or simply $\tau$ if the dimension is clear from the context. The space of mixed state operators acting on Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}$ is written as $\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H})$. The $1$-norm of an operator $A$ with eigenvalues $\lambda_i$ is defined as $|A|_1 = \text{tr} |L| = \sum_i |\lambda_i|$. The notation ‘tr’ stands for trace. The statistical distance (trace distance) between two mixed states is defined as $D(\rho, \rho') = \frac{1}{2}\text{tr} |\rho - \rho'|$. The $\infty$-norm $|A|_\infty$ is $\max_i |\lambda_i|$.

We will use the Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM) formalism. Consider a bipartite system ‘AB’ where the ‘A’ part is classical, i.e. the state is of the form $\rho^{AB} = \mathbb{E}_{x \in X}|x\rangle \langle x| \otimes \rho_x^B$ with the $|x\rangle$ forming an orthonormal basis. The min-entropy of the classical RV $X$ given part ‘B’ of the system is [24]

$$H_{\min}(X|\rho^B_X) = -\log \max_{M} \mathbb{E}_{x \in X} \text{tr} M_x \rho^B_x. \quad (1)$$

Here $\mathcal{M}$ denotes a POVM, i.e. $\mathcal{M} = (M_x)_{x \in X}$ where the operators $M_x$ are positive semidefinite and satisfy $\sum_{x \in X} M_x = 1$. Let $\Lambda \triangleq \sum_x \rho_x M_x$. The POVM which achieves the maximum in (1) satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions $\Lambda^\dagger = \Lambda$ and $\forall x : \Lambda - \rho_x^B \geq 0$.

### 2.2 The Quantum One Time Pad

An arbitrary unknown qubit state can be perfectly encrypted using a classical two-bit key [12, 25, 26]. The simplest way of doing this is using the Quantum One-Time Pad (QOTP). Consider a pure state $|\psi\rangle$ and let the key be $(u, w) \in \{0, 1\}^2$. The encrypted state is $|\psi_{uw}\rangle = E_{uw}|\psi\rangle$, with $E_{uw}$ the unitary encryption operator, $E_{uw} = |w\rangle\langle 0| + |1\rangle\langle 1|$. In terms of Pauli spin matrices: $E_{00} = 1, E_{01} = \sigma_x, E_{10} = \sigma_z, E_{11} = \sigma_x\sigma_z$.

$$E_{uw} = \sigma^u_x \sigma^w_z. \quad (2)$$

For notational brevity we will often write the key as $b = 2u + w$, $b \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and accordingly encryption operator $E_b$ and cipherstate $|\psi_b\rangle = E_b|\psi\rangle$. From the point of view of an attacker Eve who does not know $u, w$, the qubit is in the fully mixed state: $\frac{1}{4} \sum_b |\psi_b\rangle \langle \psi_b| = \frac{1}{2}1_2$. In other words, from Eve’s point of view the cipherstate carries no information at all about $\psi$. For a mixed qubit state $\rho$ the cipherstate is $E_b \rho E_b^\dagger$ and it holds that $\frac{1}{4} \sum_b E_b \rho E_b^\dagger = \frac{1}{2}1_2$. Any Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}_d$ of dimension $d = 2^n$ can be interpreted as an $n$-qubit system. QOTP encryption on $\mathcal{H}_d$ works by encrypting every qubit individually. The key is $b \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}^n$. The encryption operator factorises as $E_b = \bigotimes_{i=1}^n E_{b_i}$. From Eve’s point of view the encryption of a state $\rho \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_d)$ is fully mixed,

$$\forall \rho \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_d^n) \quad \frac{1}{4^n} \sum_{b \in \{0,1,2,3\}^n} E_b \rho E_b^\dagger = (\tau_2)^\otimes n = \tau_2^n. \quad (3)$$

### 2.3 Security definitions for quantum ciphers

The performance of a quantum cipher can be quantified in several ways. We first consider encryption of generic mixed states.

**Definition 2.1 (From [27])** A completely positive, trace-preserving map $R : \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_d) \to \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_d)$ is called $\varepsilon$-randomising if

$$\forall \varphi \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_d) : \quad |R(\varphi) - \tau_d|_\infty \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{d}. \quad (4)$$

Next we consider quantum-encryption of classical data. Let $k \in \mathcal{K}$ be a key and $x \in \mathcal{X}$ a plaintext. Encryption of $x$ using key $k$ results in a (pure or mixed) state $\rho_{k,x}$ in a Hilbert space of dimension $d$. From Eve’s point of view the total system, including the plaintext and the key, is a tripartite system...
in the state $\mathbb{E}_{k \in K} \mathbb{E}_{x \in X} |k\rangle \langle k| \otimes |x\rangle \langle x| \otimes \rho_{k,x}$. Eve has access only to the third part, and her main interest is in the second part. Tracing out the first subsystem gives the bipartite state

$$\rho = \mathbb{E}_{x \in X} |x\rangle \langle x| \otimes \rho_{x}, \quad \rho_{x} = \mathbb{E}_{k \in K} \rho_{k,x}.$$ (5)

We introduce the notation

$$\xi \overset{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{E}_{x \in X} \rho_{x}.$$ (6)

Typically $\xi = \tau_{d}$. Eve’s knowledge about the plaintext is related to the statistical distance between $X$ and the uniform distribution, given the quantum state $\rho_{X}$ for unknown $X$. This is written as

$$d(X|\rho_{X}) \overset{\text{def}}{=} D(\rho, \tau_{X} \otimes \xi) = \mathbb{E}_{x \in X} D(\rho_{x}, \xi).$$ (7)

If the encryption depends on some public randomness $Y \in Y$, then we write $\rho_{x}(y)$, and (7) generalises to

$$d(X|Y, \rho_{X}(Y)) = \mathbb{E}_{x \in X} \mathbb{E}_{y \in Y} D(\rho_{x}(y), \xi).$$ (8)

**Definition 2.2** A symmetric quantum cipher is called “statistically $\varepsilon$-private” [20] or “a scheme with error $\varepsilon$” [13] if

$$\forall_{x,x' \in X} : D(\rho_{x}, \rho_{x'}) < \varepsilon.$$ (9)

We introduce a security definition inspired by the conditional statistical distance (8).

**Definition 2.3** Let $R_{y} : \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_{d}) \to \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_{d})$ be a completely positive trace-preserving map, with $y \in Y$ public. The map is called “$\varepsilon$-uniform” if it satisfies

$$\forall_{\varphi \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_{d})} : \mathbb{E}_{y \in Y} D(R_{y}(\varphi), \tau_{d}) \leq \varepsilon.$$ (10)

An symmetric quantum cipher for classical messages which makes use of public randomness $Y \in Y$ is called “$\varepsilon$-uniform” if it satisfies

$$\forall_{x \in X} : \mathbb{E}_{y \in Y} D(\rho_{x}(y), \xi) \leq \varepsilon.$$ (11)

We introduce Def. 2.3 because the properties (10,11) appear in the literature (without the conditioning on $Y$) but receive either no name or a confusing name. We will use Def. 2.3 in Section 6. Being $\varepsilon$-randomising (Def. 2.1) implies being $\frac{\varepsilon}{2}$-uniform (Def. 2.3 with deterministic $y$). Similarly, a cipher satisfying Def. 2.2 also satisfies Def. 2.3. Note that (11) implies $d(X|\rho_{X}) \leq \varepsilon$.

When the key is chosen completely at random, the QOTP has parameter $\varepsilon = 0$ in all the above definitions.

Below we list a number of results on almost-perfect quantum encryption that can be found in the literature. The cipherstate is denoted as $\rho \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_{2^{n}})$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security property</th>
<th>Key length</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$</td>
<td>\rho - \tau</td>
<td>_{\infty} \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{2^{n}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$</td>
<td>\rho - \tau</td>
<td>_{\infty} \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{2^{n}}$ with nonzero prob.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$</td>
<td>\rho - \tau</td>
<td>_{1} \leq \varepsilon$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$</td>
<td>\rho - \tau</td>
<td>_{1} \leq \varepsilon$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Haar' indicates that the encryption operators are drawn according to the Haar measure (which is considered to be difficult). 'Pauli' means that Pauli operators are used.

Other security definitions exist [28, 29, 30], more in line with entropies and cryptographic treatment of indistinguishability. We will use the definitions detailed above because the related literature uses them, and they make it easy to reason about Universal Composability [31, 32, 33, 34].
3 Eight-state encoding

It has been remarked in the literature that applying the Quantum One Time Pad to classical data is not very exciting: Acting with any encryption operator $E_{uw}$ on $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$ yields either $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$, and hence the QOTP does the same as the classical OTP except it needs twice the key material. Furthermore, the quantum encryption yields no protection against copying of the cipherstates. This is the case only when the basis for representing a classical bit is chosen badly. We propose a basis such that QOTP encryption of a classical bit is nontrivial, resulting in 8 different cipherstates which are equally spread out over the Bloch sphere. Although 8-state encoding is very simple and has interesting properties, we are not aware that it has ever been used.

3.1 Equally separated cipherstates

We define $\cos \alpha \overset{\text{def}}{=} 1/\sqrt{3}$, $\alpha \approx 0.96$.\(^1\) We write $\sqrt{i} = e^{i\pi/4}$. We encode the classical ‘0’ and ‘1’ as qubit states $\psi_0, \psi_1$,

$$|\psi_0\rangle = \cos \frac{\alpha}{2} \sqrt{\frac{i}{\sin \frac{\alpha}{2}}} \quad |\psi_1\rangle = \sin \frac{\alpha}{2} \cos \frac{\alpha}{2} \quad \langle \psi_1 | \psi_0 \rangle = 0 \quad (12)$$

which on the Bloch sphere corresponds to the normal vectors $(1,1,1)^T/\sqrt{3}$ and $(-1,-1,-1)^T/\sqrt{3}$ respectively. In spherical coordinates $(\theta, \varphi)$ this corresponds to $(\theta, \varphi) = (\alpha, \frac{\pi}{4})$ and $(\theta, \varphi) = (\pi - \alpha, -\frac{\pi}{4})$. Compactely written in terms of the standard basis $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$,

$$|\psi_g\rangle = (-\sqrt{i})^g \cos \frac{\alpha}{2} |g\rangle + (\sqrt{i})^{1-g} \sin \frac{\alpha}{2} |1-g\rangle \quad g \in \{0,1\}. \quad (13)$$

We act on these two states with the four encryption operators $E_{uw}$ and obtain eight different cipherstates,

$$|\psi_{uwg}\rangle \overset{\text{def}}{=} E_{uw} |\psi_g\rangle = (-1)^g u \left[(-\sqrt{i})^g \cos \frac{\alpha}{2} |g\rangle + (\sqrt{i})^{1-g} \sin \frac{\alpha}{2} |1-g\rangle\right]. \quad (14)$$

On the Bloch sphere these correspond to unit-length vectors $n_{uwg}$ as follows (see Fig. 1),

$$n_{uwg} = \frac{(-1)^g u}{\sqrt{3}} \begin{pmatrix} (-1)^u \\ -1^{u+w} \\ -1^w \end{pmatrix}. \quad (15)$$

The relation between the Bloch sphere angles $\theta, \varphi$ and the elliptic polarisation parameters $\beta$ (angle from the $x$-axis to the major axis) and $\zeta$ (ratio minor/major, with $\zeta < 0$ left rotating) is given by

$$\cos \theta = \cos 2\zeta \cos 2\beta \quad ; \quad \sin \varphi = \sin 2\zeta / \sqrt{1 - (\cos 2\zeta \cos 2\beta)^2}$$

$$\tan 2\beta = \cos \varphi \tan \theta \quad ; \quad \sin 2\zeta = \sin \theta \sin \varphi. \quad (16)$$

Our eight cipherstates have $\beta \in \{\pm \pi/5, \pm 3\pi/5\}$, $\zeta = \pm (\pi/4 - \alpha) \approx \pm 0.308$. We will often write $b = 2u + w$, $b \in \{0,1,2,3\}$ as a basis index, with corresponding notation $E_b, |\psi_{bg}\rangle, n_{bg}$.

| $u$ | $w$ | $g$ | $x$ | $y$ | $z$ | $\theta$ | $\varphi$ | $\beta$ | $\zeta$ | cipherstate $|\psi_{uwg}\rangle$ |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------|---------|-------|-------|-------------------|
| 0   | 0   | 0   | +   | +   | +   | $\pi/4$ | $\pi/8$ | $+$    | $+$    | $\cos \frac{\alpha}{2} |0\rangle + \sqrt{i} \sin \frac{\alpha}{2} |1\rangle$ |
| 0   | 1   | 0   | +   | $-\pi$ | $-\pi$ | $-3\pi/4$ | $-\pi/8$ | $-$    | $+$    | $\cos \frac{\alpha}{4} |0\rangle - \sqrt{i} \sin \frac{\alpha}{4} |1\rangle$ |
| 1   | 1   | 1   | +   | +   | +   | $\pi$ | $3\pi/4$ | $-3\pi/8$ | $+$    | $-$    | $\cos \frac{\alpha}{4} |0\rangle - \sqrt{i} \sin \frac{\alpha}{4} |1\rangle$ |
| 0   | 0   | 1   | $-\pi$ | $-\pi$ | $-3\pi/4$ | $-3\pi/8$ | $-$    | $-$    | $+$    | $\sin \frac{\alpha}{4} |0\rangle - \sqrt{i} \cos \frac{\alpha}{4} |1\rangle$ |
| 0   | 1   | 0   | +   | +   | $\pi$ | $3\pi/4$ | $-\pi/8$ | $+$    | $-$    | $\sin \frac{\alpha}{4} |1\rangle + \sqrt{i} \cos \frac{\alpha}{4} |0\rangle$ |
| 1   | 0   | 1   | $\pi$ | $\pi$ | $\pi/4$ | $3\pi/8$ | $+$    | $+$    | $+$    | $\sin \frac{\alpha}{4} |0\rangle + \sqrt{i} \cos \frac{\alpha}{4} |1\rangle$ |
| 1   | 1   | 1   | +   | $-\pi$ | $-\pi$ | $-\pi/4$ | $\pi/8$ | $-$    | $+$    | $\sin \frac{\alpha}{4} |1\rangle + \sqrt{i} \cos \frac{\alpha}{4} |0\rangle$ |

\(^1\) $\sin \alpha = \sqrt{2/3}; \tan \alpha = \sqrt{2}; \cos \frac{\alpha}{2} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{3}} \sin \frac{\alpha}{2} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{3} - \frac{1}{2\sqrt{3}}}; \tan \frac{\alpha}{2} = \sqrt{\frac{\pi - 1}{\pi}}$. 

5
3.2 Some properties of eight-state encoding

It holds that $\langle \psi_0 | \psi_{b1} \rangle = 0$, i.e., opposite bit values encrypted with the same key lead to orthogonal cipherstates. This trivially follows from the unitarity of the encryption operators, $\langle \psi_0 | E_b^\dagger E_b | \psi_1 \rangle = (\psi_0 | \psi_1 \rangle = 0$.

More generally, we can readily compute the inner products between all the various cipherstates from the general rule $|\langle \psi_{b'g'} | \psi_{bg} \rangle|^2 = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} n_{b'g'} \cdot n_{bg}$.

$$|\langle \psi_{b'g'} | \psi_{bg} \rangle|^2 = \delta_{bb'} \cdot \delta_{gg'} + (1 - \delta_{bb'}) \left[ \delta_{gg'} \frac{1}{3} + (1 - \delta_{gg'}) \frac{2}{3} \right]. \quad (17)$$

In words: When $g$ gets encrypted with two different keys the two cipherstates have (squared) inner product $1/3$; any encryption of $g, g'$, $g' \neq g$, with unequal keys yields cipherstates that have (squared) inner product $2/3$. The squared inner product determines the probability that one cipherstate gets projected onto another when a projective measurement is performed. Eq. (17) tells us that the nontrivial encryptions of $|\psi_{1-g}\rangle$ look more like $|\psi_g\rangle$ than the nontrivial encryptions of $|\psi_g\rangle$ itself.

The phases of the inner products $\langle \psi_{u'w'g'} | \psi_{uwg} \rangle$ are given by

$$\frac{\langle \psi_{u'w'g'} | \psi_{uwg} \rangle}{\sqrt{(u'-u)(w'+w)(-1)^{\delta_{h,w'+u+w'+u}}}} = \begin{bmatrix} \delta_{gg'} & \delta_{uw'} & \delta_{gw'} \\ \delta_{uw'} & \delta_{ww'} & \delta_{ww'} \\ \delta_{gw'} & \delta_{ww'} & \delta_{ww'} \end{bmatrix} \frac{(-1)^g}{\sqrt{3}}$$

$$+ \frac{2}{3} \left\{ \delta_{uw'3} \delta_{ww'} - \delta_{ww'} \exp \left[ (g - g')(1 + u + u')^2 / 3 \right] \right\}. \quad (18)$$

Table 1 gives a comparison of four-, six-, and eight-state encoding regarding the entropy of the classical variables $G$ and $B$ given that an attacker Eve holds the qubit (‘E’). Table 2 contains the same information but lists entropy losses.

The states in 4-state encoding are the eigenstates of $\sigma_z$ and $\sigma_x$. In 6-state encoding one uses the eigenstates of $\sigma_z$, $\sigma_x$, and $\sigma_y$. Let the random variable $M$ denote the outcome of a measurement (possibly POVM) on the qubit $E$. In the 4-state case, the measurement that minimises $H(G|M)$ and $H_{\text{min}}(G|M)$ is the projective measurement $\sigma_x + \sigma_z$; the $H(B|GM)$ and $H_{\text{min}}(B|GM)$ are minimised by measuring $\sigma_x - \sigma_z$.

In the 6-state case, $H(G|M)$ and $H_{\text{min}}(G|M)$ are minimised by measuring $\sigma_x + \sigma_y + \sigma_z$; the $H(B|GM)$ by the POVM $\{M_{b}^{(g)}\}_{b=1}^{3}$, $M_0 = \frac{1}{4}I + \frac{1}{3}(-1)^g n_b \cdot \sigma$, $n_1 = (-2, 1, 1)^T / \sqrt{3}$, $n_2 = (1, -2, 1)^T / \sqrt{3}$, $n_3 = (1, 1, -2)^T / \sqrt{3}$; the $H_{\text{min}}(B|GM)$ is minimised by the POVM ‘opposite’ to the one above, i.e. with $n_b \rightarrow -n_b$.

In the 8-state case, the $H(B|GM)$ is minimised by the POVM $M_{b}^{(g)} = \frac{1}{2} |\psi_{bg} \rangle \langle \psi_{bg}|$ and the $H_{\text{min}}(B|GM)$ by the ‘opposite’ POVM $M_{b}^{(g)} = \frac{1}{2} |\psi_{bg} \rangle \langle \psi_{bg}|$. 

Figure 1: The eight cipherstates $|\psi_{uwg}\rangle = E_{uw} |\psi_g\rangle$ shown (left) on the Bloch sphere, forming the corner points $(\pm 1, \pm 1, \pm 1)/\sqrt{3}$ of a cube; and (right) as elliptic polarisation states. ‘R’ stands for righthanded, ‘L’ for lefthanded.
### Table 1: Conditional Shannon entropies and min-entropies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4-state</th>
<th>6-state</th>
<th>8-state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H(B</td>
<td>E)$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\log 3 \approx 1.585$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G(E)$</td>
<td>$\log(\cos^2 \frac{\pi}{8}) \approx 0.601$</td>
<td>$\log(\cos^2 \frac{\pi}{2}) \approx 0.744$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H(G</td>
<td>E)$</td>
<td>$\log(\cos^2 \frac{\pi}{8}) \approx 0.601$</td>
<td>$H(\frac{1-2\sqrt{\frac{1}{3}}}{3}, \frac{1+1/\sqrt{\frac{1}{3}}}{3}, \frac{1+1/\sqrt{\frac{1}{3}}}{3}) \approx 1.271$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G(BE)$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BG(E)$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>$\log 3 + \frac{1}{2} \approx 2.252$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} \log 3 \approx 2.689$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{\text{min}}(B</td>
<td>E)$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\log 3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G(E)$</td>
<td>$- \log \cos^2 \frac{\pi}{8} \approx 0.228$</td>
<td>$- \log \cos^2 \frac{\pi}{2} \approx 0.342$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B(GE)$</td>
<td>$- \log \cos^2 \frac{\pi}{8} \approx 0.228$</td>
<td>$- \log \left(\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3\sqrt{3}}\right) \approx 0.724$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G(BE)$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BG(E)$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\log 3$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Entropy losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4-state</th>
<th>6-state</th>
<th>8-state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H(G) - H(G</td>
<td>E)$</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H(B) - H(B</td>
<td>GE)$</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H(BG) - H(BG</td>
<td>E)$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{\text{min}}(G) - H_{\text{min}}(G</td>
<td>E)$</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>0.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{\text{min}}(B) - H_{\text{min}}(B</td>
<td>GE)$</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>0.861</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all encodings (4,6,8) the $H(BG|M)$ and $H_{\text{min}}(BG|M)$ are minimised by the POVM $\{M_{bg}\}_{bg}$ with $M_{bg} = \frac{1}{\#\text{bases}} |\varphi_{bg}\rangle \langle \varphi_{bg}|$, where $|\varphi_{bg}\rangle$ denotes the encoding of bit value $g$ in basis $b$. In all encodings we find that $H_{\text{min}}(G|BE) = 0$; $H_{\text{min}}(B|E) = H_{\text{min}}(B)$; $H_{\text{min}}(BG|E) = H_{\text{min}}(B)$.

Another important property is the intercept-resend disturbance probability. Let Alice send $|\varphi_{bg}\rangle$ for random $b,g$. Eve does a projective measurement in any basis and forwards the outcome $|\chi\rangle$ to Bob. Bob measures $|\chi\rangle$ in basis $b$. Averaged over $b$ and $g$, Bob’s probability of getting the wrong outcome ($\overline{g}$) is 1/4 in the case of 4-state encoding and 1/3 for 6-state and 8-state.

In Section 4 we will be interested in (i) hiding $G$ and (ii) hiding $B$ when the plaintext $G$ is known. In Table 2 we see that 8-state encoding does a better job of ensuring these two things simultaneously than 4-state and 6-state.

### 4 Key Recycling

When Alice and Bob have a (one-way) quantum channel at their disposal and an authenticated two-way classical channel, they can achieve unconditionally secure communication by using Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and then applying a classical One Time Pad (OTP). This has been well known since the first work on quantum cryptography.

A less known advantage of quantum channels is the possibility of re-using key material [35] when Alice and Bob detect no eavesdropping: the fact that Bob receives an ‘intact’ message means that Eve has learned at most a negligible amount of information about the key(s). It is possible to construct Key Recycling schemes that have the same unconditional security as QKD+OTP but better efficiency, i.e. less data has to be communicated.
4.1 Requirements for Key Recycling; state of the art

Consider an $m$-bit message encoded in $n$ qubits (with $n > m$), using a key $k$. A Quantum Key Recycling (QKR) scheme typically needs to refresh $n$ bits of key material if Bob detects tampering ("reject"), and a much smaller amount $t$, $t \ll n$, possibly $t = 0$, if Bob does not detect tampering ("accept"). Loosely speaking a QKR scheme has to satisfy the following requirements.

**R1** If Eve steals the entire cipherstate, the message must remain secret.

**R2** If Eve knows the entire plaintext and Bob accepts, Eve does not learn more than $t + \varepsilon$ bits of information about the key, where $\varepsilon$ is negligible.

If Bob accepts, the key update mechanism computes a new key $k'$ from the old key $k$ and $t$ bits of fresh key material unknown to Eve. This makes sure that Eve has negligible knowledge about the new key $k'$. If Bob rejects, the worst case assumption is that Eve has stolen the entire cipherstate and already knew the plaintext. Eve then could in principle learn up to $n$ key bits. Hence Alice and Bob have to introduce $n$ fresh key bits in the next encryption.

Damgård et al. [20, 21] introduced a QKR scheme with $t = 0$, for a noiseless quantum channel. A classical authentication tag is first attached to the message; this is then classically on-time-padded; finally quantum encryption is performed by selecting a basis from a set of $2^n$ Mutually Unbiased Bases (MUBs). The scheme is elegant but has the drawback that it needs a quantum computer with circuit depth $O(n^2)$ [22] for the encryption and decryption. Fehr and Salvail [23] recently proposed a QKR scheme that works with individual BB84 qubits, without needing a quantum computer. It has $t = 0$. However, it tolerates very little noise.

4.2 Proposed QKR scheme #1

We first propose a QKR scheme which is essentially a copy of [23] but using QOTP encryption.² The message is $\mu \in \{0,1\}^t$. The scheme makes use of an extractor $\text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^\ell$ and a keyed hash function (MAC) $M$ that produces an authentication tag of length $\lambda$. The security parameter is $\lambda$. The hash function must have the special property of being message-independent, i.e. the distribution of $M(K, \mu)$ does not depend on the message $\mu$. Furthermore the hash function must have key privacy, i.e. an attacker with limited information about $\mu$ learns almost nothing about the key. (These notions are explained in [23], and it turns out that implementation is straightforward.)

The scheme needs a second keyed hash $\text{SS}$ which too is message-independent and key-private; it is used as a Secure Sketch. A Secure Sketch is a secure form of error correction. Given a sketch $\text{SS}(k, x)$ of a message $x$, and a noisy version $x'$, it is possible to recover $x$. Secure Sketches with message independence and key privacy were discussed in [36]. Though constructions exist, they do not tolerate much noise.

The key material consists of three parts: $K_{\text{MAC}}$ for MAC-ing; $K_{\text{SS}}$ for the secure sketch; and $b \in \{0,1,2,3\}^n$ being QOTP bases.

**Encryption**

Generate random $x \in \{0,1\}^n$. Compute $s = \text{SS}(k_{\text{SS}}, x)$ and $z = \text{Ext} \cdot x$. Compute the ciphertext $c = \mu \oplus z$ and authentication tag $T = M(K_{\text{MAC}}, x||c||s)$. Prepare the quantum state $|\Psi\rangle = \bigotimes_{i=1}^{\ell} |\psi_{i,x_i}\rangle$. Send $|\Psi\rangle, s, c, T$.

**Decryption**

(The recipient gets $|\Psi\rangle'$, $s'$, $c'$, $T'$.)

Measure $|\Psi\rangle'$ in the b-basis. This yields $x' \in \{0,1\}^n$. From $x'$, $s$, $K_{\text{SS}}$ recover $\hat{x}$, an estimator for $x$. Compute $\hat{z} = \text{Ext} \cdot \hat{x}$ and $\hat{c} = c' \oplus \hat{z}$. Accept the message if the $x$-recovery succeeded and $T' = M(K_{\text{MAC}}, \hat{x}||c'||s')$.

**Key update**

In case of Accept, re-use the entire key. In case of Reject, compute the updated key $b'$ as a function of $b$ and $n$ fresh secret bits.

²To keep things simple, we omit the optimisation of the key refreshment procedure in case Bob rejects.
4.3 Analysis of QKR scheme #1

The modification w.r.t. the scheme of Fehr and Salvail is small but has a significant effect. In the original scheme [23], the 4-state encoding causes leakage about $x$; this necessitates a large amount of compression\(^3\) by $\text{Ext}$ in order to keep $\mu$ secure (Requirement R1). In the case of 8-state encoding much less compression is needed. Compression is needed primarily because of the channel noise. It is prudent to assume that all noise is caused by Eve. Eve may steal whole qubits from $|\Psi\rangle$ or extract information into ancillas. This provides her $nf(\beta) + a$ bits of information about $x$, where $f(\beta)$ is an increasing function\(^4\) of the bit error rate $\beta$, with $f(0) = 0$, $f(\frac{1}{2}) = 1$, and $a$ is a constant independent of $n$. Eve’s uncertainty about $x$ given $z$ is $n - \ell$ bits; this has to cover the $nf(\beta) + a$. Hence we have to set $\ell \leq n[1 - f(\beta)] - a$.

Note that asymptotically ($n \to \infty$) the constant $a$ becomes negligible. In the case $\beta \ll 1$ we see that asymptotically \textbf{the number of qubits $n$ needed to send the $\ell$-bit message is just slightly larger than $\ell$}.

4.4 Proposed QKR scheme #2

Scheme #1 has very limited noise tolerance due to the fact that it needs a special Secure Sketch with message independence and key privacy. We will now loosen this restriction and work with an ordinary Secure Sketch $S$, for instance a syndrome of an error-correcting code. The price to pay is that the sketch $S(x)$, if sent in plaintext, leaks about $x$. If the sketch is sent encrypted with key $K_{SS}$ and Eve knows $\mu$, then the sketch leaks information about $K_{SS}$. We choose the second option and accept that $K_{SS}$ has to be updated even if Bob accepts. We set the length of $K_{SS}$ equal to the length of $S(x)$, which asymptotically approaches $nh(\beta)$.

\textbf{Encryption}

Generate random $x \in \{0,1\}^n$. Compute $s = K_{SS} \oplus S(x)$ and $z = \text{Ext} x$. Compute the ciphertext $c = \mu \oplus z$ and authentication tag $T = M(K_{MAC}, x|c|s)$. Prepare the quantum state $|\Psi\rangle = \otimes_{i=1}^n |\psi_{b_i x_i}\rangle$. Send $|\Psi\rangle, s, c, T$.

\textbf{Decryption}

(The recipient gets $|\Psi'\rangle, s', c', T'$.) Measure $|\Psi'\rangle$ in the $b$-basis. This yields $x' \in \{0,1\}^n$. Recover $\hat{x}$ from $x'$ and $K_{SS} \oplus s'$. Compute $\hat{z} = \text{Ext} \hat{x}$ and $\hat{\mu} = c' \oplus \hat{z}$. Accept the message $\hat{\mu}$ if the syndrome decoding succeeded and $T' = M(K_{MAC}, \hat{x}|c'|s')$.

\textbf{Key update}

If Bob accepts, replace $K_{SS}$. If Bob rejects, replace $K_{SS}$ and compute the updated key $b'$ as a function of $b$ and $n$ fresh secret bits.

4.5 Analysis of QKR scheme #2

The security of scheme #2 is the same as for #1. The one-time-padded sketch reveals no information about $x$; this is the same situation as with the special function $SS$. We now have a primitive with the following asymptotics:

- It securely sends an $\ell$-bit classical message while using up only $nh(\beta) = \ell \frac{h(\beta)}{1 - f(\beta)}$ bits of key material.
- It works as long as $f(\beta) < 1$.
- It uses up less key material than a classical OTP as long as $\frac{h(\beta)}{1 - f(\beta)} < 1$, i.e. $1 - f(\beta) - h(\beta) > 0$.

The condition $1 - f(\beta) - h(\beta) > 0$ is similar to the noise condition under which qubit-based QKD is possible. \textit{Whenever qubit-based QKD is possible, scheme #2 works and is a better alternative than repeated use of QKD and classical OTP.}

\[^3\] $n \approx (1 - 0.772)^{-1} \ell \approx 4.3\ell$ (see line 4 of Table 2) to compensate the min-entropy loss.

\[^4\] If Eve steals and stores $2\beta$ qubits from $|\Psi\rangle$, she causes bit error rate $\beta$. By repeatedly stealing qubits which have been encrypted with the same key $b_i$, Eve would essentially learn the plaintext values $x_i$. From the existence of this simple attack we obtain a bound $f(\beta) \geq 2\beta$. More sophisticated attacks exist.
4.6 Proposed QKR scheme #3

We apply the above discussed primitive to itself: Instead of sending the OTP’ed sketch \( s = K_{SS} \oplus S(x) \) as an ordinary classical message, we send \( s \) as a payload using scheme #2. We denote quantities in the original primitive with label ‘0’ and in the additional part with ‘1’. We have \( \mu_1 = s_0 \). The additional keys and classical/quantum transmissions required for this action (asymptotically) are listed below.

- A basis key \( b_1 \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}^{n_1} \). A key \( K_{SS}^{(1)} \in \{0, 1\}^{n_1 h(\beta)} \).
- Transmission of a quantum state \( |\Psi_1\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_{2^{n_1}} \), with \( n_1(1 - f(\beta)) = \ell_1 \). This \( |\Psi_1\rangle \) is an encryption of \( x_1 \) using bases \( b_1 \).
- Transmission of a classical ciphertext \( c_1 = \mu_1 \oplus \text{Ext}(x_1) \) of length \( \ell_1 = |s_0| = n_0 h(\beta) \).
- Transmission of a classical ciphertext \( s_1 = K_{SS}^{(1)} \oplus S(x_1) \).
- Transmission of a tag \( T_{tot} = M(K_{MAC}, x_0||c_0||s_0||x_1||c_1||s_1) \) instead of the original \( T \).

If Bob accepts, only \( K_{SS}^{(1)} \) needs to be refreshed. This key has length \( |K_{SS}^{(1)}| = n_1 h(\beta) = \ell_1 \frac{h(\beta)}{1 - f(\beta)} = \ell_0 \frac{h(\beta)}{1 - f(\beta)} \), which is shorter than the original key \( K_{SS}^{(0)} \) by a factor \( \frac{h(\beta)}{1 - f(\beta)} \).

Repetition

The insertion trick can be applied repeatedly. \( r \) ‘recursive’ applications of scheme #2 result in a scheme that (asymptotically for \( \ell_0 \to \infty \)) needs to refresh only \( \ell_0 \frac{h(\beta)}{1 - f(\beta)} \) bits of key when Bob accepts. The total length of the keys and transmissions increases, but stays manageable.

- The number of qubits transmitted is \( n_{tot} \equiv n_0 + n_1 + \cdots + n_r < \frac{\ell_0}{1 - f(\beta) - h(\beta)} \). Note that in the last expression the factor \( 1 - f(\beta) - h(\beta) \) is similar to the efficiency factor in QKD due to the error correction and privacy amplification. Hence \( n_{tot} \) is not much different from the number of qubits needed to transmit a QKD secret of length \( \ell_0 \).
- The number of transmitted classical bits is \( n_{tot}(1 - f(\beta)) \), plus the size of the \( r \)’th sketch, namely \( n_r h(\beta) = \ell_0 \frac{h(\beta)}{1 - f(\beta)} \) plus the size of the tag (\( \lambda \)).

5 Other uses of 8-state encoding

5.1 Unclonable encryption

The concept of Unclonable Encryption (UE) was introduced by Gottesman in 2003 [13]. Alice sends a quantum-encrypted classical message to Bob. If Bob accepts then the message remains confidential even if Eve learns the full encryption key afterward. UE can be useful for primitives like revocable time-release encryption [38], for communication-efficient QKD, and in attacker models where the storage of keys suffers particular vulnerabilities.

Gottesman identified the chain of implications: quantum authentication \( \Rightarrow \) UE \( \Rightarrow \) QKD. He constructed an UE scheme using BB84 states. Replacing those BB84 states by 8-state encoding will improve the performance. However, we do not expect that the improvement will go far beyond what would be achieved with 6-state encoding. The security analysis of UE is almost exactly the same as for QKD (which also has the basis key revealed after the quantum transmission). For qubit-based QKD it is known [37] that 6-state encoding is essentially optimal; going to more bases does not improve noise tolerance.

An interesting option is to use 8-state encoding with a pseudorandom key, achieving almost-perfect security while using slightly more than one bit of key material per qubit (see Sections 6 and 7). This would result in a UE scheme using shorter keys than in the case of 6-state encoding.

5.2 The three-pass ‘key-less’ protocol

If a bidirectional authenticated channel is available, and a commuting encryption scheme, then a peculiar protocol becomes possible [39, 40] which does not require Alice and Bob to share an encryption key.
Let \( E_K \) denote the operation ‘encrypt with key \( K \)’. For a commuting encryption scheme it holds that \( E_K E_Q x = E_Q E_K x \) for all \( x \). The three-pass protocol, also known as key-less protocol, works as follows.

1. Alice has a plaintext message \( x \). She chooses a random key \( A \). She computes \( c_1 = E_A x \) and sends \( c_1 \).
2. Bob chooses a random key \( B \). He computes \( c_2 = E_B c_1 \) and sends \( c_2 \).
3. Alice computes \( c_3 = E_A^{-1} c_2 \) and sends \( c_3 \). Bob computes \( x = E_B^{-1} c_3 \).

The protocol is called key-less because the keys \( A \) and \( B \) never have to be known at the other side.

It has been noted [40] that QOTP encryption of general quantum states, which is (anti)commuting, is perfectly suited for this protocol. We observe that the special case of QOTP, 8-state encoding of classical data, allows us to apply the three-pass protocol to classical data.

It remains to be seen how useful the three-pass protocol is compared to QKD+OTP or QKD+QKR. An obvious drawback is the amount of communication. Sending an \( n \)-bit message requires communicating \( nq \) qubits three times, versus \( n \) qubits plus \( n \) bits for QKD+OTP, versus \( n \) qubits for QKD+QKR under optimal conditions (indefinite re-use of keys). These numbers are approximate and do not take into account the error-correction overhead. The three-pass protocol might become an interesting alternative in the case of very noisy quantum channels, where qubit-based QKD and QKR do not work and the error-correction overheads for QKD [41] are large due to the increased dimension of the employed Hilbert space.

6 QOTP with a pseudorandom key; general states

The main results of this section are sufficient key lengths, specified in Theorems 6.3 (\( \varepsilon \)-uniformity), 6.5 (almost-certain \( \varepsilon \)-randomisation) and 6.8 (\( \varepsilon \)-randomisation).

6.1 Modelling the pseudorandom key

We model a pseudorandom key for QOTP of an \( n \)-qubit system as follows. The length of the seed is \( q \) bits. We introduce the notation \( Q = 2^q \). (The seed is the actual key that is used.) We define a uniformly random table \( B \) of size \( Q \times n \), with \( B_{ji} \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\} \). All entries are independent RVs.

The entry \( b_{ij} \) is the encryption key for qubit \( i \) given the \( j \)’th possible value of the seed. The table \( B \) is known to the adversary, but not \( j \).

For given table \( B = b \) and row index \( j \), the encryption operator is given by

\[
F_{bj} = \bigotimes_{i=1}^{n} E_{b_{ij}}. \tag{19}
\]

The encryption of a state \( \rho \), as seen by the adversary, is

\[
\rho'(b) = \frac{1}{Q} \sum_{j=1}^{Q} F_{b_{j}} \rho F_{b_{j}}^\dagger. \tag{20}
\]

6.2 Results on \( \varepsilon \)-uniformity

**Lemma 6.1** Let \( d = 2^n \). For any state \( \rho \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H}_d) \) it holds that

\[
\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} [\rho'(b)]^2 = \frac{1}{Q} (\text{tr} \rho^2 - \frac{1}{d}) + \frac{1}{d}; \quad \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} [\rho'(b) - \tau]^2 = \frac{1}{Q} (\text{tr} \rho^2 - \frac{1}{d}). \tag{21}
\]

**Proof:** We write \( \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} [\rho'(b)]^2 = \frac{1}{Q^2} \sum_{j,k=1}^{Q} \text{tr} E_{b_{j}} F_{b_{j}}^\dagger F_{b_{k}} \rho F_{b_{k}}^\dagger \). There are \( Q \) terms with \( j = k \); here the \( F^\dagger \) and \( F \) cancel each other and the summand reduces to \( \text{tr} \rho^2 \). In the other \( Q^2 - Q \) terms of the summation we have \( j \neq k \) and the summand factorises to

\[
\text{tr} [E_{b_{j}} F_{b_{j}}^\dagger F_{b_{k}}^\dagger | E_{b_{k}} F_{b_{k}}^\dagger].
\]

6
(Here $b_j$ stands for the $j$’th row of $b$). The rows are mutually independent; hence the $E_{b_j}$ does not act on the expression containing $k$. Now we use $E_{b_j} F_{b_j} F_{b_j}^\dagger = \tau$ due to the general QOTP property (3), yielding $\text{tr} \, \tau^2 = \frac{1}{3}$. Adding the contributions gives $\frac{1}{2} \left[ \text{tr} \, \rho^2 + (Q^2 - Q)^\frac{1}{2} \right]$, which is the first part of (21). Next we write $\text{tr} \, (\rho' - \tau)^2 = \text{tr} \, (\rho')^2 + \text{tr} \, \tau^2 - 2 \text{tr} \, \rho' \tau = \text{tr} \, (\rho')^2 - \frac{1}{3}$, where we have used $\tau = \frac{1}{3} I$ and $\text{tr} \, \rho' = 1$. The second part of (21) follows.

**Theorem 6.2** Let $d = 2^n$. For any state $\rho \in S(H_d)$ it holds that

$$\mathbb{E}_b |\rho'(b) - \tau|_1 \leq \sqrt{\frac{2n}{Q}} (\text{tr} \, \rho^2 - 2^{-n}). \quad (22)$$

**Proof:** We denote the eigenvalues of $\rho'(b) - \tau$ as $(\lambda_a)^d_{a=1}$. We have $\mathbb{E}_b |\rho'(b) - \tau|_1 = \mathbb{E}_b \sum_a |\lambda_a| = d \cdot \mathbb{E}_b \sum_a \sqrt{\lambda_a^2}$. Using Jensen’s inequality we get $\mathbb{E}_b |\rho'(b) - \tau|_1 \leq d \mathbb{E}_b \sum_a \lambda_a^2 = \sqrt{d \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} \, (\rho'(b) - \tau)^2}$. Finally we use Lemma 6.1.

**Theorem 6.3** The Quantum One Time Pad operated with a pseudorandom key of length

$$q \geq n - 2 + 2 \log \frac{1}{\epsilon} \quad (23)$$

is $\epsilon$-uniform (see Def. 2.3).

**Proof:** Follows directly from Theorem 6.2, using $\text{tr} \, \rho^2 \leq 1$ and $q = \log Q$. The table B plays the role of the public randomness $Y$ in Def. 2.3.

Our key length is a slight improvement on the literature.\textsuperscript{5}

### 6.3 Results on $\epsilon$-randomisation

**Lemma 6.4** (Matrix version of Bennett inequality [42]) Let $(X_j)^Q_{j=1}$ be a sequence of independent Hermitian random matrices with dimension $d$ satisfying $\mathbb{E} X_j = 0$ and $\lambda_{\max}(X_j) \leq R$ for all $j$. Let $\sigma^2 \overset{\text{def}}{=} \lambda_{\max}(\sum_j \mathbb{E} X_j^2)$. Let $A(u) \overset{\text{def}}{=} (1 + u) \ln(1 + u) - u$. Then

$$\Pr[\lambda_{\max}(\sum_j X_j) \geq t] \leq d \cdot \exp \left[ - \frac{\sigma^2}{R^2} A\left( \frac{Rt}{\sigma^2} \right) \right]. \quad (24)$$

**Theorem 6.5** Let $|\psi\rangle \in H_{2^n}$ be an arbitrary pure state, and let $\rho'(b)$ be the QOTP-encryption of $|\psi\rangle \langle \psi|$ using a pseudorandom key. Let $\epsilon \in (2^{-n}, 1)$. For key length

$$q \geq n + \log n + 2 \log \frac{1}{\epsilon} + 1 + \frac{1}{n} \log \frac{1}{\delta} + \log \frac{\ln 2}{1 - \epsilon} \quad (25)$$

the scheme is $\epsilon$-randomising (Def 2.1) except with some small probability less than $2\delta$. Here the probability is with respect to the random table $B$.

**Proof:** We write $d = 2^n$. We define the projection operator $P_j \overset{\text{def}}{=} F_j |\psi\rangle \langle \psi| F_j^\dagger$. We want to reduce the probability mass in both tails to $\delta$. We first study the right tail. We write $\rho' = \sum_j X_j$ with $X_j \overset{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{d}(P_j - \tau)$. We have $\mathbb{E}_b X_j = 0$, $R = \lambda_{\max}(X_j) = \frac{1}{d}(1 - \frac{1}{d})$ and $\sigma^2 = \lambda_{\max}(\sum_j \mathbb{E} X_j^2) = \frac{1}{d^2}(1 - \frac{1}{d})$. Substitution of $X_j$, $R$, $\sigma^2$ into the Bennett inequality, with $t = \epsilon/d$, gives $\Pr[\lambda_{\max}(\rho' - \tau) \geq \epsilon/d] \leq d \exp[- \frac{Q}{d^2} A(\epsilon)] < d \exp[- \frac{Q}{d^2} A(\epsilon)]$. The latter expression is smaller than $\delta$ if $Q \geq \frac{\ln \frac{d}{\delta}}{A(\epsilon)}$. We use $A(\epsilon) \geq \frac{\epsilon}{2}$. With small loss of tightness we make the condition on $Q$ more strict: $Q > \frac{2d}{\epsilon^2(1-\epsilon)} \ln \frac{d}{\delta}$.

\textsuperscript{5}The term ‘$-2$’ appears because the statistical distance $D$ is half the $L_1$-norm. The difference between our result and [18] is a constant term ‘$4$’.
Next we study the left tail. We have \( \lambda_{\min}(\rho' - \tau) = \lambda_{\max}(\tau - \rho') \). We write \( \tau - \rho' = \sum_j X'_j \) with \( X'_j \) being the notation. Let \( \mathbb{E}_b X'_j = 0 \). We have \( \mathbb{E}_b X'_j = 0 \) and \( \sigma^2 = \frac{1}{d^2}(1 - \frac{1}{d})^2 \). Substitution of \( X'_j \) and \( \sigma^2 \) into Bennett’s inequality, with \( t = \varepsilon/d \), gives \( \Pr[\lambda_{\min}(\rho' - \tau) \leq -\frac{\varepsilon}{d}] \leq d \exp[-Q(d - 1)A(\frac{\varepsilon}{d})] \). The latter expression is smaller than \( \delta \) if \( Q \geq \frac{(d - 1)A(\varepsilon/d)}{\log d} \). We use \( A(\varepsilon/d) \geq \frac{1}{2}(\frac{\varepsilon}{d})^2(1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{d}) \). With small loss of tightness we make the condition on \( Q \) more strict: \( Q \geq \frac{2d}{e(1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{d})^2(1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{d})} \).

As \( \varepsilon > 1/d \), the condition on the right tail is slightly more difficult to satisfy. It is readily seen that \( Q = 2^t \) with \( q \) as specified in (25) satisfies the condition \( Q \geq \frac{2d}{e(1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{d})^2(1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{d})} \).

Theorem 6.5 is a probabilistic statement about the \( \varepsilon \)-randomising property. We can get rid of the nonzero probability \( \delta \) by employing another proof technique, based on high moments of \( \rho' - \tau \). This approach does not provide a full proof about \( |\rho' - \tau|_{\infty} \), since nothing is proven about the left tail. However, in the approach with the Bennett inequality we have seen that the left tail is fairly ‘better behaved’ than the right tail. This gives us confidence that the result below (Theorem 6.8) is ‘almost’ a proper proof for \( |\rho' - \tau|_{\infty} \).

We introduce the following notation. Let \( \{\binom{t}{k}\} \) be the Stirling number of the second kind, which counts in how many ways we can partition a set of \( t \) elements into \( k \) non-empty subsets. By convention \( \{\binom{0}{0}\} = 0 \) for \( t \geq 1 \) and \( \{\binom{0}{0}\} = 1 \). The notation \( (Q)_k \) stands for the falling factorial \( (Q)_k = Q(Q-1)\ldots(Q-k+1) \).

**Theorem 6.6** Let \( t \in \mathbb{N} \). For any pure state \( \rho \in S(H_{2^n}) \) it holds that

\[
\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} [\rho'(b)]^t \leq \frac{1}{Q^t} \sum_{k=0}^t \binom{t}{k} (Q)_{k}(1/2)^{(k-1)n}.
\]

(26)

For \( t = 0, 1, 2, 3 \) the equality holds.

**Proof:** See Appendix A.

**Corollary 6.7** For any pure state \( \rho \in S(H_{2^n}) \) it holds that

\[
\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} [\rho'(b) - \tau]^3 = \frac{1}{Q^3}(1 - \frac{1}{2^n})(1 - \frac{2}{2^n})
\]

(27)

\[
\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} [\rho'(b) - \tau]^4 < \frac{1}{Q^4}(1 + \frac{3Q}{2^n} - \frac{1}{2^n})
\]

(28)

**Proof:** Using (21) and (26) we get (27).

Similarly, \( \text{tr} (\rho' - \tau)^4 \) is given by

\[
\text{tr} (\rho' - \tau)^4 = \text{tr} (\rho')^4 - 4\text{tr} (\rho')^3\tau + 6\text{tr} (\rho')^2\tau^2 - 4\text{tr} \tau^3\rho' + \text{tr} \tau^4 = \text{tr} (\rho')^4 - 4(\frac{1}{2})^n\text{tr} (\rho')^3 + 6(\frac{1}{2})^2\text{tr} (\rho')^2 - 4(\frac{1}{2})^3n + (\frac{1}{2})^3n
\]

Using (21) and (26) we get (27).

**Theorem 6.8** Let \( \varepsilon \in (0, 1) \). Let \( \rho'(b) \) the the pseudorandom-keyed QOTP encryption of any pure state in \( H_{2^n} \). Then the following key length,

\[
q \geq n + \log n + 2 \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon} + 4,
\]

(29)

suffices to ensure that \( \mathbb{E}_b \lambda_{\max}(\rho'(b) - \tau) < \frac{\varepsilon}{2^n} \).

**Proof:** Let \( \Lambda \) be the maximum eigenvalue of \( \rho'(b) \). We have \( \mathbb{E}_b \Lambda = \mathbb{E}_b (A')^{1/t} \leq \mathbb{E}_b (\text{tr} (\rho')^{1/t}) \). We use Jensen’s inequality to write \( \mathbb{E}_b \Lambda \leq \mathbb{E}_b (\text{tr} (\rho')^{1/t}) \). We apply Theorem 6.6 to bound the expectation value, and we make use of \( (Q)_k \leq Q^k \). We switch from summation variable \( k \) to \( a = k - t \). This allows us to write \( \mathbb{E}_b \Lambda \leq \frac{1}{(\frac{1}{2})^{nt/2}} \sum_{a=0}^t \binom{t}{a} (2^n/Q)^a \).

Next we use
\[ \left\{ t^{1-a} \right\} < \frac{2^n}{2^{n-t}} \text{ for } a \geq 1. \] This yields \( E_0 \leq 2^{n/t} \left[1 - \frac{1}{2^t} \right] \sum_{n=1}^{t} \frac{1}{2^n} \left(t^2 2^n/Q\right)^{1/t} < 2^{n/t} \left[\exp(t^2 2^n/Q)\right]^{1/t} = 2^n \exp(t^2 2^n/Q) \). We set \( t = \frac{2\ln 2}{\ln (1 + \varepsilon)} \). We have \( Q = 2^d = 2^n \frac{1}{\varepsilon} > 2^n n \frac{4 \ln 2}{\ln (1 + \varepsilon)^2} \). (The inequality holds for \( \varepsilon < 1 \).) Substitution of this \( t \) and this bound on \( Q \) gives \( 2^{n/t} \exp(t^2 2^n/Q) < \left(1 + \varepsilon\right)/2^n \). It follows that \( \mathbb{E}_b \lambda_{\max}(\rho' - \tau) < \varepsilon/2^n \). \( \square \)

### 7 Pseudorandom-keyed QOTP encryption of classical data

From Section 6 we already have general results on \( \varepsilon \)-uniformity and \( \varepsilon \)-randomisation, which apply to 8-state encoding as a special case. What else do we want?

- In Section 7.2 we briefly discuss the min-entropy of the plaintext conditioned on the fact that Eve has possession of the cipherstate.
- In Theorem 7.2 below we will show that the moments of \( \rho' - \tau \) are smaller than those in Theorem 6.6. This gives an indication that it might be possible to prove tighter bounds for 8-state encoding than for general quantum states.
- The results in Section 6 are bounds, the tightness of which we do not know. In Sections 7.4–7.6 we numerically study the eigenvalues of the cipherstates.
- Def. 2.2 defines \( \varepsilon \)-privacy as a security property in terms of \( \rho_x - \rho_{x'} \) instead of \( \rho' - \tau \). In Section 7.7 we discuss \( \varepsilon \)-privacy.

#### 7.1 The cipherstate

We use the method described in Section 6 to model a pseudorandom QOTP key for encrypting an \( n \)-qubit state. The adversary knows the table \( B \). We consider a quantum system consisting of three parts: the classical random variable \( J \in \{1, \ldots, Q\} \) in the Hilbert space labeled ‘K’ (‘key’), the classical random variable \( G \in \{0, 1\}^n \) in space ‘D’ (‘data’), and Eve’s quantum state in space ‘E’. A cipherstate is prepared by choosing a message \( G \) at random and encrypting it with the \( J \)th row of \( B \), for random \( J \). For given \( B = b \) we have

\[
\rho_{KDE}^B(b) = \frac{1}{Q} \sum_{j=1}^{Q} \frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{g \in \{0,1\}^n} |j\rangle \langle j| \otimes |g\rangle \langle g| \otimes \rho_{E}_{jg}^E(b)
\] (30)

\[
\rho_{E_{jg}}^E(b) = \bigotimes_{i=1}^{n} |\psi_{b_{jgi}}\rangle \langle \psi_{b_{jgi}}|.
\] (31)

We want to study Eve’s knowledge about the data \( G \) given subsystem E. To this end we need only the D and E subspaces. Tracing out the K subspace gives

\[
\rho_{DE}^B(b) = \frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{g \in \{0,1\}^n} |g\rangle \langle g| \otimes \rho_{E}^E(b) \quad \text{with} \quad \rho_{g}^E(b) = \frac{1}{Q} \sum_{j=1}^{Q} \bigotimes_{i=1}^{n} |\psi_{b_{jgi}}\rangle \langle \psi_{b_{jgi}}|.
\] (32)

Eve’s object of study is \( \rho_{g}^E(b) \); from this state she wants to learn \( g \).

#### 7.2 Min-entropy of the plaintext given the cipherstate

Below we give a simple bound on the min-entropy of one message bit given the cipherstate. Unfortunately this does not allow us to draw conclusions about the whole plaintext \( G \).

**Theorem 7.1** Eve’s knowledge about a single data bit \( g_i, i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \), can be bounded as

\[
H_{\min}(G_i|B, \rho_{E}^E) \geq 1 - \log(1 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{Q}}) > 1 - \log e \frac{1}{\sqrt{Q}}.
\] (33)

**Proof:** See Appendix B.
7.3 Sharper bounds on the moments

**Theorem 7.2** The moments of $\rho_g^E(b)$ and $\rho_g^E(b) - \tau$, averaged over $b$, are as given in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.

**Proof:** See Appendix C.

In Table 4 the contributions $\{\cdots\}$ are negligible (at large $n$ and $Q \ll 3^n$) w.r.t. the preceding terms; hence the expressions can be simplified substantially if one wants to know upper bounds only. Furthermore, for $Q = \mathcal{O}(2^n)$ the terms of order $Q/3^n$, $Q/(3^n)$ and $Q^2/(3^n)$ are negligible as well.

It is interesting to look at the quantity $c_i \equiv \frac{1}{2^n} \mathbb{E}_b(\rho_g^E - \tau)^t$. In some sense it represents the $t$'th moment of the eigenvalues of $\rho_g^E - \tau$. If one imagines that there is a probability density $\mu$ on $[-\frac{1}{2^n}, 1 - \frac{1}{2^n}]$ governing the value of the $i$'th eigenvalue for random $i, b, g$, then $c_i$ is the $t$'th moment of $\mu$. At $Q \approx 2^n$ we have

$$c_1 = 0, \quad c_2 \approx \left(\frac{1}{2^n}\right)^2 \equiv \sigma^2, \quad c_3 \approx 3\sigma^3, \quad c_4 \approx 3\sigma^4, \quad c_5 \approx 6\sigma^5, \quad c_6 \approx 15\sigma^6. \quad (34)$$

Note that $c_4$ and $c_6$ are exactly as in a Gaussian distribution. The odd central moments are positive because the interval $[-\frac{1}{2^n}, 1 - \frac{1}{2^n}]$ extends only a little distance into the negative side. We note that, at $Q \approx 2^n n, n \ll 2^n$, the parameters in Table 3 are smaller than the Stirling numbers in Theorem 6.6. This hints at the possibility to prove tighter bounds for 8-state encoding than for general states when the moments based approach is used as in the proof of Theorem 6.8. This question is left for future work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$Q^t \cdot \mathbb{E}_b(\rho_g^E(b))^t$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$Q + \frac{1(Q^2)}{2^n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$Q + 3 \frac{(Q^2)}{2^n} + \frac{(Q^3)}{2^n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$Q + 6 \frac{(Q^2)}{2^n} + \frac{(Q^3)}{2^n} + 6 \frac{(Q^4)}{2^n} + \frac{(Q^4)}{2^n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$Q + 10 \frac{(Q^2)}{2^n} + 5 \frac{(Q^3)}{2^n} + 20 \frac{(Q^4)}{2^n} + 10 \frac{(Q^4)}{2^n} + \frac{(Q^5)}{2^n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$Q + (Q)_2 \left{ \frac{15}{2^n} + (\frac{5}{18})n + \frac{15}{3\cdot 2^n} \right} + (Q)_3 \left{ \frac{50}{2^n} + \frac{36}{3\cdot 2^n} + 3(\frac{5}{36})n + \frac{1}{3\cdot 2^n} \right} + (Q)_4 \left{ \frac{50}{2^n} + \frac{15}{3\cdot 2^n} \right} + 15 \frac{(Q^5)}{2^n} + \frac{(Q^5)}{2^n}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: Moments of $\rho_g^E(b)$**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$Q^{t-1} \cdot \mathbb{E}_b(\rho_g^E(b) - \tau)^t$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$1 - \frac{1}{2^n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$(1 - \frac{1}{2^n})(1 - \frac{2}{2^n})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$1 + 2 \frac{Q}{2^n} + \frac{Q^2}{3^n} - \left{ \frac{6}{2^n} + \frac{3(Q^2-2)}{2^n}(2 - \frac{1}{2^n}) \right}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$1 + 5 \frac{Q^2}{2^n} + \frac{5(Q^2-1)}{3^n} - \left{ \frac{10}{2^n} + \frac{30Q^2-40}{2^n} - \frac{50Q^2-60}{2^n} + \frac{10(Q^2-1)}{2^n} + \frac{20Q^2-24}{2^n} \right}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$1 + 9 \frac{Q^2}{2^n} + 5 \frac{Q^3}{2^n} + 3\frac{(Q^3)}{2^n} - \left{ \frac{10}{2^n} + 4(\frac{Q^2-16}{3^n} + \frac{Q^2}{2^n} + \frac{(Q^2-1)(Q-2)}{2^n} + \frac{(Q^2)}{2^n} + \frac{36}{3^n})n \right}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4: Moments of $\rho_g^E(b) - \tau$**
Figure 2: Numerical results for $\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} |\rho_g^E - \tau|$, at $n = 9$ qubits, for various values of $Q$. The $\mathbb{E}_b$ was approximated by taking 100 random tables $b$.

Figure 3: Numerical results for $\mathbb{E}_b D(\rho_g^E, \tau)$, at $n = 7, 8, 9$ qubits, for various values of $Q$. For larger $n$ fewer random tables $b$ were taken to estimate the $\mathbb{E}_b$.

7.4 The $L_1$-norm of $\rho_g^E - \tau$

Fig. 2 shows the numerics for $\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} |\rho_g^E - \tau|$ as a function of $Q$, for $n = 9$, and the upper bound $\sqrt{2^n/Q}$. In Fig. 3 we have plotted results for $n = 7, 8, 9$ together. In spite of the small number of qubits we tentatively identify some trends.

With increasing $n$ the slope of $\mathbb{E}_b D(\rho_g^E, \tau)$ for $Q > 2^n$ increases. This could indicate that for large $n$ and $Q > 2^n$ the trace distance decreases faster than the bound $\propto 1/\sqrt{Q}$. Furthermore, at $Q = 2^n$ there seems to be a constant factor $\approx 0.83$ between the bound and the empirical value. More work is needed to see if these trends persist at large $n$. 

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7.5 Eigenvalues of $\rho_y^E$

Fig. 4 shows eigenvalue histograms. We see a qualitative change as $Q$ increases. At small $Q$, there are distinct bunches of large and small eigenvalues. At $Q = 2^n$ we see something resembling an exponential or power law distribution. At $Q \gg 2^n$ the distribution becomes more peaked around $\lambda = 2^{-n}$. 
Figure 4: Histogram of the eigenvalues of $\rho^E_{\mathcal{B}}(b)$, plotted for various values of $Q$. The eigenvalues from 100 runs are combined. The horizontal axis is scaled by a factor $2^n$ so that ‘1’ corresponds to the eigenvalues of the fully mixed state $\tau$. 

$n = 9$: Eigenvalues of $\rho^E_{\mathcal{B}}(b)$; 100 runs

- $\log Q = \frac{n}{3}$
- $\log Q = \frac{2n}{3}$
- $\log Q = n$
- $\log Q = \frac{7n}{6}$
- $\log Q = \frac{4n}{3}$
- $\log Q = \frac{5n}{3}$
7.6 Maximum eigenvalue of $\rho_E^\tau - \tau$

Fig. 5 shows empirical data on $\max_i |\lambda_i(\rho_g^E - \tau)| = |\rho_g^E - \tau|_\infty$. The plots are rather noisy due to the limited number of runs. We observe that the empirical $|\rho_g^E - \tau|_\infty$ is orders of magnitude smaller than the Bennett bound, for the values of $n$ that we studied.

![Max. absolute eigenvalue of $\rho_g^E(b) - \tau$; $n = 9$; 100 runs](image)

Figure 5: Histogram of the maximum absolute eigenvalue of $\rho_g^E(b) - \tau$, plotted for various values of $Q$. The horizontal axis is scaled by a factor $2^n$.

7.7 Statistical properties of $\rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E$

For completeness we also present theoretical and empirical results on $\rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E$. This is motivated by Def. 2.2.

**Theorem 7.3** For any $g, g' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ with $g' \neq g$ it holds that

$$\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} (\rho_g^E(b) - \rho_{g'}^E(b))^2 = \frac{2}{Q}$$

$$\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} (\rho_g^E(b) - \rho_{g'}^E(b))^3 = 0$$

$$Q^3 \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} (\rho_g^E(b) - \rho_{g'}^E(b))^4 = 2 + 8 \frac{Q}{2^n} + 4Q + 4!Q^2(-\frac{1}{2})|g \oplus g'| - \left\{ \frac{s v}{2^n} + \frac{4}{3^n} \right\}.$$ (37)

Here $|g \oplus g'|$ stands for the Hamming weight of $g \oplus g'$.

**Proof.** see Appendix D.

Furthermore we have $\forall b : \mathbb{E}_{g,g'} \text{tr} (\rho_g^E(b) - \rho_{g'}^E(b))^t = 0$ for odd $t$ due to symmetry.

**Corollary 7.4** Pseudorandom-keyed QOTP encryption of classical data using the 8-state encoding is on average (w.r.t. $b$) statistically $\varepsilon$-private (Def. 2.2) with $\varepsilon = \sqrt{2^n-1}/Q$.

**Proof** We follow the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 6.2. Let $d = 2^n$ and let $\{\lambda_a\}_{a=1}^d$ be eigenvalues of $\rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E$. We have $\mathbb{E}_b D(\rho_g^E, \rho_{g'}^E) = \frac{1}{2} d \mathbb{E}_b \sum_a \sqrt{\lambda_a^2} \leq \frac{1}{2} d \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} (\rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E)^2$. In the last step we used Jensen’s inequality. Substituting (35) gives $\mathbb{E}_b D(\rho_g^E, \rho_{g'}^E) \leq \sqrt{d/2Q}$.

Again we investigate the moments of the eigenvalues in the case $Q \approx 2^n$. Theorem 7.3 gives $s^2 = \frac{1}{2^n} \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} (\rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E)^2 \approx (\frac{s v}{2^n})^2$ and $\frac{1}{2^n} \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} (\rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E)^4 \approx 10 \cdot 2^{-4n} \approx \frac{5}{2}s^4$. Note that the number $\frac{5}{2}$ is smaller than the ‘3’ that would hold in the case of a Gaussian distribution.
Fig. 6 shows eigenvalues of \( \rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E \). As a function of \( Q \) the same trends are visible as in Fig. 4, but now with symmetry around zero. Fig. 7 shows empirical values of \( |\rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E|_\infty \). Again there is a large gap between the actual numbers and the bound obtained from the matrix Bennett inequality (see below).

**Figure 6:** Histogram of the eigenvalues of \( \rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E \), plotted for various values of \( Q \). The horizontal axis is scaled by a factor \( 2^n \).

**Figure 7:** Histogram of the maximum absolute eigenvalue of \( \rho_g^E(b) - \rho_{g'}^E(b) \), plotted for various values of \( Q \). The horizontal axis is scaled by a factor \( 2^n \).

**Theorem 7.5** For any \( g, g' \in \{0, 1\}^n \) the mixed states \( \rho_g^E, \rho_{g'}^E \) satisfy

\[
\Pr \left[ \lambda_{\max}(\rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E) \geq \frac{\varepsilon}{2^n} \right] \leq 2^n \exp \left[ -\frac{2Q}{2^n} A(\frac{\varepsilon}{2}) \right].
\]

*Proof:* We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 6.5, but now with \( X_j = \frac{1}{Q}(P_j - P'_j) \), where \( P'_j = \bigotimes_{i=1}^n |\psi_{b_j g'_i}\rangle \langle \psi_{b_j g'_i}|. \) We have \( E_b X_j = 0 \) and \( \sum_j X_j = \rho_g^E - \rho_{g'}^E \). Furthermore \( R = \lambda_{\max}(X_j) = \ldots \)
1/Q and $\sigma^2 = \lambda_{\max}(\sum_j E_b X_j^2) = \lambda_{\max}(\frac{2}{Q}) = \frac{2}{Q^2}$. Here we have used Theorem 7.3. Substitution into (24) and setting $t = \varepsilon/d$ in the Bennett inequality yields the result. \hfill \Box

From (38) we can derive an expression like Theorem 6.5 for the sufficient key length to obtain a $\infty$-norm version of $\varepsilon$-privacy; only the constant terms are different.

8 Summary and discussion

The most important results of this paper are: the introduction of the basis states $|\psi_{000}\rangle, |\psi_{001}\rangle$ to represent a classical bit, leading to 8-state encoding when the QOTP is applied; the key recycling scheme ‘$\#3$’ presented in Section 4.6, which has improved noise tolerance and efficiency compared to previous proposals; bounds on the sufficient key length for pseudorandom-keyed QOTP encryption of arbitrary quantum states (Theorems 6.3, 6.5 and 6.8); statistical analysis of the cipherstate eigenvalues (for classical plaintext) up to 6th order.

We briefly comment on the physical implementation of 8-state encoding. The eight photon polarisation states as depicted in Fig.1 are not necessarily the most practical implementation. Most single-photon sources produce linearly polarised states; hence elliptic polarisation may be more difficult to handle than linear. We note that it is possible to rotate the cube in Fig.1 in such a way that four of the eight cipherstates lie in the $xz$-plane [43], corresponding to linear polarisation. Another physical implementation of qubits is to use pulse trains as in Differential Phase Shift QKD [41], but with different amplitudes and phases.

As topics for future work we mention (i) detailed security proofs for the proposed key recycling scheme; (ii) obtain sharp bounds on high moments of the $\rho_g^E$ eigenvalues, in order to derive tighter bounds on the sufficient key length; (iii) establish how far the actual distances $|\rho_g - \tau|_1, |\rho_g - \tau|_\infty$ lie below the provable bounds.

Acknowledgments

We thank Christian Schaffner, Serge Fehr and Andreas Hülsging for useful discussions.

A Proof of Theorem 6.6

We write $\rho = |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$. We introduce short notation $P_j = F_{bj} |\psi\rangle\langle\psi| F_{bj}^\dagger$. The $P_j$ is a projection operator satisfying $E_{bj} P_j = \tau$. We have

$$\mathbb{E}_{b} \text{tr} [\rho'(b)] = \frac{1}{Q^t} \sum_{j_1=1}^Q \cdots \sum_{j_t=1}^Q \text{tr} E_{bj_1} \cdots P_{j_t}.$$ (39)

If for some $a \in \{1, \ldots, Q\}$ a projection $P_a$ occurs only once in the product $P_{j_1} \cdots P_{j_t}$ then the $\mathbb{E}_{b}$ reduces it to $\tau$. However, in the $t$-fold summation many different collisions can occur between the summation variables $j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_t$. In any of the $Q^t$ terms we denote the number of distinct values as $k$, with $k \in \{1, \ldots, t\}$. There are $\{C_k^t\} = (t)_k$ terms with a given value of $k$. At given $k$, there are $k$ distinct projectors in the product $P_{j_1} \cdots P_{j_t}$; they occur multiple times spread out over the product. If the identical projections are direct neighbours then we can immediately use the reduction $P_a^m = P_a$ ($m \geq 1$). For $t \leq 3$ there are only direct neighbours. (This follows from the circular property of the trace, $\text{tr} ABC = \text{tr} CAB$). Then the expression $\text{tr} E_{b} P_{j_1} \cdots P_{j_t}$ reduces to $\text{tr} \tau^k = (\frac{1}{Q})^{k-1}$, which immediately yields (26). For $t \geq 4$, however, there are sub-expressions like $P_{a_1} P_{b_1} P_{a_2} P_{b_2}, P_{a_3} P_{b_3} P_{a_4} P_{b_4}$, etcetera.

We define an inner product on the space of $2^n \times 2^n$ complex matrices as $\langle M, N \rangle = \mathbb{E}_{b} \text{tr} M(b)N(b)$. We now use Cauchy-Schwartz, $|\langle M, N \rangle|^2 \leq \langle M, M \rangle \langle N, N \rangle$ to bound our product expressions for $t \geq 4$. For example, at $t = 4, k = 2$ we have $\mathbb{E}_{b} \text{tr} P_a P_b P_a P_b = |\mathbb{E}_{b} \text{tr} P_a P_b P_a P_b| = |\langle P_a P_b, P_a P_b \rangle| \leq \sqrt{\langle P_a P_b, P_a P_b \rangle \langle P_a P_b, P_a P_b \rangle} = \sqrt{\mathbb{E}_{b} \text{tr} P_a P_b P_a P_b} = \text{tr} \tau^2$. At $t = 6, k = 2$ we have $\mathbb{E}_{b} \text{tr} (P_a P_b)^3 = |\langle P_a P_b P_a, P_b P_a P_b \rangle| \leq \sqrt{\mathbb{E}_{b} \text{tr} (P_a P_b)^2 \mathbb{E}_{b} \text{tr} (P_b P_a)^2} = \text{tr} \tau^2$. At $t = 6, k = 3$
we have \( \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr}(P_x P_y P_z)^2 = |(P_x P_y P_z, P_x P_y P_z)| \leq \sqrt{(P_x P_y P_z, P_x P_y P_z)(P_x P_y P_z, P_x P_y P_z)} = \sqrt{\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr}P_x P_y P_z}[\mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} P_x P_y P_z] = [\mathbb{E}_b \tau_3] = \text{tr} \tau_3^3 \). With every use of Cauchy-Schwartz we remove duplications of projectors, until only single occurrences remain.

**B  Proof of Theorem 7.1**

The D subsystem consists of \( n \) qubit systems \( D_1, \ldots, D_n \). We take \( i = n \) without loss of generality. Since we concentrate on

\[
|\lambda\rangle = |\tau\rangle
\]

This expression can be written as a spin operator in some direction times a scalar factor which is.

Eve’s first \( n-1 \) qubits give no information about \( g_i \). We compute the min-entropy of \( G_n \) given Eve’s subsystem \( E_n \) using (1).

\[
H_{\text{min}}(G_n|B, \rho_{G_n}(B)) = -\log \mathbb{E}_b \max_{M_0, M_1} \mathbb{E}_{g_n \in (0,1)} \text{tr} M_{g_n} \rho_{G_n=\gamma}(b). \tag{41}
\]

Here we have inserted the \( \mathbb{E}_b \) in the logarithm because of the conditioning on the classical variable \( B \). As the POVM has to satisfy \( M_0 + M_1 = \mathbb{1} \) we eliminate \( M_1 \) as a degree of freedom and are left with

\[
H_{\text{min}}(G_n|B, \rho_{G_n}(B)) = 1 - \log \left[ 1 + \mathbb{E}_b \max_{M_0} \text{tr} M_0 (\rho_{G_n=\gamma} - \rho_{G_n=1}) \right] = 1 - \log [1 + \mathbb{E}_b \lambda_{\max}(\rho_{G_n=\gamma} - \rho_{G_n=1})]. \tag{42}
\]

Here we have used that the optimal \( M_0 \) is a projection operator in the direction of the positive eigenvector of \( \rho_{G_n=1} \). The notation \( \lambda_{\max}(A) \) stands for the maximum eigenvalue of \( A \). We introduce tallies \( Q_{\beta}, \beta \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\} \), which count how many times key \( \beta \) occurs in the \( n \)’th column of \( b \). The tallies are multinomial-distributed with parameters \( Q \) and \((\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4})\).

We have

\[
\rho_{G_n=0} - \rho_{G_n=1} = \frac{1}{Q} \sum_{j=1}^Q \left( |\psi_{b_j,0}\rangle \langle \psi_{b_j,0}| - |\psi_{b_j,1}\rangle \langle \psi_{b_j,1}| \right) = \frac{1}{Q} \sum_{j=1}^3 Q_{\beta} \left( |\psi_{\beta 0}\rangle \langle \psi_{\beta 0}| - |\psi_{\beta 1}\rangle \langle \psi_{\beta 1}| \right). \tag{43}
\]

We define \( v_x = Q_0 + Q_1 - Q_2 - Q_3, v_y = Q_0 - Q_1 + Q_2 + Q_3, v_z = Q_0 + Q_1 - Q_2 - Q_3 \). Using

\[
|\psi_{\beta 0}\rangle \langle \psi_{\beta 0}| - |\psi_{\beta 1}\rangle \langle \psi_{\beta 1}| = n_{\beta 0} \cdot \sigma \]

we find, after some algebra,

\[
\rho_{G_n=0} - \rho_{G_n=1} = \frac{v_x \sigma_x + v_y \sigma_y + v_z \sigma_z}{Q \sqrt{3}}. \tag{44}
\]

This expression can be written as a spin operator in some direction times a scalar factor which is exactly \( \lambda_{\max} \). We have

\[
v^2 = v_x^2 + v_y^2 + v_z^2 = 3(Q_0^2 + Q_1^2 + Q_2^2 + Q_3^2) - 2 \sum_{\beta \neq \beta'} Q_{\beta} Q_{\beta'}.
\]

Using the multinomial property \( \mathbb{E}_b Q_\beta^2 = (\frac{Q}{4})^2 + Q \cdot \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4} \) for the four square terms and \( \mathbb{E}_b Q_\beta Q_{\beta'} = (\frac{Q}{4})^2 - Q \cdot \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4} \) for the six crossterms we finally get \( \mathbb{E}_b v^2 = 3Q \) and

\[
\mathbb{E}_b \lambda_{\max} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_b v^2}{Q \sqrt{3}} \leq \frac{\sqrt{\mathbb{E}_b v^2}}{Q \sqrt{3}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{Q}}. \tag{46}
\]
\[ \text{Proof of Theorem 7.2} \]

The results for \( t = 2 \) follow from Theorem 6.6. The results for \( t = 3 \) are copied from Theorem 6.6 and Corollary 6.7.

For \( t = 4 \) we closely follow the proof of Corollary 6.7. The only difference lies in one type of summation term in the computation of \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_t^4) \), namely \( \bb tr \bb E_t P_j P_j P_j P_j \) with \( j, \ell \in \{1, \ldots, Q\}, \ell \neq j \). In Corollary 6.7 this was upperbounded as \( \bb tr \bb E_t P_j P_j P_j P_j \leq \bb tr \bb E_t P_j P_j = \bb tr \tau^2 = 2^{-n} \). For states restricted to the 8-state system we can do the computation exactly. We have \( P_j = \rho_j^E(b) \) as defined in (31) for some arbitrary \( g \in \{0, 1\}^n \), which gives

\[ \text{tr } \bb E_t P_j P_j P_j P_j = \prod_{i=1}^n \bb E_{b_{ji}} \bb E_{b_{\ell i}} |\langle \psi_{b_{ji}}, \psi_{b_{\ell i}} \rangle|^4 = \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{3} = \left( \frac{1}{3} \right)^n. \] (47)

Here we have used that \( b_{ji} \neq b_{\ell i} \) occurs with probability \( 3/4 \) and yields \( |\cdot|^4 = \left( \frac{1}{3} \right)^2 \) while \( b_{ji} = b_{\ell i} \) occurs with probability \( 1/4 \) and yields \( |\cdot|^4 = 1 \). The upshot is that a contribution \( \frac{1}{3^n} \bb Q(Q-1)_t^2 \) in the proof of Corollary 6.7 has to be replaced by \( \frac{1}{3^n} \bb Q(Q-1)_t^2 \).

For \( t = 5 \) we follow the same procedure. At \( k = 2 \) there are 5 terms of the form \( P_j P_j P_j P_j P_j \) (or rotations thereof), which each yield a contribution (47).

For \( t = 6 \) the procedure is the same but with more complicated combinations. At \( k = 2 \) there is one term of the form \( (P_j P_j)'^3 \) which yields \( \left( \frac{1}{2} \bb tr \right)^n \), and 15 terms that reduce to \( (P_j P_j)'^2 \) by idempotency, yielding (47). At \( k = 3 \) there is one term \( (P_j P_j M_j)'^2 \) yielding \( \left( \frac{1}{3} \right)^n \), three terms of the form \( P_j P_j P_j P_j P_j P_j \) yielding \( \left( \frac{1}{2} \bb tr \right)^n \), and 36 terms that reduce to \( \tau (P_j P_j)'^2 \) yielding \( \frac{1}{2^n} \bb tr \).

The product over the keepings results in the expressions listed in Table 3.

Table 4 follows by applying the binomial expansion \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j - \tau)^t = \sum_{a=0}^t \binom{t}{a} \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j - \tau)^{t-a} = \sum_{a=0}^t \binom{t}{a} \bb E_t \bb tr \rho^t (\rho_j - \tau)^{t-a} + \bb E_t \bb tr \rho^t \) and then using Table 3.

\[ \text{Proof of Theorem 7.3} \]

2nd power. Since \( \bb E_t \bb tr \rho_j^2 \) does not depend on \( g \) we can write \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j - \rho_j')^2 = 2 \bb E_t \bb tr \rho_j^2 - 2 \bb E_t \bb tr \rho_j \rho_j' \).

The first term follows from Lemma 6.1 using \( \bb tr \rho^2 = 1 \) (the plaintext is a pure state). We define \( P_j \) as in the proof of Theorem 6.6, and \( R_j = \bigotimes_{i=1}^n |\psi_{b_{ji}}, g_i \rangle \langle \psi_{b_{ji}}, g_i| \), and \( \rho_j = \bb E_j \bb tr R_j \). It holds that \( \bb E_t R_j = \tau \) and \( P_j R_j = 0 \). We write \( \bb E_t \bb tr \rho_j \rho_j' = \frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{j, k = 1}^Q \sum_{\ell, t, t' \neq j} \bb E_j \bb tr P_j R_{t, t'} = \frac{1}{2^n} \bb Q(Q-1)_t^2 \bb tr \tau^2 \).

4th power. We note that \( \bb E_t \bb tr \rho_j^4 \) does not depend on \( g \) and \( g' \) as long as \( g' \neq g \). This allows us to write \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j - \rho_j')^4 = 2 \bb E_t \bb tr \rho_j^2 - 8 \bb E_t \bb tr \rho_j^2 \rho_j' + 2 \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j \rho_j')^2 + 4 \bb E_t \bb tr \rho_j^2 \rho_j' \). The first term is given in Table 3. We write \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j \rho_j')^2 = \sum_{t, k = 1}^Q \sum_{j, k = 1}^Q \bb E_j \bb tr P_j R_{j, k} P_k R_{j, k} \). The \( R_{j, k} \) reduces to \( \tau \) and we get \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j \rho_j')^2 = \sum_{j, k, t, k \neq j} \bb E_j \bb tr P_j R_{j, k} P_k R_{j, k} \). Next we have \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j \rho_j')^2 = \sum_{j, k, t, k \neq j} \bb E_j \bb tr P_j R_{j, k} P_k R_{j, k} \). As earlier we use the notation \( n \) for the number of different table rows present in a summation term. At \( k = 1 \) we get zero contribution since a \( P \) and \( R \) projector must collide. At \( k = 2 \) we have to set \( j = s, \ell = m \) yielding a contribution \( (Q)_2 \bb tr \tau^2 \). At \( k = 3 \) we have the combinations \( P_j R_j P_j R_j \) and \( R_j P_j R_j P_j P_j \), which both yield \( (Q)_3 \bb tr \tau^3 \). At \( k = 4 \) there is the unsurprising contribution \( (Q)_4 \bb tr \tau^4 \). Together this yields \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j \rho_j')^2 = \frac{(Q)_2}{2} + \frac{(Q)_3}{2} + \frac{(Q)_4}{2} \).

Finally we have \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j \rho_j')^2 = \sum_{j, k, t, k \neq j} \bb E_j \bb tr P_j R_{j, k} P_k R_{j, k} \). At \( k = 1 \) there is again zero contribution because of the collisions between \( P \) and \( R \). At \( k = 4 \) we have the usual \( (Q)_4 \bb tr \tau^4 \). At \( k = 3 \) the only nonzero contributions come from the combinations \( P_j^2 R_j R_j P_j R_j P_j R_j \) and \( P_j P_j R_j^2 \), both yield \( (Q)_3 \bb tr \tau^3 \). The case \( k = 2 \) is the most complicated. The combination \( P_j P_j R_j^2 \) yields \( (Q)_2 \bb tr \tau^2 \). For the combination \( P_j P_j R_j R_j \) we get a factorised expression \( \prod_{i=1}^n \bb E_i \bb tr P_j R_{j, i} R_{j, i} \), where \( \bb E_i \) refers to the \( i \)th column of \( b \). It turns out that \( \bb E_i \bb tr P_j R_{j, i} R_{j, i} \) depends on \( g_i \) or \( g_i' \).

For \( g_i' = g_i \) we get \( \frac{1}{8} \), while for \( g_i \neq g_i' \) the outcome is \(-\frac{1}{6} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot (-\frac{1}{3})\). The product over \( i \) yields \( \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)^n \left( -\frac{1}{3} \right)^{|g \oplus g'|} \). Adding up the pieces gives \( \bb E_t \bb tr (\rho_j \rho_j')^2 = \frac{(Q)_2}{2} + \frac{(Q)_3}{2} + \frac{(Q)_4}{2} + \frac{(Q)_2}{2} + \frac{(Q)_3}{2} \).

6With probability \( \frac{1}{2} \) it occurs that \( b_{ji} \neq b_{\ell i} \), yielding \( |\langle \psi_{b_{ji}}, g_i | \psi_{b_{\ell i}}, g_i' \rangle|^6 = \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)^3 \). With probability \( \frac{1}{2} \) it occurs that \( b_{ji} = b_{\ell i} \), yielding 1. The expectation is \( \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\frac{1}{2})^3 + \frac{1}{2} = \frac{5}{8} \).
Taking \( \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} (\rho_g - \rho_{g'})^4 = 2 \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} \rho_g^4 - 8 \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} \rho_g^3 \rho_{g'} + 2 \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} (\rho_g \rho_{g'})^2 + 4 \mathbb{E}_b \text{tr} \rho_g^2 \rho_{g'}^2 \), yields the final result.

**References**


