

MASTER

Does punishment help or harm leader effectiveness?

the role of competence-based versus integrity-based violations and leaders' decision speed

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Running head: Punishment and Leader Effectiveness

Does punishment help or harm leader effectiveness? The role of competence-based versus integrity-based violations and leaders' decision speed.

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Abstract

Leaders from time to time have to use punishment to enforce rules in organizational settings, yet the effect of punishment on leader effectiveness has essentially received no attention from researchers. Surprisingly, since effective leadership has been frequently studied by researchers, and has proven to be of great value for organizations. This thesis addresses this gap by investigating whether different types of violations (competence- vs. integrity-based) and different decision speeds (fast vs. slow) influence the effect of punishment on leader effectiveness. Two different studies were conducted to test these relationships. The first study had an experimental design and the last study was a cross-sectional field survey. In both studies participants evaluated leaders as more effective when punishing integrity-based violations (vs. competence-based violations). The results also indicate that when a leader decides to punish a norm violator the leader's decision speed is perceived in terms of doubt. As such, this thesis present new insights into the relation between punishment and leader effectiveness, especially when punishing different types of violations with different speeds.

Keywords: punishment; leader effectiveness; types of violations; leader decision speed

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Management Summary

Effective leadership and punishment are both heavily researched topics. Effective leadership has found to be key for organizational success (Tsui, 1984; Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003; Yukl, 2008), and the use of punishment by leaders in organizations has proven to be an important aspect of a leader's job (Butterfield, Treviño, Wade, & Ball, 2005). Since leaders occasionally have to use punishment to enforce organizational rules, as inspirational leadership itself is not always enough to promote rule compliance (Wyld, 2013). Despite the extensive research on both topics, surprisingly little is known about the relationship between punishment and effective leadership. More specific, does the type of violation and in addition leaders' decision speed influence leader effectiveness when a leader decides to punish a follower. The present research is an initial step towards understanding the relation between punishment and leader effectiveness.

Two different studies were conducted to investigate this gap by empirically testing for the first time, how the type of violation and in addition leader decision speed affect observers' perception of leader effectiveness when a leader decided to punish a follower. Study 1 used an experimental design which allowed to demonstrate relationships between the variables leader decision speed, type of violation, and leader effectiveness. The scenario-based vignette experiment in Study 1 had a total of 501 participants. The environment in experiment 1 was highly controlled. Therefore, the objective of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1 in a more natural environment. In Study 2, a total of 200 participants participated in a cross-sectional field survey. In this survey participants were asked to describe a situation from their own working life in which they observed a fellow employee getting punished by their leader.

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The results of both studies consistently show that people respond differently to these two type of violations when evaluating leaders who use punishment. Specifically, leaders who punished integrity-based violations were perceived as more effective than leaders who punished competence-based violations. The results from both studies also confirmed that people interpret leader decision speed in terms of doubt when a leader decided to punish a follower. In addition, Experiment 1 showed partial support for the interaction effect of leader decision speed between type of violation and leader effectiveness (i.e., only in the competence-based violation condition). That is, leaders were rated lower on perceived leader effectiveness when the leader quickly decided to punish a competence-based violation in comparison to a slow decision to punish in the same condition. In contrast, in Study 2, which took place in a more natural environment no interaction effect of leader decision speed between type of violation and leader effectiveness was found. However, in Study 2, the explorative variable ‘punishment fitted the seriousness of the violation’ was found to be associated with leader effectiveness. That is, participants rated leaders as more effective when the leader’s punishment fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing (as opposed to a poor fit of the punishment). On top of that, an interaction effect of punishment fit between type of violation and leader effectiveness was found. Specifically, participants rated leaders who punished a follower for committing a competence-based violation as more effective when the punishment fit was high (as opposed to low) while this effect was attenuated when leaders punished a followers for committing an integrity-based violation.

This thesis also has its limitations. First, the vignette described a situation which explained that the employee got punished, however the punishment itself was not defined. With hindsight, this left to much room for interpretation. Second, the questions measured the

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perception of leader decision speed instead of actual decision speed. Third, the data was gathered with MTurk, which does not represent the general population of America. Fourth, data from only one country prevented us to test for cross-cultural differences. Fifth, no consideration was made whether the punishment was based on a one-time violation or a sustained violation over time. Sixth, the variable ‘the severity of the punishment fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing’ only measured the fit of the punishment. It did not measure whether the punishment was too severe or too soft. Final limitation is that the leader always decided to punish.

It also opens questions for future research. First, another research setup that allows to measure actual leader decision speed instead of the perception of leader decision speed. Second, further investigate when leaders decision speed is interpreted as doubt vs. effort. Third, conduct a similar research in different types of organizations and countries to gain an enhanced understanding of the effects. This also allows to test for cross-cultural differences. Fourth, obtaining more data about the punishment fit. That is, when the punishment did not fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing was the punishment too soft or too harsh. Final suggestion, expand this thesis by testing what happens when the leader decides to do nothing, or provide support when a follower violates the norms of the leader.

To conclude, both experiments showed that the type of violation impacted the effect of punishment on leader effectiveness. That is, leaders who punished integrity based violations received higher ratings of leader effectiveness than leaders who punished competence-based violations. The results also showed that leaders who quickly decided to punish a follower were generally perceived as less doubtful than leaders who slowly decided to punish.

Introduction: The Impact of Punishment on Leader Effectiveness

There is a growing recognition that effective leadership behavior is key for organizational success (Tsui, 1984; Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003; Yukl, 2008). An effective leader should not only be able to plan, control and inspect the overall running of an organization, but s/he should also be able to motivate others in order to nurture positive attitudes at work (Hogan, Curphy & Hogan, 1994). That is, effective leaders have been shown to influence a wide range of perceptions and behaviors, including a follower's job satisfaction (Bass & Stogdill, 1990), task performance (Howell & Frost, 1989; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990; Yammarino & Bass, 1990), group performance (Bass & Bass, 1985; Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993), and organizational commitment (Howell & Frost, 1989; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990; Yammarino & Bass, 1990). However, despite the recognition of the importance of leader effectiveness in general, little is known about this phenomenon in relation to punishment. This in itself is interesting, since an effective leader should be able to successfully use punishment when more positive approaches have little to no effect (Wyld, 2013), this to protect the groups beliefs, and the norms and values of the organization (Hogan & Emler, 1981; Miller & Vidmar, 1981). Especially, when a leader's failure to punish is witnessed by followers and viewed as unjust, since it leaves the social order in an unbalanced state (Trevino, 1992). In addition, followers develop aversion against leaders when they are wrongfully punished (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Therefore, gaining a better understanding of the relationship between punishment and effective leadership will likely benefit the leader and the team s/he is operating in. The goal of the current thesis is to provide more insights into these matters by testing how the use of punishment by leaders shape observers' perceptions of leader effectiveness.

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Punishment is defined as a manager's imposition of a negative consequence or the withdrawal of a positive consequence (Trevino, 1992). Withdrawal of a positive consequence, often covert would be limiting exposure or growth opportunities. While suspension, verbal reprimands, and terminations are examples of negative consequences that qualify as overt punishment. Overt punishment can best be described as a visible or apparent form of punishment, whereas covert punishment means hidden or concealed punishment. This thesis focusses on overt levels of punishment, because overt punishment can be immediately noticed by followers and or third party observers, which is required for this thesis. The use of punishment by leaders in organizations is a common occurrence and remains an important aspect of almost all leaders' jobs (Butterfield et al., 2005).

Leaders are responsible for maintaining norms and rules within an organization. As such, they have the goal to keep social control (Mooijman and Graham, 2018). Leaders indicate that they try to limit the use of punishment, yet when positive approaches have little to no effect leaders use punishment to deal with violating behavior (Butterfield et al., 2005). In this thesis, we speak of violating behavior when an employee's behavior falls short of a leader's moral- or technical (work) standards, i.e., leader's expectations (Trevino, 1992). Given this definition, employee theft, bribery, tardiness, sexual harassment, drug or alcohol abuse, excessive absenteeism, and below standard work performance are all forms of misconduct (Redeker, 1984). Despite the consensus that punishment influences leaders and their employees (Butterfield et al., 2005; Podsakoff, Todor, & Skov, 1982), there is little agreement on whether it helps or hurts effective leadership. Effective leadership, defined as a leader's ability to perform the leader's role (i.e. behavior perceived to benefit the group)(Tsui, 1984). More traditional views highlight the destructive and counter-effective sides of punishment (Estes, 1944; Gneezy and

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Rustichini, 2000; Skinner, 1938), noting that punishment is associated with negative side effects such as evoking anger, avoidance, and retaliation (Luthans, 1995) which has led many scholars to conclude that punishment should be avoided (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Lukowiak & Bridges, 2010; Skinner, 1965). In contrast, Podsakoff and colleagues (1984) found that contingent punishment did not negatively affect followers' satisfaction with their respective supervisors. Contingent punishment can best be described as administering negative feedback to employees in response to their poor performance or undesirable behaviors. In addition, Atwater, Dionne, Camobreco, Avolio, and Lau (1998) found that contingent punishment positively impacted the perceived effectiveness of leaders. Although only a few studies to date focus directly on punishment and effective leadership, related research suggests that punishment can be used to positively influence contribution rates (Gürerk, Lauer, & Scheuermann, 2018; Güth, Levati, Sutter, & Van Der Heijden, 2007; Schnake, 1986; Sutter, Haigner, & Kocher, 2010), deters future violations (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002), reduce role ambiguity (Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006), and maintains the social system of shared norms and beliefs (Hogan & Emler, 1981; Miller & Vidmar, 1981).

These divergent perspectives and empirical findings result in confusion as it is still unclear whether punishment facilitates or hinders effective leadership. The purpose of this thesis is to address this unclarity by investigating how leader's use of punishment affects effective leadership depending on the type of violation and leaders' decision speed. Researchers found that people respond differently to violations that concern employees who intentionally breach the ethical and moral standards of the workplace, in comparison to employees who unintentionally violated the rules due to lack of skills and knowledge (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Wang, Restubog, Shao, Lu, & Van Kleef, 2018). Expressing

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anger for example had divergent effects on observers' perceptions of effective leadership depending on the types of violations (i.e., competence-based vs integrity-based violations) (Wang et al., 2018). Therefore, in this thesis it is suggested that the decision from a leader to punish competence-based vs integrity-based violations produces differential outcomes on observers' perception of leader effectiveness. In addition, researchers found that observers not only gain information about the decision itself but also derive information from the decision speed that was used to make the decision (e.g., Critcher, Inbar & Pizarro, 2013; Van de Calseyde, Keren, & Zeelenberg, 2014; Jordan et al., 2016; Evans & Van de Calseyde, 2017; Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). In the present thesis, I propose that the use of punishment has differential impact on observers' perceptions of leader effectiveness depending on the type of violation, and in extension the speed of decision making. More specifically, this current thesis will address the following research questions:

When punishing followers, how does the type of violation shape the perceived effectiveness of leaders? In addition, how does the speed in which leaders decide to punish norm violators impact observers' perceptions of a leader's effectiveness?

The current thesis contributes to the existing literature about punishment, leader effectiveness and decision speed in three important ways. First, it shows that the effect of leaders' use of punishment depends on whether the type of violation is competence- or integrity based. Second, it appears that when leaders decide to punish their decision speed signals doubt. Third, this thesis carefully deliberates how and when leaders decision speed influences leader effectiveness depending on the type of violation.

This thesis is structured as follows. First, relevant theory is defined, discussed and evaluated in the theoretical background. Three hypotheses were formed based on this overview. The second part defines the research methods of study 1 and 2, followed by the research results. Finally, the thesis provides an in depth discussion of the results and their implications, limitations and directions for future research.

The effect of punishment

How punishment is perceived heavily depends on the context. According to a social learning research, both punishment and the failure to punish will influence observers' subsequent misconduct and their perceptions of supervisors (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1963; Schnake, 1986; Schnake, 1987). That is, the punishment of one individual discourages the prohibited behavior in observers, while a failure to punish increases the prohibited behavior in observers (Trevino, 1992). When observers expect a punishment for a norm violator, a manager's failure to punish is viewed as unjust and leaves the social order in an unbalanced state (Trevino, 1992). In a similar vein, a manager's failure to punish negatively affects the group's belief systems, norms, and values since they are questioned by not acting on the norm violation (Miller & Vidmar, 1981). Punishment, on the other hand, upholds and reinforces a group's fundamental belief about what is right by setting an example which, in turn, maintains an organization's norm and values (Blau, 1964; Miller & Vidmar, 1981). Furthermore, there is also the possibility that a manager wrongfully punished an employee, which is a painful experience with negative consequences (Trevino, 1992), such as evoking anger, confusion, helplessness, and disappointment (Mikula, 1986; Reis, 1984), lowering commitment and motivation, and developing an aversion against the authority figure (Lind & Tyler, 1988). The reasoning behind is that observers who evaluate leaders' actions as unjust are likely to experience empathic distress and try to distress in

numerous ways (Austin, Walster, & Utne, 1976). Leaders wrongfully or not punishing employees for violating the rules are generally perceived as less effective by their followers (Arvey, Davis, & Nelson, 1984; Atwater et al., 1998). Alternatively, if a leader's response to a violation is perceived as just, more positive outcomes can be expected (Trevino, 1992), such as the perception of fairness (Hogan & Emler, 1981), increase in loyalty and commitment (Trevino, 1992), positively affect satisfaction with a decision outcome (Greenberg & Folger, 1983), positively affect satisfaction with the supervisor who made the decision (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987; Atwater et al., 1998; Tyler, 1984), and an increase in work performance (O'Reilly & Puffer, 1989). The effect of leaders using punishment on perceived leader effectiveness, therefore, differs in each situation. In this thesis it is argued that one of the factors that it depends on is the type of violation that was committed.

Competence-based Versus Integrity-based Violations

Wang, Restubog, Shao, Lu, & Van Kleef (2018) suggest that most types of negative follower behaviors can be classified into two overarching categories, namely competence-based and integrity-based violations. Competence-based violations can best be described as unintentional wrongdoing and occur when followers do not have the technical skills necessary to perform their jobs, while integrity-based violations occur when followers intentionally breach the ethical and moral standards of the workplace (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004).

This categorization will be adopted in this thesis since these dimensions have shown to produce differential outcomes on leader effectiveness when a leader expresses anger (Wang et al, 2018). Besides, anger and punishment are closely related. That is, feeling angry was found to be a strong predictor of handing out punishments (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999). Another finding that supports the use of this categorization is that the

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dimensions competence and integrity represent two of the most important dimensions for determining trustworthiness (Barber, 1983; Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Schindler & Thomas, 1993). Whereas, leader's trustworthiness is a key factor for predicting leader effectiveness, especially in the eyes of subordinates (Van Knippenburg et al., 2003; Norman et al., 2010). In addition, the difference between competence- and integrity-based violations fits well with research on leader expectations, since similar overarching categories are used, namely leaders expect followers to show both technical competence and ethical integrity when performing their job (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Sy, 2010).

In addition, recent research has shown that people respond differently to problems related with competence versus integrity (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Kim et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2018). For example, researchers in the trust literature made a distinction between competence-based trust and integrity-based trust violations since this distinction has an influence on how trust can be restored (Kim et al., 2004). That is, an apology was perceived as a more favorable response in comparison to a denial in a competence-based trust violation, whereas a denial was perceived as a more favorable outcome in comparison to an apology in an integrity-based violation. Researchers in the affect literature found similar results, namely that the type of violation (competence vs integrity) affect people's perception of anger (Wang et al., 2018). A leader expressing anger in an integrity-based violation was perceived as more effective than a leader expressing anger in a competence-based violation. Altogether, these findings support the possibility that a leaders usage of punishment in reaction to the two types of violation (competence- vs. integrity-based) can result in different outcomes.

Punishment and Types of Violations

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People generally see punishment as necessary when harm is committed intentionally (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Hogan & Emler, 1981). Research on ethical leadership found similar results, namely that leaders are expected to be strict and resolute in case of ethical transgressions (Trevino, 1992; Trevino & Ball, 1992). For example, Wenger, Korenman, Berk, & Liu (1998) found that respondents suggested punishments for 80% of the scenarios that were rated as unethical violations. It is not that observers desire punishment when a fellow worker breaches the ethical norms only because they believe the violator deserves it, more important is that punishment reinforces and upholds the behavioral standards within the organization (Blau, 1964). Punishing intentional wrongdoing maintains the perception that the organization is a place where people get what they deserve (Lerner, 1970), it shapes people's perceptions of fairness (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Furthermore, Treviño and Ball (1992) found that severe punishment to unethical behavior will influence observers expectancies of future management responses; moreover, observers' reactions to punishment are as important, if not more important than reactions of the punished individual, since it is more likely that the observers stay and represent the company in the near future.

In contrast, observers are more likely to react negatively when a leader punishes behavior that is generally accepted, behavior that would not be defined as misconduct by co-workers (Treviño, 1992). A form that would not be classified as misconduct by followers would be a lack of job-related knowledge and skills, and should therefore not be punished (Baron, 1990; Brethower, 1993). For example, Schnake (1987) found that satisfaction with supervision decreased when punishment was perceived as unfair. However, when harm is inflicted unintentionally it can still invoke a compensatory justice reaction. That is, the harm doer is expected to compensate the victim for the damage done to his or her belongings, where

restoration is considered appropriate (Darley & Pittman, 2003). Although restoration in this context is considered as appropriate, a punitive or disciplinary response is not. That is, people do not believe that those who lack job-related knowledge and skills deserve to be punished (Baron, 1990).

The expected response from a leader is context-dependent. Therefore, it is likely that the observers reaction to leader's use of punishment is influenced by the type of violation that was committed. As stated above, problems caused by a lack of ethics and integrity are generally calling for punitive and disciplinary actions (Brown & Trevino, 2006). Therefore, a leader punishing an employee that committed an integrity-based violation should be viewed as appropriate and will most likely produce positive outcomes and increase leader effectiveness, because people believe that ethical and integrity violations should be punished (Trevino, 1992). By contrast, problems caused by a lack of skill and or job competence (i.e., competence-based violation) call for developmental and supportive leadership behavior (Brethower, 1993). Punishing in this context would be the opposite behavior of what is expected from the leader, increasing the chance that observers perceive the punishment as less appropriate (Schnake, 1993). Whereas, inappropriate and inconsistent punishment negatively affects the satisfaction with leaders (Arvey et al., 1984). These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Observers evaluate leaders as more effective when leaders punish employees that have committed an integrity-based violation, but as less effective when leaders punish employees that have committed a competence-based violation.

Leader Decision Speed and Interpersonal Effects of Punishment

Recent research indicates that observing decision speed shapes and influences people on the individual level (e.g., Critcher, Inbar & Pizarro, 2013; Van de Calseyde, Keren, & Zeelenberg, 2014; Jordan et al., 2016; Evans & Van de Calseyde, 2017; Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). Leaders decision speed has the ability to influence people on the individual level because decision speed is interpreted as a signal, more specifically as a signal of doubt (Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). Signaling can best be described as a process of transferring information via verbal- and or nonverbal modes of communication (Antonakis, Bastardo, Jacquart & Shamir, 2016; Reh, Van Quaquebeke, & Giessner, 2017). For example, Critcher and colleagues (2013) tested the effects of decision speed on moral judgments. Participants were asked to evaluate the moral character of two individuals who found a cash-filled wallet. The first individual decided to return the wallet immediately, while the second person decided after long and careful deliberation. Moreover, both decided to do morally right. However, the results indicated that the individual who decided quickly to return the wallet was seen to have better moral character than the one who decided after a delay. The delay from the decision-maker was perceived as a term of doubt by the observer, which resulted in a lower rating on moral character.

Similarly, Van de Calseyde and colleagues (2014) found that observing others' decision speed also influences interpersonal choices. In one experiment, Calseyde and colleagues observed the behavior of game show contestants. Data from the television show *The Voice* was used. In this music talent show, contestants sing for four coaches and have two minutes to impress them. The coaches sit in chairs which are turned backwards until they are convinced of the talent. When convinced they are able to turn their chair, which means they are willing to welcome the contestant in their team. If multiple coaches turn around, the contestant is able to choose a coach to his or her preference. Coaches who were first in turning their chair were more

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frequently chosen than coaches who turned second, third or last. Whereas, coaches who turned last were frequently less chosen than coaches who turned first, second or third. The decision speed of the coaches had a serious impact on interpersonal behavior, as show contestants were motivated to collaborate with a coach who signaled confidence in their abilities by turning first (fast), while hesitant to cooperate with a coach who signaled the least degree of confidence by turning last (late).

Finally, Van de Calseyde and colleagues (2020) found that leaders' can use decision speed to influence followers' procedural justice evaluations and their perceived trustworthiness. In three experiments, they consistently found that employees perceived their leaders as fairer and less conflicted when leaders were fast (vs. slow) in deciding to include followers into the decision making process. However, followers evaluated leaders as less fair when leaders quickly decided to exclude followers from consequential decisions. The reason for this reversal is the unfavorable outcome of the decision. That is, observers only respond positively to fast, decisive decisions when outcomes are favorable (e.g., Critcher et al., 2013; Van de Calseyde et al., 2014; Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). In addition, Van de Calseyde (2020) found that quickly deciding to include followers in decisions also positively influences the willingness to reward leaders, and their willingness to cooperate with leaders.

In all the above-mentioned studies, researchers explain how decision speed influence observers due to the fact that people interpret speed in terms of doubt, that is slow decisions are perceived as more doubtful than fast decisions (Critcher et al., 2013; Van de Calseyde et al., 2014; Evans & Van de Calseyde, 2017; Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). In the present article, it is argued that decision speed is similarly perceived in terms of doubt when a leader decides to punish a follower. Researchers found that you should immediately punish violating behavior as it

is more likely to stop the misconduct, and therefore more effective than a delayed punishment (Abramowitz and O’Leary, 1990; Arvey and Ivancevich, 1980; Arvey and Jones, 1985; Domelle, 2017; Goralski and Leblanc, 2012). In addition, researchers found that by not punishing unethical behavior, people generally appear irresolute and indecisive (Bailey, 1971; Hogan et al., 1981). A fast decision to punish would likely signal to observers that their leader is resolute and has no doubt in his decision. While a slow decision would signal a leader’s doubt to punish. More specifically:

Hypothesis 2: Observers interpret leader decision speeds in terms of doubt. That is, slow decisions are indicative that a leader doubted whether to punish a follower or not while a fast decision reveals a leader’s lack of doubt.

Since followers expect different responses from a leader based on the type of violation it may also cause followers to respond differently to the decision speed used by leaders to confront the violating employees. As mentioned before, researchers found that people interpret decision speed in terms of doubt. Slow decisions are perceived as more doubtful than fast decisions (e.g., Critcher et al., 2013; Van de Calseyde et al., 2014; Evans & Van de Calseyde, 2017; Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). How doubt is interpreted depends on the expected outcome. Whenever the outcome is perceived as “favorable”, normative behavior, a fast decision generally has a positive impact (e.g., Critcher et al., 2013; Van de Calseyde et al., 2014; Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). Although fast decisions generate positive evaluations when a leader decides according to the norm, this effect is expected to reverse when leaders' decisions are perceived as non-normative behavior. For example, although immediately including a follower into a decision was perceived

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as more fair, this effect reversed when the leader quickly decided to exclude the follower. When quickly excluding the follower the leader was perceived as less fair (Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). Similarly, immediately returning the cash-filled wallet was perceived as more honest. However, quickly deciding to keep the wallet was perceived as less honest (Critcher et al., 2013). Therefore, it is likely that non-normative behavior will reverse the effect of leader decision speed on perceived leader effectiveness when punishing employees based on different types of violations.

In the context of an integrity-based violation, a fast decision to punish would signal to observers that their leader is resolute and has no doubt in his decision. Moreover, punishment is perceived as normative behavior when an integrity-based violation occurs. Therefore, it is assumed that a leader, quickly deciding to punish an employee that committed an integrity-based violation, will likely positively influence the observer's perceived leader effectiveness. In contrast, an employee shouldn't be punished for unintentionally harm doing, especially caused by a lack of skill (Darley & Pittman, 2003). It is likely that quickly punishing this employee will be perceived as unfavorable behavior and therefore harm the leader's effectiveness. This thesis argues that the consequences of leaders' decision speed on observers' perceived leader effectiveness highly depends on the type of violation whenever a leader punishes an employee. More specifically:

Hypothesis 3: People evaluate leaders as more effective when leaders are fast (vs. slow) to punish integrity-based violations, but as less effective when leaders are fast (vs. slow) to punish competence-based violations.

Present research

Two different studies were conducted to investigate the effect of decision speed and type of violation on observers' perception of leader effectiveness when a leader decided to punish an employee. In the first study, a scenario-based vignette experiment was used. More specifically, after reading the vignette, participants (MTurk; $N = 501$) were asked to answer a series of questions regarding punishment, leader effectiveness, type of violation and leaders' decision speed. The results fully support hypothesis 1 and 2 and partially support hypothesis 3. That is, when a leader punishes a follower the type of violation influenced the perceived effectiveness of the leader. In addition, the decision speed to punish an employee is perceived in terms of doubt. Finally, leaders who quickly decided to punish in response to a competence-based violation were perceived as less effective than leaders who slowly responded to a competence-based violation.

Most relationships were confirmed in study 1; therefore, Study 2 tested the same hypotheses, but now in a cross-sectional survey (as opposed to an experiment). In Study 2 employees of various organizations (MTurk; $N = 200$) were asked to describe a situation from their own working life in which they observed a fellow employee getting punished by their leader. The objective of Study 2 was to test whether the above mentioned relationships were also applicable in a more natural environment. In addition, based on the results of study 1, one extra variable was added for purely explorative research. This variable provided a better understanding of the effect of type of violation on observers' perception of leader effectiveness when a leader decided to use punishment. Again, support was found for hypothesis 1 and 2, although this time no support was found for hypothesis 3. However, the purely explorative variable provided some interesting findings. The most interesting one is that there was an interaction effect between punishment fit and type of violation on leader effectiveness. More specifically, participants rated

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leaders who punished competence-based violators as more effective when the punishment fit was high (as opposed to low) while this effect was attenuated when leaders punished integrity-based violators.

MTurk was used for both studies since it enabled me to specify which individuals were allowed to participate in the studies. In addition, MTurk provides an affordable and simplified way to recruit participants that reflect the diversity of the US population by using convenience sampling. Although recently some concerns arose regarding MTurk data quality. Hauser, Paolacci, & Chandler (2018) found some common concerns with the use of Mturk: participants do not invest sufficient effort in answering questions, MTurkers do not speak English, MTurkers are deceptive, Attrition occurs, and MTurkers self-select. However, these data quality problems can be addressed by carefully designing the studies and questionnaires. In both of our studies the questions were randomly presented, neutrally phrased, and clearly formulated. In addition, different scales were used, an attention check was added, and questions were positively and negatively worded. Besides, honest information was provided about the duration of the questionnaire with a matching financial reward, and anonymity was assured. Furthermore, self-selection was prevented by providing only basic descriptions of the nature of the study in the task description. The gathered data is also screened before usage to ensure clean, high quality data. Overall, all these precautions likely result in high quality data and also prevent common method bias.

Study 1

A scenario-based vignette experiment was conducted to test Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3. The experiment had a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, with leader speed (fast vs. slow) as the first factor and type of violation (competence-based vs integrity-based) as the second factor.

Method

Participants and procedure. The questionnaire used for this study was built in Qualtrics and was posted on MTurk¹. One qualification was set in MTurk: the participants live in America. A total of 501 participants were recruited on MTurk. To increase the response rate, a financial reward of \$0.50 was provided to participants who completed the questionnaire. To increase the quality of the data participants were randomly assigned to one the four experimental conditions and participants were blind to the hypotheses. Participants who did not pass an initial attention check were excluded from the data, resulting in a total of 496 participants (211 females; $M_{age}=38.23$, $SD_{age}=11.67$).

Consistent with prior studies on leaders' decision speed (e.g., Critcher et al., 2013; Van de Calseyde et al., 2014), Study 1 used a scenario-based vignette to assess participants' responses to leaders' punishment decisions. The vignette used for this experiment was an adaption of a vignette used in an experiment by Wang and colleagues (2018). More specifically, participants were asked to read a scenario about an interaction between James and Robert who work for an insurance company in the same department where James is Robert's departmental leader. The interaction took place after James (as leader) learned that Robert (as follower) had violated a company rule. In all four conditions, James decided to punish Robert to make sure that this would not happen again. After reading the vignette, participants were asked to complete a series of questions concerning James as leader. Participants also provided their demographic information.

Manipulations.

¹ It has repeatedly been demonstrated that online participants are equally reliable as lab participants while providing greater diversity (e.g., Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014).

Manipulation of type of violation. The type of violation was manipulated by varying whether the violation was competence-based or integrity-based (Kim et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2018). In the *competence-based violation* condition, participants learned that Robert unintentionally exaggerated to customers the benefits of an insurance policy due to a lack of knowledge about the policies. In the *integrity-based violation* condition, participants learned that Robert intentionally exaggerated the benefits of the insurance policy because he wanted to increase his own sales.

Manipulation of decision speed. Leader decision speed was manipulated by describing how fast James decided to punish Robert (Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). That is, in the fast decision speed condition, participants learned that James immediately decided to punish Robert upon hearing about his misconduct while in the slow decision speed condition, participants learned that he decided to punish Robert after a long pause.

Measurements.

Type of violation. Four questions were used to test the successfulness of the type of violation manipulation. The items were taken and slightly adapted from Kim and colleagues (2004) and Wang and colleagues (2018). Two items formed the integrity-based violation measure (sample item: “Robert deliberately broke the rules for personal gain”; $r_s = .93, p < .001$), and two questions formed the competence-based violation measure (sample item: “Robert broke the rules because he didn’t understand the company’s insurance policies very well”; $r_s = .51, p < .001$).

Perceived doubt. The perceived doubt of the leader (James) was measured by a two-item scale. The items were taken or slightly adapted from Evans, Dillon, & Rand (2015). Participants answered the questions on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*)

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about the perceived doubt of the leader in the scenario (sample item: “James felt conflicted whether to punish Robert for his behaviour”); the Spearman-Brown coefficient was $r_s = .89, p < .001$).

Decision speed. Measures from Van de Calseyde et al. (2020) were adapted to test the effectiveness of the decision speed manipulation. Participants answered two questions on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*) about the expressed leader’s decision speed in the scenario (sample item: “James was fast in deciding to punish Robert”); The Spearman-Brown coefficient was $r_s = .77, p < .001$).

Perceived leader effectiveness. Participants evaluated five questions to assess the perceived effectiveness of the leader. These measures were adapted from Madera and Smith (2009) and Norman, Avolio, & Luthans (2010). More specifically, participants imagined working in the same department as James and Robert and rated the leader (James) on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*) to capture a participant’s general evaluation of the effectiveness of James as leader (“I would want James to continue to be the departmental leader,” “James deserves to be the departmental leader,” “James is a competent leader,” “I would not approve of James as a leader,” “I would recommend James as a leader to a close friend”); $\alpha = .95$).

Strategy of analysis. The G*Power tool was used to calculate the number of participants required to ensure enough statistical power for our experiment. Based on the G*Power a total of 500 participants were recruited for Experiment 1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).

Multiple Likert scale items were used to measure the variables. The Likert scale items were treated as interval data. Therefore, I was able to use the mean of the total items of each scale to create a new item that measures the variable. Perceived leader effectiveness was

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measured with five items and combined into one item that measured leader effectiveness. Cronbach's Alpha was used to measure the scale reliability with a cut-off score of .70 (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010; Nunnally, 1978). The other variables were measured with two items and were averaged into one item that measured the variable. For these items the Spearman-Brown coefficient was used to calculate the scale reliability. Because of the early stage of the research and since only two items were used to measure the variable a cut-off score of 0.50 was used (Cortina, 1993; Nunnally, 1967).

The data will be summarized with descriptive statistics and a correlation table. The descriptive statistics include a table with means, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis, and the Pearson correlation coefficients. The Pearson correlation coefficients were used to identify the relationships between the variables. In addition, analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test if our manipulations for type of violation and leader's decision speed were successful. In this study an alpha value of 0.05 was considered significant. In all models eta squared is used to measure the effect size. Followed by an ANOVA to identify the effects of the independent variables leader decision speed (fast vs. slow) and type of violation (competence-based vs. integrity-based) on the dependent variables perceived doubt and perceived leader effectiveness. When an interaction effect was found, the effect was further explored with a post hoc test. Tukey's Honest Significant difference test was used for the post hoc analyzes, this tells us which specific group's means were different.

After creating the models I screened the results for missing data and outliers. When found they were examined and dealt with before I continued to test the models for the basic assumptions of ANOVA. First, normality was tested with the Shapiro-Wilk test, a Q-Q plot, histogram, and in addition the skewness and kurtosis of the variables. If the skewness and

kurtosis values are between (-2, 2) it is argued to be within an acceptable range to assume normality (Gravetter and Wallnau, 2014). Second, homogeneity was tested with Levene's test. Third, variables were tested for multicollinearity issues. When the variable inflation factor (VIF) is < 2.5 it is assumed that no multicollinearity issues occur (Allison, 2012). Finally, since data on both independent and the dependent variable were collected from the same respondents at one point in time I decided to also test for common method bias (CMB). CMB was tested with the Harman's single factor test and the results should be lower than 50 percent (Fuller, Simmering, Atinc, & Babin, 2016). Furthermore, the assumption of homogeneity and normal distribution are no hard cut-offs since ANOVA is generally robust to these violations when group sizes are equal and the sample size is bigger than 30. The data was analyzed with Rstudio, version 3.6.2 (Rstudio, Boston, MA).

Results

Manipulation checks. A 2 (decision speed: fast vs. slow) x 2 (type of violation: competence-based vs. integrity-based) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on participants' perceptions of the employee's unethical behaviour showed a main effect of type of violation, $F(1,492) = 958.28, p < .001, \eta^2 = .77$. As expected, participants in the integrity-based violation condition perceived Robert's conduct as more unethical than those participants in the competence-based violation condition ($M_{integrity} = 4.79, M_{competence} = 1.75, p < .001$). Likewise, there was a main effect of type of violation on participants' perception of the follower's job incompetence, $F(1,493) = 734.92, p < .001, \eta^2 = .60$. Participants in the competence-based violation condition were more likely to perceive that Robert had a lack of sufficient skills and knowledge than participants in the integrity-based violation condition ($M_{competence} = 3.81, M_{integrity} = 1.73, p < .001$). A similar ANOVA on perceived decision

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speed showed a significant main effect of the speed manipulation, $F(1,493) = 754.03, p < .001, \eta^2 = .60$. As expected, James (as leader) was seen as significantly faster when he immediately decided to punish Robert as opposed to when James came to this decision after a long pause ($M_{fast} = 4.69, M_{slow} = 2.67, p < .001$). There were some other main and interaction effects; however, the effect size of those effects were very small ($<.01$) and for that reason trivial for the current discussion.

Correlation. A correlation analysis was performed to analyze the correlation between type of violation, leader decision speed, leader's doubt, leader effectiveness, gender, and age. The descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in table 1. Promising correlations were found, since all correlations regarding the constructs of interest were significant. In line with Hypothesis 1, a significant correlation was found between type of violation and leader effectiveness $r(496) = 0.39, p < .01$. This result suggest that participants perceive leaders as more effective when leaders punish employees that committed an integrity-based violation (as opposed to a competence-based violation). Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 2, a significant correlation was found between leader decision speed and perceived leader's doubt $r(496) = 0.74, p < .01$. More specifically, this correlation suggest that leaders who are perceived as quick decision makers are perceived as less doubtful than leaders who are perceived as slow.

The results also showed a correlation between age and gender, and between type of violation and perceived leader's doubt. Arguing that a leader who punished a follower for committing a competence-based violation is perceived as more doubtful than a leader who punished a follower for committing an integrity-based violation.

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics and Correlations of Variables in Study 1

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Variable	Mean	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1. Violation	0.50	0.50	0.00	-2.00	1.00					
2. Speed	0.50	0.50	0.01	-2.00	0.01	1.00				
3. Doubt	2.34	1.37	0.43	-1.34	-0.13**	-0.74**	1.00			
4. Effectiveness	3.63	1.08	-0.74	-0.14	0.39**	-0.09	0.01	1.00		
5. Gender	0.57	0.49	-0.30	-1.92	-0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.06	1.00	
6. Age	38.23	11.67	0.88	0.20	-0.07	-0.01	-0.06	-0.09	-0.11*	1.00

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$


Analysis of variance.

Perceived doubt. Following Hypothesis 2, it was predicted that observers would interpret a leader's decision speed in terms of doubt. That is, slow decisions are indicative that a leader doubted whether to punish a follower or not while a fast decision would reveal a leader's lack of doubt. Results from a 2 (decision speed: fast vs. slow) X 2 (type of violation: competence-based vs. integrity-based) ANOVA on perceived doubt revealed that there was a main effect of decision speed on perceived doubt, $F(1,492) = 385.88, p < .001, \eta^2 = .55$. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the leader in the slow decision speed condition was perceived significantly more doubtful than the leader in the fast decision speed condition ($M_{slow} = 3.35$ vs. $M_{fast} = 1.32, p < .001$). The ANOVA also revealed that there was no main effect of type of violation on perceived doubt, $F(1,492) = .84, p > .10, \eta^2 = .02$. On the other hand, there was a significant interaction effect between leaders decision speed and the type of violation, $F(1,492) = 7.47, p = .007, \eta^2 = .007$. The interaction and main effect are depicted in Figure 1. Simple effect analyses were run to gain a better understanding of this interaction effect. Leaders who were slow in their decision to punish a violator in the competence-based violation condition were judged by participants as more doubtful ($M_{slow\ competence} = 3.62, SD = 1.02$) than leaders who were slow in deciding to punish a violator in the integrity-based violation condition

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($M_{slow\ integrity} = 3.07, SD = 1.14$), $b = .55, SE = .11, p < .001$. On the contrary, in the opposite fast condition, we did not find a significant result. That is, leaders who were fast in their decision making to punish a violator in the competence-based violation condition were not significantly judged by participants as more doubtful ($M_{fast\ competence} = 1.37, SD = .73$) than leaders who were fast in the integrity-based violation. ($M_{fast\ integrity} = 1.27, SD = .60$), $b = .11, SE = .11, p > .10$. No clear explanation is currently available to account for these differences (although it should be noted that the effect size of the interaction is relatively small). Overall, these results are in line with the conjecture that people interpret decision speed in terms of doubt (Critcher et al., 2013; Evans & Van de Calseyde, 2017; Van de Calseyde et al., 2014; Van de Calseyde, 2020).

Figure 1. *Interaction plot for perceived doubt.*



Perceived leader effectiveness. Following Hypothesis 1, it was predicted that observers would evaluate leaders as more effective when leaders decide to punish employees that have committed an integrity-based violation, but as less effective when leaders punish employees that


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have committed a competence-based violation. In addition, following Hypothesis 3, it was predicted that people evaluate leaders as more effective when leaders quickly (as opposed to slowly) decided to punish integrity-based violations. This effect is expected to reverse when leaders decide to punish an employee for a competence-based violation. In this case, it was predicted that people evaluate leaders as less effective when leaders quickly (as opposed to slowly) decided to punish competence-based violations. A 2 (decision speed: fast vs. slow) X 2 (type of violation: competence-based vs. integrity-based) ANOVA on perceived leader effectiveness was conducted to test these predictions. The model showed a significant main effect of type of violation, $F(1,492) = 94.94, p < .001, \eta^2 = .15$. In support of Hypothesis 1, the leader who decided to punish in the integrity-based condition was perceived significantly more effective than the leader who decided to punish in the competence-based condition ($M_{integrity} = 4.05, M_{competence} = 3.21, p < .001$). The ANOVA also showed a significant main effect of decision speed on perceived leader effectiveness, $F(1,492) = 21.270, p < .001, \eta^2 < .01$. This effect suggests that the leader who decided to punish after a long delay was perceived significantly more effective than the leader who immediately decided to punish the follower, ($M_{slow} = 3.72, M_{fast} = 3.54, p < .001$). Importantly, the analysis revealed a significant interaction effect between the type of violation and leader decision speed, $F(1,492) = 18.375, p < .001, \eta^2 = .03$, indicating that the effect of type of violation on perceived leader effectiveness was moderated by leader decision speed. This interaction effect is represented in Figure 2. Simple effects analysis was used to gain a better understanding of this interaction. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, leaders' decision speed significantly lowered perceived leader effectiveness in the competence-based violation condition ($M_{fast\ competence} = 2.92, SD = 1.15$ for the fast condition vs. $M_{slow\ competence} = 3.50, SD = .95$ for the slow

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condition), $b = -.57, SE = .12, p < .001$. This effect was expected to reverse when participants evaluated leaders in the integrity based-violation condition. However, the results showed no significant evidence to suggest that leaders decision speed enhanced perceived leader effectiveness in the integrity-based violation condition ($M_{fast\ integrity} = 4.13, SD = .88$ for the fast condition vs. $M_{slow\ integrity} = 3.95, SD = .91$ for the slow condition), $b = .18, SE = .12, p > .10$. Overall, these findings fully support Hypothesis 1 while partially supporting Hypothesis 3.

Figure 2. *Perceived leader effectiveness as a function of leader's decision speed and the type of violation that elicited the punishment, Experiment 1.*



Study 2

Although the results from the previous study did not fully support Hypothesis 3, the initial findings were promising. However, while promising, Study 1 used a scenario-based experiment. Although an advantage of this research method is that it provided a high level of control. A disadvantage of this method is that it used a hypothetical situation to test the proposed relationships. To address this limitation, Study 2 tested the same hypotheses, but now in a cross-

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sectional survey (as opposed to an experiment). More specific, Study 2 tested the hypotheses in the context of actual organizations in which employees recalled an incident in which their departmental leader punished a fellow co-worker.

Furthermore, an additional measurement was added to the questionnaire, namely did the severity of the punishment fitted the seriousness of the violation. This measure was based on the proportionality principle in English sentencing. The introduction of the proportionality principle was written down in the white paper of the criminal justice act of 1991, which asserted that: “If the punishment is just, and in proportion to the seriousness of the offence, then the victim, the victim’s family and friends, and the public will be satisfied that the law has been upheld and there will be no desire for further retaliation or private revenge” (Home Office, 1990). The concept of proportionality is still used till this day, as a method to find the correct balance between the severity of the punishment and the seriousness of the wrongdoing. Therefore a punishment does not always lead to compliance, as punishment can result in positive or negative outcomes depending on the fit of the punishment (Mooijman, Van Dijk, Van Dijk, & Ellemers, 2017; Van Dijk, Mulder, & de Kwaadsteniet, 2014).

Method

Participants and procedure. Employees of various organisations were asked to recall a situation in which they observed a fellow employee getting punished by their leader based on a competence-based or integrity-based violation. Additionally, participants were asked to indicate the speed with which their supervisor decided to punish their colleague. Similar to study one, Qualtrics was used to build the questionnaire and the questionnaire was posted on MTurk. For this experiment two qualifications were set in MTurk: the participants live in America, and the participants had to have a job in an organization. After excluding six participants for either

failing the attention check or for not complying with describing a relevant instance of their working life, 194 participants remained (70 females; $M_{age} = 36.73$, $SD_{age} = 10.20$).

Measurements.

Decision speed. Measures from Van de Calseyde and colleagues (2020) were adapted to assess participants' perceptions of a leader's decision speed. The first question ("How much time did your supervisor need in deciding to punish your colleague?") was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *A lot of time*; 5 = *A little time*). The second question ("How fast was your supervisor in deciding to punish your colleague?") was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *Very slow*; 5 = *Very fast*), resulting in a composite measure labelled 'leader decision speed'; the Spearman-Brown coefficient was $r_s = .63$, $p < .001$.

Perceived doubt. To examine the perceived doubt of a leader, participants answered a question on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "Not at all conflicted," 5 = "Very conflicted") about how conflicted the leader was in deciding to punish the employee ("How conflicted was your supervisor in deciding whether to punish your colleague or not?"). This item was developed by Evans and colleagues (2015).

Leader effectiveness. Participants responded to five questions (1 = *Strongly disagree*; 5 = *Strongly agree*) to assess participants' evaluations of the leader's effectiveness (e.g., "My supervisor deserves to be the departmental leader"; $\alpha = .91$). These questions were adapted from Madera and Smith (2009) and Norman and colleagues (2010).

Punishment is proportional to the violation. One item was used to examine the participants' opinion whether the severity of the punishment fitted the seriousness of the violation. Participants answered the question ("The severity of the punishment fitted the

seriousness of the wrongdoing”) on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *Strongly disagree*; 5 = *Strongly agree*).

Demographics. We also asked participants for some personal and organizational characteristics, this to obtain a more complete dataset. The added control variables were age, gender, tenure and size of the organization.

Strategy of analysis. The G*Power was used to ensure enough statistical power for my second experiment. According to the G*Power I needed to recruit a total of 200 participants for Experiment 2 (Faul et al., 2007). The preparation of the data and interpretation of the Likert items were the same as in Experiment 1.

Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were tested with simple linear regression. For hypothesis 3 I decided to use hierarchical linear regression since I wanted to know what the collective impact was of multiple variables on my dependent variable leader effectiveness. In this study an alpha value of 0.05 was considered significant. Hierarchical linear regression is a framework to compare different models to analyze whether the new model better explains the variance in the dependent variable. The first block includes the demographic factors age, gender, organization size, and organization tenure. In the next block, I added the three variables of interest type of violation, leader decision speed, and punishment fit. In the third block, the three two-way interactions of the variables of interest were entered in to the model to test whether the interactions statistically are better predictors of the dependent variable leader effectiveness compared to the three variables separately. In the last block I added the three-way interaction to test whether there is a two-way interaction that varies across levels of a third variable. R^2 was used define how well the regression model fitted the observed data.

The models were screened for missing data and outliers, when found they were handled with care. Furthermore, I tested the assumptions for linear regression. First, the residual of the regression should follow a normal distribution. A normal predicted probability (P-P) plot was used to determine whether the residuals followed a normal distribution. Second, a scatterplot of the predicted values and residuals were used to test for homoscedasticity. Third, absence of multicollinearity was tested with the VIF score. According to Allison (2012) the score should be below 2.5 to assure no multicollinearity. Finally, since all the data was gathered at one single moment in time I also tested for common method bias. The Harman's single factor test was used and if the total variance of a single factor is less than 50%, it indicates that CMB does not affect the data (Fuller et al., 2016). The data in Study 2 was analyzed with SPSS, version 26 (IBM, Armonk, NY).

Results

Correlation. A correlation analysis was performed to get an initial impression of the relationship between the variables: type of violation (i.e., competence- and integrity-based), leader decision speed, leaders doubt, leader effectiveness and punishment proportional to the violation. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2, presenting the descriptive statistics and the correlations of the variables. The results point out that there is a significant correlation between the type of violation and leader effectiveness $r(192) = .15, p < .05$. A promising correlation since this is in line with Hypothesis 1 that argues that the perceived effectiveness of leaders punishing followers depends on the type of violation of a follower. Another significant correlation was found between perceived leaders decision speed and perceived doubt $r(192) = -.48, p < .01$. This is in line with Hypothesis 2, arguing that a leader who decides fast is perceived as less doubtful than a leader who decides slow.

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Furthermore, the explorative variable punishment fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing showed a significant correlation with leader effectiveness $r(192) = .49, p < .01$. More specifically, when a leader's punishment fits the employee's wrongdoing the leader was rated higher on leader effectiveness by their employees. Finally, the longer an employee is working for their organization (tenure), the higher they rated their leader on leader effectiveness.

Table 2.

Descriptive statistics and Correlations of Variables in Study 2

Variable	Mean	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1. Violation	0.55	0.50	-0.21	-1.98	1.00								
2. Speed	4.04	0.93	-0.73	-0.17	-0.16*	1.00							
3. Doubt	2.13	1.29	0.80	-0.71	-0.06	-0.48**	1.00						
4. Effectiveness	3.78	0.97	-0.84	0.20	0.15*	-0.12	-0.14	1.00					
5. Punishment fit	3.73	1.17	-0.80	-0.11	0.13	-0.05	-0.06	0.49**	1.00				
6. Gender	0.36	0.48	0.58	-1.68	0.07	0.08	-0.06	-0.01	-0.08	1.00			
7. Age	36.73	10.20	0.89	0.28	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.18*	1.00		
8. Tenure	2.33	0.61	-0.31	-0.64	0.03	-0.13	0.05	0.19**	0.07	0.03	0.32**	1.00	
9. Org size	2.42	0.62	-0.61	-0.57	-0.04	0.08	-0.10	0.10	0.11	-0.08	0.03	0.12	1.00


* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Regression. Hypothesis 1 proposes that observers would evaluate leaders as more effective when leaders punish employees that have committed an integrity-based violation, but as less effective when leaders punish employees that have committed a competence-based violation. The results related to this hypothesis are presented in Figure 3. A significant regression equation was found $F(1,192) = 4.41, p = 0.04$ with an R^2 of .02. As predicted, a simple linear regression revealed a significant difference between type of violation and leader effectiveness $b = .29, t(192) = 2.10, p < .05$. The average leader effectiveness score when punishing an employee in a competence-based violation is .29 lower than when a leader decided to punish in a situation where the employee committed an integrity-based violation. The findings again

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underscore the importance of type of violation when punishing followers. Consistent with my predictions and study 1, results showed that leaders are rated as more effective when they punish an integrity-based violation in comparison to a competence-based violation.

Figure 3. *Leader effectiveness as a function of type of violation.*



Hypothesis 2 proposes that there is a relation between leaders' decision speed and observers' perception of leaders' doubt. A simple linear regression was performed to predict perceived leaders' doubt based on perceived leaders' decision speed. A significant regression equation was found ($F(1,191) = 56.09, p < .001$, with an R^2 of .23). The regression revealed that perceived leaders' doubt was significantly predicted by perceived leaders' decision speed. More specifically, the faster the decision speed of a leader, the less doubtful s/he was perceived, $b = -.66, t(192) = -7.49, p < .001$. This is consistent with Study 1 and in support of Hypothesis 2.

Four-stage hierarchical regression analysis. A four-stage hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to test the role of the explorative variable 'punishment fit', and the

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variables leader decision speed and type of violation on the perceived effectiveness of a leader. At stage 1, the variables age, gender, organization size, and tenure were used as control variables for estimating the level of leader effectiveness. At stage 2, ‘type of violation’, ‘leader decision speed’, and ‘punishment fit’ were entered in the model as predictors. At stage 3, the two-way interaction terms were added into the model (i.e. type of violation * punishment fit, type of violation * leader decision speed, and leader decision speed * punishment fit). In the final stage, the three-way interaction term between type of violation, leader decision speed, and punishment fit were entered into the model.

The regression statistics for leader effectiveness are presented in Table 2. At stage 1, it showed that leader effectiveness was predicted by the control variable organizational tenure. More specifically, the longer a participant was working at their current organization, the higher they rate their leader on one’s effectiveness, $b = .31, t(189) = 2.52, p = .01$. The other control variables did not predict a leader’s effectiveness. More important, at stage 2, adding type of violation, leaders decision speed and punishment fit to the model improved the model significantly ($\Delta R^2 = .25; p < .001$). That is, punishment fit was significantly related to a leader’s effectiveness, $b = .38, t(186) = 7.25, p < .001$. When the punishment was perceived to be proportional to the wrongdoing, a leader was generally perceived as more effective. Importantly, at stage 3, the added two-way interactions again improved the model ($\Delta R^2 = .04; p < .001$). More specific, the interaction between punishment fit and type of violation was significantly related to effective leadership, $b = -.32, t(183) = -2.90, p = .004$. That is, the results indicate that the effect of type of violation on leader effectiveness depends on the punishment fit. When leaders punished competence-based violations, followers evaluated leaders as more effective when the punishment fitted the seriousness of the

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wrongdoing (as opposed to a poor fit to the wrongdoing) $b = 0.57, t(85) = 8.26, p < .001$. An explanation for the high leader effectiveness in the competence-based violation could be that in most situations you could barely speak of a punishment. Most described situations spoke of a verbal warning instead of a punishment. For example, “He got a verbal warning to be more careful and to slow down next time”, “my supervisor talked to the person and gave a light punishment as he was warned before”, “A colleague rushed his work and was caught by his supervisor. Our supervisor warned him and made him do the assignment again”. This also explains why participants rated the ‘punishment’ as just in relation to the wrongdoing. A similar effect occurs when leaders punish integrity-based violations. That is, when leaders punished integrity-based violations, followers evaluated leaders as more effective when the punishment fitted the violations (as opposed to a poor fit to the violation) $b = 0.19, t(105) = 2.51, p = .014$. Although this time the effect of the type of violation is not as evident as in the competence-based violation. It can even be argued whether there is a linear effect, since it seems that the effect of punishment fit on an integrity-based violation followed a U-pattern. At this moment in time no clear explanation is available for the U-pattern. Figure 4 graphically presents this interaction effect. In contradiction to the significant two-way interaction between type of violations and punishment fit there was no significant two-way interaction between type of violation and leader decision speed. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is not supported in study 2. More specifically, no evidence was found for the relation between leader decision speed and type of violation in predicting leader effectiveness. In the discussion section we will further elaborate on this finding.

Figure 4. *The relationship between leader effectiveness and punishment fitted the seriousness of the violation as a function of the type of violation, Study 2.*

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At stage 4, the three-way interaction did not further improve the model. Overall, the added exploratory variable ‘punishment fit’ provided some interesting results regarding the dependent variable leader effectiveness, especially when ‘punishment fit’ interacted with the variable ‘types of violations’.

Table 3.

Summary of the Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models Predicting Leader Effectiveness by Age, Gender, Organization Size, Organization Tenure, Leader decision speed, Punishment Proportional to the Violation, Types of Violations, and the Two- and Three-way Interactions of Leader decision speed, Types of Violations, and Punishment Proportional to the Violation, Study 2.

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	Leader Effectiveness							
	Stage 1		Stage 2		Stage 3		Stage 4	
<i>Independent variables</i>	<i>b (SE b)</i>	β	<i>b (SE b)</i>	β	<i>b (SE b)</i>	β	<i>b (SE b)</i>	β
Age	-0.01(0.01)	-0.02	-0.01(0.01)	-0.04	-0.01(0.01)	-0.01	-0.01(0.01)	-0.01
Gender	-0.01(0.15)	-0.01	0.07(0.13)	0.03	0.06(0.13)	0.03	0.06(0.13)	0.03
Org Size	0.12(0.11)	0.08	0.07(0.10)	0.04	0.08(0.10)	0.05	0.08(0.10)	0.05
Org Tenure	0.31(0.12)	0.19*	0.25(0.11)	0.16*	0.19(0.11)	0.12	0.19(0.11)	0.12
Speed			-0.08(0.07)	-0.072	-0.30(0.25)	-0.28	-0.53(0.43)	-0.50
Punishment fit			0.38(0.05)	0.46***	0.29(0.29)	0.35	0.01(0.53)	0.01
Violation			0.14(0.13)	0.07	1.18(0.69)	0.61	-0.26(2.33)	-0.13
Punishment fit * Speed					0.06(0.06)	0.35	0.12(0.12)	0.74
Punishment fit * Violation					-0.32(0.11)	-0.68**	0.07(0.61)	0.15
Violation * Speed					0.04(0.14)	0.07	0.36(0.52)	0.77
Punishment fit * Speed * Violation							-0.09(0.14)	-0.79
R^2		0.044		0.277		0.322		0.324
F for change in R^2		2.16		19.98***		4.12**		0.42

* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$

General Discussion

The aim of this study was to investigate the relationships between types of violations, leader decision speed, perception of leader's doubt and leader effectiveness when a leader decided to punish a follower. The results showed some indications that leader's decision time when punishing followers is perceived in terms of doubt. It is likely that the type of violation (competence-based vs. integrity-based) influenced the perceived leader effectiveness when a leader decided to punish followers. Leader's decision speed affected the outcome of leader effectiveness in the competence based violation condition. There could possibly be an effect between type of violation and punishment fit on leader effectiveness, as an interaction was found.

At first, I took a closer look at how people rated leaders on effectiveness when a leader decided to punish different types of violations. The committed violations were categorized in

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integrity- and competence-based violations since research in multiple areas had shown that people respond differently to misconduct related to competence vs integrity (Fiske et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2018). I consistently found in both studies that people might respond differently to these two type of violations when evaluating leaders who punish. Indicating that leaders who punished integrity-based violations often were perceived as more effective than leaders who punished competence-based violations.

Second, I tested whether people interpreted leaders' decision speed in terms of doubt when a leader decided to punish one of their followers. The results in both studies indicate that participants are likely to interpret leaders' decision speed to punish in terms of doubt.

Third, although no full support for hypothesis 3 was found, some possible relationships concerning punishment and leader effectiveness were found. For example, in Experiment 1 leaders' decision speed significantly lowered perceived leader effectiveness in the competence-based violation condition. Leaders fast in deciding to punish their followers in a competence-based violation were rated lower on perceived leader effectiveness than leaders who slowly decided to punish their followers in this condition. In the integrity-based violation condition, decision speed had no significant influence on perceived leader effectiveness. Study 2 was not able to replicate these findings, no significant results were found. Although Experiment 2 was not able to replicate these findings. The results from Experiment 1 suggest that leaders should take their time before they decide to punish a follower when the leaders are not certain of the cause of the wrongdoing, because a quick controversial decision is likely to relate to lower ratings on leader effectiveness in comparison to controversial slow decisions. Atwater, Waldman, Carey, and Cartier (2001) also argue that it may desirable to delay punishment, however they argue that it is because of the emotional state of the leader instead of his doubt.

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That is, leaders were often emotionally out of control when punishing violating behavior immediately, often resulting in a harsh interaction with the employee. Keep in mind that effective leadership when punishing employees is not achieved by deciding either quick or slow, but rather in knowing when to do so.

Finally, the exploratory variable ‘punishment fitted the seriousness of the violation’ was significantly related to leader effectiveness. Participants rated leaders higher on effectiveness when the punishment fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing (as opposed to when the punishment poorly fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing). This is in line with the findings of Alexander and Ruderman (1987), Atwater and colleagues (1998) and Tyler (1984), who also found that a just punishment positively affect satisfaction with the leader. In addition, another interesting relation regarding punishment and type of violation was found. That is, an interaction effect between punishment fit and type of violation on leader effectiveness was found. More specifically, participants rated leaders who punished competence-based violators as more effective when the punishment fit was high (as opposed to low) while this effect was attenuated when leaders punished integrity-based violators.

Theoretical Implications

Prior literature stated that people respond differently to violations originating from a lack of competence or integrity (Fiske et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2018). Wang and colleagues (2018), for example, provided some initial results for this notion within the anger literature, whereas Kim and colleagues (2004) did this within the trust literature. My work further contributes to this line of research, since the current research similarly suggest that people respond differently to leaders who decided to punish employees who committed an integrity-based vs. competence-based violation. That is, punishing integrity-based violations positively

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influences leader effectiveness in comparison to punishing competence-based violations. This is a relevant extension for the punishment literature because prior research mostly show a negative relationship between punishment and leader effectiveness. Here is shown that it highly depends on the type of violation.

The current findings are in line with previous research indicating that followers use leaders' signals to gain information about leaders' hidden intentions (Antokanis et al., 2016; Reh et al., 2017). More specifically, the signal speed shapes and influences people on the individual level (e.g., Critcher et al., 2013; Evans & Van de Calseyde, 2017; Jordan et al., 2016; Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). The present research extends these findings by providing evidence that followers are also sensitive to a leader's signaling speed when observing leaders' decision-making process whether to punish a follower or not. A slow decision was perceived as more doubtful than a fast decision to punish a follower. In this thesis, slow decisions signal doubt, this however does not mean that slow decisions always signal doubt. Researchers found that slow decision speed is perceived differently for complex tasks that require effort. In this case slow decision speed reveals a person's effort as opposed to one's doubts (Efendic, Van de Calseyde, & Evans, 2019). For example, Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, and Altermatt (2004) asked participants to read and evaluate a poem. Half of the participants were told that it took 18 hours (high-effort) to compose the poem, and the other half were told it took 4 hours (low-effort) to complete the poem. The participants evaluated more effort with higher quality. They also expected the poem to have a higher price value. The observed effort in this case measured in time was related to quality and value by the participants. Therefore, it is likely that the information observers gain from the signal speed depends on the difficulty of the task. It would be interesting to further investigate when leaders decision speed is interpreted as doubt vs. effort.

Aramovich and Blankenship (2020) argue to remain competitive, leaders should be confident and make decisions quickly to take immediate action. Some scholars even rated decisiveness above competence as one of the most important characteristics to look for in leaders (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). This thesis provided evidence that the effect of leaders' decision speed depends on the context and therefore questions the generality of this proposition. Other researchers already provided evidence that the effect of leaders' decision speed depends on the outcome of the decision (e.g., Critcher et al., 2013; Van de Calseyde et al., 2020). When a decision is controversial, a quick decision is likely to backfire, whereas a quick decision helps a leader when the outcome is favorable. A leader quickly deciding to punish in the competence-based violation condition was perceived as less effective than a leader who slowly decided to punish in the same condition. This research, therefore, contributes to a stream of research that argues that the effect of decision speed is context-dependent. To be more precise, it depends on whether the outcome is perceived as favorable or unfavorable. Although only significant results were found for an unfavorable outcome, this could be an interesting topic for future research. That is, are people more sensitive for details when an outcome is unfavorable vs. favorable.

Past research mainly focused on the influence of decision speed on the organizational level. Researchers repetitively found that fast strategic decisions contribute to better firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge & Miller, 1991). In addition, Stevenson and Gumpert (1985) found that firms that make faster decisions have a greater ability to exploit new business opportunities than their competitors. The present research adds to this area of research that decision speed does not only impact results on the organizational level, but also should be taken into account when researching processes on the interpersonal level.

Practical Implications

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The results of this thesis also have some practical implications. First, leaders whom seek to increase their leader effectiveness when punishing norm violators could benefit from this. That is, the type of the committed violation influences the outcome of leader effectiveness when a leader uses punishment. These findings suggest that leaders can use punishment to increase their effectiveness by successfully punishing integrity-based violations. On the contrary, in this study punishing competence-based violations decreased satisfaction with supervisors. This work provides leaders with some guidelines when punishment may enhance or undermines leader effectiveness. As a result, leaders should pay close attention to the type of violation before punishing the violator.

Second, effective leaders are of great importance to organizations (e.g., Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Denison, Hooijberg, & Quinn, 1995; Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003; Yukl, 2008). Leaders could use signaling to become more effective. However, leaders should keep in mind that signaling affects people even before leadership interactions take place (Swider, Barrick, & Harris, 2016). Accordingly, it is likely that leaders can use the signal decision speed to further increase their effectiveness when punishing a follower. That is, when they decide controversially. However, it is not likely that a leader decides controversially on purpose. Therefore the advice for managers is to decide slowly when they have to punish a follower, because this generally results in higher leader effectiveness. This understanding may provide leaders with the capacity to maximize the power of the signal speed.

Strengths, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research

A strength of the present study is that it used two different research methods. First, an experimental design (2x2 between-subject design) was used. The leader's decision speed and the violation that was committed by the employee were manipulated. This setup allowed me to

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control the independent variables (type of violation and leader decision speed) into different combinations to study possible outcomes on leader effectiveness. Although an experimental design provides a high level of control it also has some disadvantages. A controlled experiment creates a somewhat artificial situation. That is, the environment is highly controlled and therefore limits the generalizability of the findings. The second study, a cross-sectional field survey, fills this gap. One of the strengths of this research method is that it is conducted in a real-world and natural environment. Therefore, it comes as close to the reality as possible. Nonetheless, this research also has its weaknesses. One of the biggest weaknesses is that this type of research is correlational, making it difficult to establish a causal relationship. It is also not possible to control for confounding variables. In summary, the strength of two different methods is that they complement each other. That is, the weaknesses of one method are compensated by the strengths of another method.

In this thesis, hypothesis 3 was only partially supported in study 1 and not supported in study 2. An explanation why no support for hypothesis 3 was found could be due to our research design. For example, in study 1 a vignette was used that described a leader-follower interaction. The vignette described a situation which explained that the employee got punished, although the punishment itself was not defined. Therefore, participants were left to their imagination whether the punishment fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing. It is likely that the effects of punishment may differ depending upon the form of punishment, e.g., reprimand, suspension, cut in pay. In study 2 an exploratory variable was added that measured whether the punishment fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing. Although, in this experiment the average for leaders decision speed was very high. Resulting in a lot of data on quick leaders in comparison to slow leaders. This does not have to be a problem; however, it was found that leaders who decided within

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seconds were perceived as quick, but leaders who decided within minutes, hours or even days were also rated as quick. I asked for the perception of the leader's decision speed, in future research I would advise to also gain information about the actual decision speed. My advice is to add a question that measures whether the leader decided in seconds, minutes, hours or even days. Another option could be a different experimental setup where participants watch a video or a staged conversation with actual speed. In summary, not specifying the punishment in Experiment 1 and only measuring the perception of leaders' decision speed in Experiment 2 could be reasons why no results were found for hypothesis 3.

It is worth noting that MTurk was used for both studies to collect the data. Although MTurk has been proven equally reliable as lab participants (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014), it also has some limitations. For example, MTurk restricted us to data from one country, America. It would also be interesting to test our findings in different environments. For example, within a company, or within another country. Besides, MTurk used convenient sampling to gather the data. This technique has some flaws a better sampling method would have been random sampling, this to ensure the absence of bias.

Another limitation of our study is that I did not consider whether the punishment was based on a one-time violation or a sustained violation over time. It is feasible that punishment in response to competence-based violations can yield different consequences if the wrongdoing is a repeated offense. For example, how do people respond to an employee that does simply not improve and repetitively shows a lack of skills and knowledge.

Data was gathered at one moment in time, this increases the possibility for common method bias. For future research I would suggest a time lag between measuring the dependent and independent variable.

It is important to note that the purely exploratory variable ‘The severity of the punishment fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing’ was measured by only one question. Since the first results regarding this variable were promising it therefore could be interesting to further explore this subject. For example, when the punishment did not fit the seriousness of the wrongdoing someone could wonder whether the punishment was too harsh or too soft in relation to the violation. Future research could take this into consideration when further exploring how the proportionality of a punishment influences leader effectiveness.

Our final limitation is that in this thesis the leader always decided to punish a follower for their wrongdoing. Although literature suggests that it is sometimes better to show support instead of punishing a follower that violated the leaders expectations (Brethower, 1993). An interesting follow-up study could test what happens when a leader decides not to punish, or even decides to show support instead.

Conclusion

The present research is an initial step towards understanding the relationship between punishment and leader effectiveness. More specifically, this thesis investigated how the effect of punishment on leader effectiveness is influenced by the type of violation and in addition leader’s decision speed. This thesis showed that the effect of punishment on leader effectiveness is influenced by the type of violation. Therefore, a leader should pay close attention to the type of violation that is committed before punishing the violator. Effective leaders should be aware of the power of punishment and what the effects are of punishment in different contexts and thereby ensure that their use of punishment results in a positive atmosphere within the organization. In addition, the results show that observers interpret leaders decision speed in terms of doubt when a leader decided to punish a follower. However, in this thesis only partial support was found to

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argue that leader's decision speed would moderate the effect between type of violation and leader effectiveness. Overall, these findings underline the importance of considering further investigation of the relationship between punishment and leader effectiveness in future research.

Punishment is typically considered a negative response, however, a leader successfully using punishment depending on the type of violation is able to increase his or her effectiveness. A successful leader knows the power of punishment and the signal speed, and is therefore using them with care.

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Appendix

Questions for experiment 1

Measures of doubt, decision speed, type of violation, and leader effectiveness

To indicate the degree to which each participant agrees with each statement a five point Likert-scale was used.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Perceived doubt.

1. James felt conflicted whether to punish Robert for his behavior
2. James doubted whether to punish Robert or not for his behavior

Perceived leader effectiveness.

Imagine working in the same department and respond to the following statements:

1. I would want James to continue to be the departmental leader
2. James deserves to be the departmental leader
3. James is a competent leader
4. I would not approve of James as a leader (Reversed)
5. I would recommend James as a leader to a close friend

Decision speed.

1. James was fast in deciding to punish Robert
2. James needed much time to decide to punish Robert (Reversed)

Type of violation.

Competence-based violation:

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1. Robert broke the rules because he didn't understand the company's insurance policies very well
2. Robert broke the rules due to lack of skills

Integrity-based violation:

1. Robert broke the rules because he wanted to increase his own sales
2. Robert deliberately broke the rules for personal gain

Characteristics.

1. Gender
2. Age

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Vignettes for experiment 1

Insurance company - exaggerated the benefits of the company's insurance policies

Fast + Competence

James and Robert work for an insurance company in the same department. James is Robert's departmental leader.

James asked for a meeting with Robert as he found out that Robert exaggerated the benefits of the company's insurance policies to customers. During this meeting, James learned that Robert **unintentionally exaggerated** the benefits of the company's insurance policies because of Robert's **inadequate knowledge** of the policies.

James **immediately** decides to punish Robert for his behavior.

Fast + Integrity

James and Robert work for an insurance company in the same department. James is Robert's departmental leader.

James asked for a meeting with Robert as he found out that Robert exaggerated the benefits of the company's insurance policies to customers. During this meeting, James learned that Robert **intentionally exaggerated** the benefits of the company's insurance policies to **increase his own sales**.

James **immediately** decides to punish Robert for his behavior.

Slow + Competence

James and Robert work for an insurance company in the same department. James is Robert's departmental leader.

James asked for a meeting with Robert as he found out that Robert exaggerated the benefits of the company's insurance policies to customers. During this meeting, James learned that Robert **unintentionally exaggerated** the benefits of the company's insurance policies because of Robert's **inadequate knowledge** of the policies.

After a long pause James decides to punish Robert for his behavior.

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Slow + Integrity

James and Robert work for an insurance company in the same department. James is Robert's departmental leader.

James asked for a meeting with Robert as he found out that Robert exaggerated the benefits of the company's insurance policies to customers. During this meeting, James learned that Robert **intentionally exaggerated** the benefits of the company's insurance policies to **increase his own sales**.

After a long pause James decides to punish Robert for his behavior.

Questions for study 2

Decision speed.

1. How much time did your supervisor need in deciding to punish your colleague
2. How fast was your supervisor in deciding to punish your colleague

Perceived doubt.

1. How conflicted was your supervisor in deciding whether to punish your colleague or not?

Perceived leader effectiveness.

1. My supervisor deserves to be the departmental leader
2. My supervisor is a competent leader
3. I do not approve of my supervisor as a leader (reversed)
4. I would recommend my supervisor as a leader to a close friend
5. I would want my supervisor to continue to be the departmental leader

Punishment proportional to the violation.

1. The severity of the punishment fitted the seriousness of the wrongdoing.

Characteristics.

1. Gender
2. Age
3. Size of the organization
4. Tenure