Cycling as a service assessed from a combined business-model and transitions perspective

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Cycling as a service assessed from a combined business-model and transitions perspective


School of Innovation Sciences, Eindhoven University of Technology, De Rondom 70, 5612AP, Eindhoven, the Netherlands

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ABSTRACT

Cycling-based mobility services or 'Cycling as a Service' (CaaS) have recently expanded in number and scale in the Netherlands. In contrast to the contexts of most other CaaS studies to date, cycling has a high modal share and strong institutions in the Dutch context. However, these supportive features have not translated into straightforward success for CaaS providers. Instead, responses to CaaS providers have varied widely, from tolerance to opposition. In this study we employ a combined business model and transition perspective to investigate this variation and its implications for CaaS in Dutch urban mobility systems. We present value propositions derived from business models, and integrate these into Hoogma's fit-and-stretch strategy framework for emerging niches. This enables a comparison between technology design and value propositions, and an analysis of the CaaS niche's transitions potential. Our findings clarify the strategies used by niche actors to enter and operate within established cycling regimes.

1. Introduction

Cycling as a Service (CaaS), referring to services such as bikeshare that provide users with temporary access to a bicycle, has been promoted around the world as a low-carbon form of urban mobility that is cost, energy and space-efficient. Considering that transport's share of global carbon emissions is at 23% and rising, CaaS's potential to combat climate change on an urbanising planet is significant (World Bank, 2017). However, despite the Netherlands' strengths as a leading cycling nation with a long history of cycling innovation, Dutch cities have lagged behind their developed-world counterparts in their adoption of city-wide public bikeshare systems, which have long been the face of CaaS elsewhere (Alpkokin, 2012; KiM, 2016a; van Goeverden and Godefrooij, 2010). In many cities, the promotion of these systems, often with public subsidy or incentives, has been intended to pioneer a mainstream, everyday cycling culture (Goodman et al., 2014). In Dutch cities, in contrast, a mainstream cycling culture already exists, along with a supportive legal environment and physical infrastructure (Fishman, 2016; KiM, 2016b). However, despite these favourable conditions, CaaS in the Netherlands has until recently been largely limited to the rail station-based OV-Fiets bike hire system.

It was only in the period 2015–2017 that CaaS operators began to enter the Dutch urban mobility market en masse (van Waes et al., 2018). This period provides an instructive case of an innovation that has largely developed and matured in historically low-cycling contexts, interacting with a mature and socially embedded cycling context. The Dutch case also makes for a compelling study of CaaS operators' strategic responses to this environment. Understanding why CaaS lagged in its introduction to the Netherlands, and
why individual CaaS operators met with varying levels of opposition from other actors, may yield a more nuanced understanding of its prospects in the future of Dutch urban mobility. These prospects are particularly important in light of the country’s stated aim to further raise cycling levels and improve the integration of cycling with other mobility modes, in pursuit of a sustainable mobility transition (Bertolini et al., 2015; KiM, 2018). These observations may also contribute to theoretical conceptions of how firms bring shared mobility innovations to specific markets (Manders et al., 2018) by creating and capturing value for various stakeholders. Business models are one unit of analysis that can help analyse and compare CaaS firms, as well as how they interact with other, more established incumbent actors, and shape outcomes that affect other firms.

The variations among CaaS business models in the context of ongoing urban mobility transitions are only beginning to be conceptually unpacked. Van Waes et al. (2018) address the case of CaaS in the Netherlands, using a co-evolutionary approach to industry emergence to determine the upscaling potential of various CaaS business models. Other, more general studies of CaaS in the Netherlands include Van Zessen (2017), who analysed the spatial effects of bikeshare and its potential for integration into urban public transport systems in order to project various pathways for CaaS development in the Netherlands. Outside of the Netherlands, the business models of CaaS providers, as well as other shared mobility services, have been investigated by Cohen and Kietzmann (2014) who focus on the relationship between mobility service providers and local government.

Scholars have also considered CaaS in terms of the role it might play in a wide-ranging and deep-seated transition towards more sustainable, lower-carbon forms of urban mobility. CaaS, mostly in the form of bikeshare, has been analysed from a sustainability governance perspective in London (Akyelken et al., 2018) while Spinney and Lin (2018) offer a critique of the transformational potential of dockless bikeshare systems in Shanghai.

From a theoretical perspective, the nexus between business models and transitions has been explored in generic terms (Bocken et al., 2014; Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013; Evans et al., 2017; Schaltegger et al., 2016) and, more specifically, in connection with sustainable mobility (Hildermeier and Villareal, 2014; Abdelkafi et al., 2013; Wells, 2013) and shared mobility (Castillo-Manzano et al., 2016; Cohen and Kietzmann, 2014; Lan et al., 2017; Sarasini and Linder, 2017). Such a conceptual integration can help transitions scholars with a more detailed understanding of the mechanisms by which firms can influence innovation processes (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). For business model researchers, transition approaches allow for a more robust account of the macro context in which organisations operate, including the potential of internal business model decisions to influence this macro context and, in turn, affect the firm internally (Wirtz et al., 2016).

However, despite sustained calls for further conceptual integration between the two fields, this literature is at an early stage, and is largely characterised by single case studies (Bolton and Hannon, 2016; Huijben et al., 2016; Sarasini and Linder, 2017; Schaltegger et al., 2016; Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016). With few exceptions (see the work of Bidmon and Knab, 2018, 2014, 2017), it does not yet provide an integrated lens that can elucidate key questions arising from cases such as CaaS in the mature cycling context of the Netherlands. These include the actual strategies and means used by organisations to bring such an innovation to market, and how these strategies can be accounted for in transitions terms; or the potential effects of an organisation’s business model on its environment. While the empirical field of energy offers some work in this area, it has not yet been shown to what extent these insights are applicable to mobility services, given their distinct relationship with finite, enabling resources such as public space, and with the conventional bicycle’s unique status as a ‘new-old’ technology (Bijker, 1997; Vivanco, 2013). In this article, we attempt to address this gap by means of the following research question:

How can the conceptual integration of business models and sustainability transitions help to explain the case of CaaS in the Netherlands in 2016-2018?

In this paper, we combine insights from transitions and business models to create an analytical framework that will help to address this question and contribute to the discussion underway in this journal (e.g. Sarasini and Linder, 2018). The paper is composed of seven sections. Following this introduction, section 2 presents our theoretical framework. In section 3 we set out our methods, while our case is described in section 4. Sections 5 and 6 respectively present and discuss the results obtained. In section 7 we conclude and offer recommendations for further research.

2. Analytical framework

In the context of mobility, Geels (2012) defined a socio-technical transition as a major shift in the configuration of elements that make up the mobility system, including technology, policy, markets, consumer practices, and infrastructure. Socio-technical transitions approaches offer a powerful lens to study the emergence and development of radical and incremental innovations within stable socially-embedded technical systems, and how they produce or prevent fundamental change (Geels, 2002; Wieczorek and Berkhout, 2009), including in the field of urban mobility (Berger et al., 2014; Geels, 2012). Transitions research draws on evolutionary theory and constructivism from the field of science and technology studies, inter alia, to describe the variation, selection and retention of innovations, and the role played by creative and heterogeneous actors in interpreting and applying rules, albeit within

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2 For example, Bolton and Hannon (2016) contrasted the transitions approach with two other systems views in analysing energy industry business models in the UK. Huijben et al. (2016) focused on fit-and-conform and stretch-and-transform strategies used by energy firms to contend with regulatory regimes. Wainstein and Bumpus (2016) investigated lock-in in the decarbonising of electrical power systems, concluding that business models can be drivers of transitions irrespective of technology.

3 This refers to the safety bicycle’s fundamental technological stability between the late 19th century and the present, which Bijker presented as a key example of technology stabilisation and closure.
constraints (Geels, 2010; Giddens, 1984). The Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2012) has been developed within this approach to represent three analytical levels of increasing structuration (Giddens, 1984). These are the niche, a protected space within which radical innovation occurs; the regime, a dynamically stable alignment of established practices and rules; and the landscape, an exogenous source of influences outside the short-term control of system actors (Geels, 2012). Within these structuration levels, innovation trajectories result from social interactions subject to semi-coherent rule structures; between these levels, radical innovations at niche level ultimately interact with selection environments at the regime and landscape levels (Geels, 2010). However, the creation of ‘fit’ between niche variations, such as CaaS, and selection environments, such as urban mobility in the Netherlands, is an enacted and multi-dimensional process that depends on social and other dimensions as well as markets and regulations. Hoogma (2002), referring to initial stages of niche development, considers this ‘fit’ to be the outcome of a form of strategy that emerges from the interaction between the deliberate strategies of individual niche actors to promote their innovations, and the emergent strategies resulting from the mediating and constraining dynamics of the selection environment, as well as the realised strategies (Mintzberg et al., 1998) which are discarded before implementation.

The strategies used by individual organisations for initial entry into selection environments, or markets, are also a key concern in business model research (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Teece, 2010). In the CaaS field much innovation is provided by private firms, meaning that business models, which address focal firms and their networks, are an essential analytical framework for understanding the transitions potential of CaaS in the Dutch context. While ‘strategies’ are defined in a number of different ways in both transitions and business model research, we argue that the commonalities in the interpretation of ‘strategy’ in Hoogma’s framework and in aspects of business models are significant enough to enable direct comparison.

### 2.1. Socio-technical transitions and strategy

In socio-technical transitions approaches, actors in general “think strategically and try to further their interests” (Geels and Schot, 2010, p. 50); however, as meso-level theories, these approaches do not focus on the micro-dynamics of individual actors, and the determinants of their actions. Yet in recent years, scholars have called for closer attention to the critical role played by individual organisations in societal transitions, in pursuit of what Wells (2013) terms “more detailed causal mechanisms” for transitions theories (Bidmon and Knab, 2018; Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). In his development of structuration theory, a key influence on transitions research, Giddens (1984) had earlier recognised this need to integrate macro- and micro-phenomena to better account for the dynamics of structural change, and identified the concept of ‘unintended consequences’ as a bridge between the intentional actions of actors, and the unintended results of these actions within their context.

Mintzberg and Waters (1985, cited by Hoogma (2002)) use the concept of strategy, which they define as a “pattern in a stream of decisions”, to differentiate between patterns of decisions mediated by context. According to Mintzberg et al. (1998, p. 12), realised strategy equals deliberate strategy, minus unrealised strategy, plus emergent strategy. Realised strategy is thus the outcome of deliberate strategy, meditated and shaped by emergent strategy, minus unrealised strategies that are discarded or shelved before implementation.

The nature of the strategies used by niche actors to introduce novel technologies is described by Hoogma (2002, p. 15) in his heuristic model of initial niche development in the electrical vehicle industry. As such, Hoogma offers an analysis not of the deliberate strategies developed by actors before launching a product into the market, but of the realised strategies that result when an initial deliberate strategy combines with emergent strategies that respond to the dynamics of the niche, regime and landscape, and some strategies are blocked or discarded. Hoogma develops the concept of the fit between these strategies and the constraints of the existing regime, and differentiates between different dimensions on which innovations can be a better or worse fit with the regime. In this framework (Table 1), Hoogma concentrates on two strategically important articulation processes that occur in niche development. The first of these is the technology choice and design process, by which a technology is given form and articulated (including such factors as its optimal design and production method). The second is the process that establishes the innovation’s targeted use environment, or the intended application domain for the technology (including such factors as how the innovation will be used and by whom, what infrastructures it will depend on and require, and how it will relate to the existing regulatory context). The use environment therefore approximates the innovation’s projected value to users.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use Environment</th>
<th>Technology choice and design</th>
<th>Stretch &amp; Transform</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fit &amp; Conform</td>
<td>Selective Substitution</td>
<td>Leapfrog design for substitution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stretch &amp; Transform</td>
<td>Market differentiation</td>
<td>Exploration of a new regime</td>
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matrix in which the following four composite strategies appear:

- **Selective substitution**: both the technology and use environment conform to the existing regime
- **Market differentiation**: the technology remains close to the regime, while promoters target a use environment that differs significantly from the regime
- **Leapfrog design for substitution**: the use environment remains close to the regime, while the technology develops into a substantially different form
- **Exploration of possible new regime**: both technology and use environment depart significantly from the regime

This framework offers a nuanced perspective on niches at an early stage of development, such as CaaS in the Netherlands, where most firms have been operating for less than 3 years, and where the fundamental innovation offered by CaaS is not necessarily a technological novelty, but rather a novel form of access to an established technology.

### 2.2. Business models and strategy

The concept of the business model has been developed in fields such as strategic management and innovation management as a distinct unit of analysis that describes how organisations ‘do business’, centring on a focal organisation’s activities but extending beyond them, to explain how they both create, deliver and capture value (Zott and Amit, 2013). These functions can be conceptualised as the value proposition, describing the value of the firm’s offering to customers; value creation, detailing how value is actually produced and delivered; and value capture, or the means by which the firm transforms value into financial or other resources (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Osterwalder, 2004; Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016). Business models are therefore also understood in both material and cognitive terms (Bidmon and Knab, 2018). Materially, they are a set of objective relationships and interdependent activities involving contracts, routines and resource configurations (Chesbrough, 2010; Teece, 2010; Zott et al., 2011). Cognitively, they are a representation of how the causal links between exchange mechanisms of organisations and their environment are understood (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013), often via abstractions that can serve as a reference language and aid in collective sense-making (Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009). There are many interpretations of business models, serving different analytical purposes (Massa et al., 2017). We here adopt a definition of the business model provided by Teece (2010, p. 179) that stresses that it is simultaneously a value proposition presented to the customer(s) or user(s), as well as a description of what organisations do to deliver that value:

A business model articulates the logic, the data and other evidence that support a value proposition for the customer, and a viable structure of revenues and costs for the enterprise delivering that value.

Teece’s description of business models as a value proposition, plus the means to deliver on that proposition, emphasise the potential of the value proposition to serve as a means of differentiation between firms (Payne and Frow, 2014), especially from the perspective of customers or users. This differentiation is strategic in nature; for example, Chesbrough and Rosenbloom find that initial business models, before firms enter markets, serve as a kind of proto-strategy (2002), while Kaplan and Nortont define the business model as “the essence of strategy” (2001). Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart define the business model of a firm already in operation as “an expression of the firm’s realised strategy” (2010, p. 195). This reference to ‘realised’ strategy suggests draws on the conception of strategy used in both strategic management literature (Mintzberg et al., 1998) and the Strategic Niche Management field (Hoogma, 2002, citing Mintzberg, 1984) to explain how an organisation’s initial strategy, informed by expectations, visions and beliefs, is mediated by context, such as market or regime dynamics.

### 2.3. An integrated business models-transitions analytical perspective

In this paper we argue that selected aspects of business models and transitions research can be usefully combined based on this common strategic element. In Hoogma’s framework (2002), the strategies that are realised from the interplay of deliberate, unrealised and emergent strategies of individual niche actors are analysed along the dimensions of technology choice and design, and targeted use environment. The ‘use environment’ element of Hoogma’s approach, which envisages the innovation’s projected use in various contexts and therefore its value to users, has significant similarities with the value proposition element of business models, which projects how a firm can create value for its customers. However, it is more limited in scope, lacking an established and systematic method by which it can be analysed and collated, and lacking the competitive orientation of value propositions, which hinders comparison within a set of firms. By analysing the value propositions of CaaS firms in the place of use environments in an adaptation of Hoogma’s framework in Table 1, the element of the business model that most directly addresses users, the value proposition⁴, can be incorporated into a fit/stretch matrix of niche actor introduction strategies. While the value proposition is not a microcosm of the business model as a whole, we use it as a *pars pro toto* that best captures the essence of a firm’s intended offering to users (Baldassarre et al., 2017).

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⁴ In comparison, and despite their great heterogeneity, the remaining categories used in the business model literature, such as Osterwalder’s Business Model Canvas (2004), tend to be more restrictive in scope, such as the supply chain, which involves suppliers, or the customer interface, which concerns only customers (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013).
The resulting integrated framework in Table 2 creates a typology of four combinations of ‘fit’ and ‘stretch’ niche actor introduction strategies along the axes of technology choice and design, and the value propositions of the firms that bring these technologies to market. In this framework, firms in the category Fit-Fit have chosen a value proposition that closely conforms to existing user expectations, combined with a substantially familiar technology, meaning that these firms can be considered closely aligned with the regime. Firms in the Fit-Stretch group combine a technological ‘stretch’ with a ‘fit’ value proposition. An example of these might be firms using a familiar value proposition, such as commercial advertising on vehicles, to bring a technologically novel innovation to market. Stretch-Fit refers to firms that are offering a service that is familiar and established in technological terms, through the vehicle of a novel value proposition. Lastly, Stretch-Stretch includes firms that aim to reconfigure the cycling regime around their offering, using novel value propositions and novel technology.

3. Methods

Our methodological approach has been shaped by the limited literature on CaaS in the Dutch context. This motivated the use of the case study method (Yin, 2014), consisting of a desk study, followed by interviews with the sample of CaaS providers. The desk study aimed to delimit and define the concept of CaaS in the context of large Dutch cities, in light of the heterogeneity of the services they offer. It further aimed to establish a list of all the providers of CaaS operating within the Netherlands, along with preliminary data on their business models and value propositions, and on the technological choices that had been made in the development of their service(s).

We employed three data collection approaches in an iterative manner appropriate for heterogeneous and emerging fields, in which delimitations are in constant flux (Greenhalgh and Peacock, 2005). Firstly, the scientific literature on CaaS was reviewed for relevant articles by means of a Scopus search. Secondly, a LexisNexis search was conducted for articles in the Dutch-language press related to CaaS issues using the term ‘deelfiets’ (shared bicycle, bikeshare). Lastly, a Google Search was conducted for bikeshare firms mentioned in the scientific literature and Dutch-language press review, as well as using the search terms above in both English and Dutch. This search continued until saturation had been reached in terms of new information.

The interview phase aimed to verify and expand on this data. Questions were developed iteratively using Castillo-Montoya’s Interview Protocol Refinement Process (2016) and Osterwalder’s Business Model Canvas (2004), due to the latter’s level of detail and emphasis on value propositions. Supplementary questions addressed the design of the service (such as the specifications of bicycles and digital and physical supporting infrastructure) (see Table A2 List of Interview Questions in Appendix). Emphasising strategy as a link between these categories as set out in our theoretical framework, we then classified the value propositions and technology choices of each provider in terms of their fit with the existing cycling regime. We draw on the value proposition analysis criteria developed by Anderson et al. (2006, cited in Bohnsack and Pinkse, 2017) to establish the extent to which these propositions differ from those already on offer within the regime. Interviews were requested with the full sample of CaaS firms listed during the desk study, in order to obtain a comprehensive view of the field; of these, 15 took place (see Table A1 List of Interviews in Appendix), lasting approximately 60–75 minutes each. The answers were transcribed and then used to tabulate each provider’s value proposition and technology choices.

4. Case description

In their regime analysis of the Dutch mobility system, Turnheim et al. (2015) make use of transitions insights to describe a dominant automobility regime and two subordinate regimes, that of public transport and cycling, and note that cycling’s status as a regime is almost unique to the Netherlands, it being a niche almost everywhere else. The cycling regime is structured by several strong stabilising forces, such as: a high-density dedicated infrastructure market; well-developed civil society organisations such as the Fietsersbond; an established cycling retail, manufacturing and repair industry; a socially embedded cycling culture; high modal share for cycling; and cycling expertise in the public sector, especially in local government. In contrast, Turnheim et al. note only a few cracks, tensions or problems acting to destabilise the regime, which were characterised as of limited influence (such as bicycle theft in cities). While Turnheim et al. do not include pressure on urban public bicycle parking capacity in this list, they note that the creation of such capacity has been an important achievement and a source of synergy between cycling and public transport. Van

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5 Using the terms ‘bike OR bicycle AND share OR sharing AND netherlands OR dutch’, 32 journal articles were obtained and reviewed.
6 The 310 exact matches were refined to 40 sources from newspapers, magazines, and specialist mobility blogs and websites, such as that of the Fietsersbond, covering the period 2015-2018.
Second' bicycles here refers to the tendency of regular train commuters in the Netherlands to maintain one or more inexpensive bicycles in cities they commute to regularly, since bicycle parking is usually cost-free and conveniently located. However, this can result in underutilisation of well-located bicycle parking capacity.

Zessen (2017) however, identifies pressure on public bicycle parking capacity, whether in dedicated facilities or on open public space, as a central concern in the Dutch urban mobility system. This pressure continues to grow despite decades of public investment in such capacity, mostly provided cost-free or heavily subsidised. Van der Spek and Scheltema (2015) ascribe this to its lack of management as a scarce resource, leading to a Dutch phenomenon whereby much formal parking capacity is taken up by abandoned or little-used second bicycles, necessitating costly and constant monitoring, while the obstruction of public open space by informally parked bicycles has been a longstanding challenge in Dutch cities (van Goeverden and Godefrooij, 2010). Along with the assumption of a right to cost-free and convenient bicycle parking space, private bicycle ownership is a deeply socially embedded practice within this regime, and in turn helps to define Dutch national identity and culture (Kuipers, 2013). In contrast, CaaS constitutes a socio-technical niche because it provides access to bicycles that are owned by service providers, using a business model that Wittmann (2017) terms ‘usership’, rather than the private ownership that is the norm within the regime.

4.1. The CaaS niche

The common emphasis on usership of bicycles across CaaS providers distinguishes them from the cycling regime in a number of ways. These include the many regulatory ambiguities common to shared mobility services, such as pre-existing local bylaws that render dockless bikeshare technically illegal (Cohen and Kietzmann, 2014; Frenken, 2017). Another example is the tendency among CaaS providers, of both bike share and bike leasing, to use a business model that ‘bundles’ support services, such as bike repair, into their offerings, in ways that reshape or replace users’ relationships with powerful actors in the cycling regime, such as bicycle retailers and local repair shops. At the same time, the potential of CaaS to facilitate intermodal mobility may, in some instances, support other regimes in ways that run counter to the interests of private cycling (Gebhardt et al., 2016; Jonuschat et al., 2015), leaving it “caught between regimes” in the words of Parkhurst et al. (2012, p. 308). An example of this might be bikeshare schemes connected to car parking garages, that enable the ongoing use of the car to reach city centres (Villwock-Witte and van Grol, 2015), in competition with (for example) a door-to-door trip via the bike-train combined mode (Kager and Harms, 2017; Rottier, 2018).

CaaS thus constitutes a niche distinct from, and in some ways competitive with, the Dutch private cycling regime. Present CaaS technologies in the Netherlands are also mostly imports from other, low-cycling contexts. A major exception to this is the OV-Fiets system, which developed by incorporating legacy bike hire firms with the backing of the national railway operator (Oldenziel et al., 2016; Ploeger and Oldenziel, 2019), and had long been the only sizeable CaaS operator in the country.

By 2016, however, other new forms of bikeshare started to enter key urban markets in the Netherlands at scale, largely concentrated in the country’s two largest cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Fig. 1 shows the non-OV-Fiets fleet (in orange) rising above a negligible level for the first time in 2016, and by the next year, surpassing the OV-Fiets fleet; the number of firms in the CaaS market also increases abruptly from 2 to 13 over 3 years. The rapid growth achieved by these systems in a mature cycling market suggests that, despite the success and unique features of the Dutch cycling system, its existing offering left some needs unmet (van Zessen, 2017); however, these needs were difficult to ascertain using transitions approaches. Examples of these might include last-mile trips from public transport other than rail, since very few bus or tram stops have OV-Fiets docks; or short intra-urban journeys, particularly in peripheral areas where the existing public transport offering may be limited, or where maintaining a private bicycle may be challenging (for example, due to a lack of safe parking). The period following 2016 also saw an increase in public opposition to CaaS, largely directed at the dockless systems and expressed through many press editorials, public statements by local government leaders, and articles in the print and online press (Adriannie, 2017; Echt Amsterdams Nieuws, 2017; Koops, 2017; Tour de Force 2020, 2017; Tour de Force 2020, 2017; Trouw Editorial, 2017; Verkade, 2017). In Amsterdam, a temporary ban was enacted on dockless bikeshare in August 2017, pending the development of a new policy (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017), while in Rotterdam, these systems were allowed to continue under revised conditions (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2018). One of the most frequent justifications for this policy response, particularly in Amsterdam, is CaaS’s impact on urban public bicycle parking capacity, which has long been under great pressure in urban centres (van der Spek and Scheltema, 2015). This suggests that safeguarding the interests of (private) cyclists, such as access to parking capacity, has been an important driver of official responses to (dockless) CaaS, and that the relationship between CaaS and stakeholders of private cycling is a key determinant of CaaS’s future, although further research is needed to investigate this correlation.

5. Results

Given the developments and the limitations of both the transitions and business models approaches to clarify the controversy on their own, we applied our fit-stretch framework to CaaS providers' technology choices and value propositions. Here we discuss our empirical results after we establish a contextual definition of CaaS in the Netherlands, present our sample of CaaS providers, and apply our framework to their technology choices and value propositions.

In the scientific literature, bikeshare is a well-studied concept (Fishman, 2016) and generally refers to systems that grant access to a bicycle in increments ranging from 10 min to a one or more days. In contrast, bike leasing, another form of bicycle usership, is little studied (exceptions include Flüchter, 2014; and Park and Yoon, 2015). Moreover, bike leasing mimics the freedom and responsibility
of private cycling use, while bikeshare requires the user to locate a bicycle but releases the user from responsibility for their bicycle as soon as a ride ends. However, we found that the two services were most often discussed as part of the same set of potentially disruptive innovations in the Dutch national press, especially given the similar ways in which they bundle repair services, changing users’ relationship to local bicycle repair and retail industries (Duursma, 2017a; Homan, 2017). For this reason, we define the CaaS niche in the Dutch context as the set of services that provide access to a bicycle on a usership basis in time increments of between 10 min and 30 days.

Drawing on academic literature, press coverage and web search content, including new bikeshare policy documents (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017; Gemeente Rotterdam, 2018) we compiled a list of organisations which had provided some form of CaaS service in the Netherlands in 2015–2017. These were: Cykl, BimBimBike, Donkey Republic, Dropbyke, E-bikeToGo, Flickbike, Gobike, Haagsche Stadsfiets, Hello-Bike, HopperPoint, Keobike, Mobike, Nextbike, Obike, OV-Fiets, Spinlister, Studentbike, Swapfiets, Urbee, and USP Campusbike. For these organisations, we used interview responses to tabulate a list of value propositions and technology design choices qualified and contextualised by the specific circumstances of each provider.

Our interview round verified this business model data, from which we derived each organisation’s value proposition. Technology choice data emerged from specific questions relating to fleet and system design. The value propositions in our sample can be analysed along a number of dimensions, using distinctions such as conventional versus motorised bicycles, systems which store their bicycles on public versus private land when not in use, systems that support trips that do not terminate at their starting point, and systems that are formally integrated with other mobility modes versus those that stand apart. In addition, fleet size data emerged as an important proxy for the overall performance of each service, as it was available from public sources for all firms, whereas data such as ridership figures, turnover or profit, were very seldom disclosed.

Table 3 presents 18 different CaaS firms classified by the ‘fit’ or ‘stretch’ strategy evident in their value propositions and technology choices, as measured against the cycling regime in the Netherlands prior to the advent of CaaS providers. When the same firms are sorted by fit/stretch quadrant, the variation in fleet size among the CaaS firms becomes apparent, as shown in Fig. 2.

The overall image of the CaaS niche at an early phase in its development consists of two elements. The first is a long tail of small to very small, geographically dispersed service providers in the Fit-Fit group, mostly operating without competition, except from the OV-Fiets system. The second are three clusters of larger fleets: the established OV-Fiets system, highly aligned to the public transport regime; Swapfiets and Studentbike, the leasing firms that mimic the regime norm of private bicycle ownership; and the cluster of Stretch-Stretch firms. The latter group, although severely affected by the Amsterdam temporary ban on dockless bicycles, succeeded in putting relatively large bicycle fleets into circulation in a short timeframe. These will be discussed in turn.

5.1. Fit-Fit

The OV-Fiets offers a good example of a provider that has consciously pursued a fit-and-conform pattern in both its value proposition and choice of technology. This strategy, which Hoogma (2002) terms selective substitution, can be seen in the OV-Fiets system’s initial design, its subsequent incremental evolution, and in its steady growth. Ploeger and Oldenziel (2019) describe how the OV Fiets system brought 3rd-generation back-to-one bikeshare to the market in 2003, approximately 12 years before the advent of 4th-generation CaaS. The system was a combination of technologies that were more than a century old (standard Dutch bicycles), recently established (the railway operator’s passenger smart card), and novel (web-based communication of fleet data). The OV-Fiets value proposition was shaped by its parent company’s decision to absorb existing bike hire firms already present at Dutch stations, and persuade them to accept lower fees in exchange for a greatly expanded user base; its minimum 24-h ride increment is also an inheritance from these legacy business models (OV-Fiets interview, 26/04/2018). In technological terms, the OV-Fiets was defined by its durability and simplicity rather than its novelty, although innovations such as e-bikes have trialled. The OV-Fiets’ selective substitution strategy was also shaped by its parent company’s scepticism as to its ability to break even, which was only achieved recently, after 15 years of operation (OV-Fiets interview, 26/04/2018)\(^9\).

![Fig. 1. Evolution of bicycle fleet size and number of firms in the bikeshare market of the Netherlands 2004–2017.](image-url)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CaaS Providers (Rent Size)</th>
<th>Value Proposition</th>
<th>F/S</th>
<th>Technology Choice and Design</th>
<th>F/S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OV-Fiets (14,500)</td>
<td>Back-to-one (B21) bike share of up to 24 h for rail users (with option of 2 extra bikes) at all NS railway stations and some other locations with common smartcard</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Rail station-hosted, dock-based system with simple bikes.</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keobike (340)</td>
<td>Dock-based bikeshare for users of local public transport provider via app</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dock-based system with smart bikes unlocked via app</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next-bike (75 + 80)</td>
<td>B2M dock-based bikeshare for users of local public transport provider via app or by phone and card</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dock-based system with smart bikes unlocked via app</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USP Campus-bike (5)</td>
<td>B2M dock-based bike share for up to 72 hours via app, but only within a campus area.</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dock-based, dockless-enabled smart bikes unlocked via app.</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uwdeelfiets (24)</td>
<td>Bikeshare allowing one-way trips within each of several operating areas around Amsterdam, located and unlocked via an app.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Dock-based bike share with smart bike, unlocked via app.</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haagse Stadsfiets (180)</td>
<td>B2M bike share based at manned rental points via internet, phone or Whatsapp</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dock-based rental with tourism focus</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopper-point (50)</td>
<td>B2M GPS-equipped bikeshare within Brabant city centres, via app.</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dock-Based Bikeshare on Public Land</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cykl (24)</td>
<td>B2M bike share within a campus via app run on a modified open-source platform.</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dock-Based Bikeshare on Public Land</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-Bike To Go (8)</td>
<td>B21 e-bike share across the Randstad offering higher-speed bike rides with geofencing via app and corporate reporting of rides</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dock-Based E-bike Share on Private Land</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gobike (50)</td>
<td>B21 e-bike share</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dock-Based E-bike Share on Private Land</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obike (2000 + 3000)</td>
<td>B2M dockless, last-mile bike share with blanket coverage of city centres, with deposit</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Dockless Bike Share on Public Land</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flick-bike (1000)</td>
<td>B2M dockless bike share in Amsterdam via app.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Dockless Bike Share on Public Land</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobike (150)</td>
<td>B21 dockless bike share in Amsterdam via app.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Dockless Bike Share on Public Land</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hello-bike (250)</td>
<td>B2M bike share based within an urban business district using geofencing via an app</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Dockless Bike Share with Geo-fencing</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DonkeyBike (450)</td>
<td>B21 e-bike share outside AMS city centre via an app</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dockless E-Bike Share on Private Land</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbee (300)</td>
<td>B21 e-bike share across AMS based at places of business via an app</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Dockless E-Bike Share on Private Land</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swapfiets (17,400)</td>
<td>A ‘Netflix model’ for cycling: maintenance and replacement of one bicycle on monthly rolling lease for flat fee.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Bike Leasing on (User’s) Private Land</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student-bike (1000)</td>
<td>Cost-free cycling as a service monthly rolling lease in exchange for exposure.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Bike Leasing on (User’s) Private Land</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Firms with a similar strategy of closely integrating bikeshare offerings with existing public transport concessions and the full agreement of local government are Keobike and Nextbike. Also included in this group are the many small operators who either provide a comparable value proposition and a technology choice that closely resembles the regime, or who are so small and geographically limited (to a single town or campus) that they reach a very limited audience. For these firms, mostly limited to physical docks and the regulatory processes required to secure them, the OV-Fiets presents close competition and a great scale advantage, with its 400 station-based docks and annual ridership of more than 3 million; in consequence, their fleet sizes are in many cases limited (by apprehensive local governments) to well below what many firms would otherwise operate (Nextbike interview 08/12/2017, Gobike interview 12/04/2018).

5.2. Fit-Stretch

This group consists of firms that have pursued a fit-and-conform value proposition combined with a novel technology, such as geofencing\(^8\) (Hellobike) or e-bikes (Donkeybike, Urbee). In this case, our framework has been particularly useful in capturing within this group firms that initially adopted a ‘stretch’ value proposition and subsequently reorganised themselves in pursuit of a ‘fit’ in response to regime challenges. This is particularly true of Donkeybike, a dockless operator initially using open public land in Amsterdam to store its fleet between rides. When the city imposed a ban on the storage of dockless bikeshare fleets in the public realm in August 2017, Donkeybike responded by withdrawing from public land and securing permission to store its fleet on a series of public premises sited around Amsterdam. Donkeybike thus ensured its continued operation, but, due to the cost and scarcity of private land in central Amsterdam, this came at the cost of greatly curtailing its availability across the city, and therefore its value proposition (Donkeybike interview, 07/02/2018).

A second example in this group is the geofencing model of Hellobike, which ‘fits’ into local governments’ existing legal framework by conforming to existing legislation governing public open space, but deploys novel technology to avoid the investment costs associated with the placement of physical docks. Hellobike also enjoys a degree of local government support that is rare in the CaaS niche, with a direct mandate from a local authority in charge of Amsterdam’s high-rise business district.

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\(^8\) When capital investments are taken into account.

\(^9\) Geofencing refers to the designation of virtual docks visible through an app.
5.3. Stretch-Fit

This group consists of bike leasing providers who combine technologically familiar bicycles with highly innovative value propositions. In the case of Studentbike, students receive a bicycle (covered in advertisements) cost-free, provided that they cycle a minimum average number of kilometres per day. While Studentbike includes considerable innovation in value proposition terms through a gamification element that rewards users for completing tasks that result in greater exposure for the advertisements on their bikes, its size and therefore impact has been consciously limited by its operators (Hellobike interview, 08/11/2017). In contrast, Swapfiets has achieved spectacular growth in fleet size, surpassing the OV-Fiets within 2 years of its founding. It has done so by combining a novel value proposition, which has been termed ‘Netflix for bikes’ (Meijers, 2018) in reference to its flat-fee subscription model, with an ostensibly traditional product, the classic Dutch city bicycle.

While Swapfiets bikes in fact contain a degree of discreet innovation, mainly to improve service life, the system does not fundamentally depend on smartphone access and its value proposition to its target group, students, is distinguished by services such as rapid maintenance, repair and replacement of lease bicycles. Swapfiets’ offer of a bicycle that users store at home and use like a private bicycle on a rolling month-to-month lease sets it apart from other CaaS offerings in the sample, most of which offer bikeshare and provide short-term mobility options for urban travel. However, Swapfiets is priced so competitively, with a monthly subscription equal to around 4 OV-Fiets trips or one day’s use of a Donkeybike, that some users may find it economical to take out more than one subscription even in a city they visit occasionally, since bicycle parking is free, and any wear and tear to the bicycle (from storage in free bicycle parking, which is usually open-air) is not for their own account. It is this immense upscaling potential, and the addition of services that reposition cycling as a ‘service’ separated from responsibility for the bicycle as an object, that justify the inclusion of Swapfiets in the CaaS sample.

5.4. Stretch-Stretch

This group includes the dockless bikeshare operators that store their fleets on public land between trips, such as Obike, Flickbike and Mobike. These systems depend on novel technologies such as remote locking and geo-location on bicycles, as well as smartphone-based platforms, and their rapid advent in 2015-6 is associated with advances in performance and a fall in price for these technologies (Lan et al., 2017; Spinney and Lin, 2018) These technologies, in turn, underpin a value proposition that could not have existed before geo-location, smartphones and remote locking: that of the free-floating, one-way bikeshare system, in which users themselves decide where and how to park the bicycles they have used. This value proposition, far more than any other in the CaaS sample, positions all of public open space as bicycle parking capacity, to be monetised by private CaaS providers.

The firms in this group have also been most closely associated with the negative externalities of bikeshare, such as the perceived saturation of public bike parking capacity in Dutch cities (Adrianne, 2017; Duursma, 2017b; Verkade, 2017) and highly publicised outcomes in their home markets in Asian cities and elsewhere (Lan et al., 2017; Spinney and Lin, 2018; Vlaskamp, 2017). These firms’ approach to public space may be intrinsically associated with their value proposition; Obike representatives have stated in the press that launching at scale is essential to their system, which “only works with a bike every 200 m”, according to a company spokesperson (Voermans, 2017).

In addition to their innovative technological offering, these firms tend to operate a service that is technically illegal under most Dutch cities’ bylaws10, meaning that early attempts to secure a regularised status with local government led instead to a tolerance policy on the part of the city (which continues in Rotterdam, but was abruptly withdrawn in Amsterdam). This willingness to enter a market in spite of regulatory ambiguity and associated risk exemplifies a stretch-and-transform value proposition.

6. Implications of CaaS providers’ fit-and-stretch strategies for the niche

Analysis of a sample of CaaS providers in the Netherlands in terms of technology choice and business model ‘fit’ or ‘stretch’ strategies has yielded a definition of CaaS in context, and established the kinds of strategies that niche actors have realised in this early phase of niche development. However, the question remains of whether CaaS providers’ strategies have had discernible effects on the niche as a whole, and whether a value proposition (or broader business model) perspective can provide a conceptual link between the micro-level dynamics that may have determined these strategies, and dynamics within the CaaS niche and cycling regime that may affect individual firms.

Our finding is that CaaS in the Netherlands presents a correlation between two elements: value propositions and their approach towards the commons resource of public open space and bicycle parking capacity; and CaaS technologies that obviate physical docking infrastructure. Firms that have pursued ‘fit’ strategies in their use public space, by limiting themselves to physical docking infrastructure depending on formal permission from local government, have generally failed to achieve significant scale in Dutch cities, resulting in high resident-to-bicycle ratios and system coverage that seldom extends beyond city centres to the peripheries, where transport choice is most limited. OV-Fiets is no exception to this rule, since it is based on private land owned by the railways, and is in almost every case accessible (for pick-up and drop-off of a bicycle) only in the centre of a given urban area.

Some CaaS providers have robustly pursued a ‘stretch and transform’ strategy, and proceeded to launch in the face of regulatory ambiguity and a degree of public backlash against perceived saturation of bicycle parking capacity. These providers have also found

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10 Known as the APV or Algemeen Plaatselijke Verordening.
their operations limited by greater scrutiny in Rotterdam (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2018) and a temporary ban in Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017), one of the country’s largest markets with considerable symbolic power (Nextbike interview, 08/12/2017). Some of this backlash has been attributed by CaaS operators (Flickbike interview, 03/11/2017) to a projection of negative outcomes from other CaaS markets, such as the ‘bicycle graveyards’ of Asian cities (Lanting, 2018; Tates, 2017), onto the Dutch context, highlighting a communicative function of the business model which is absent from Hoogma’s concept of use environment (2002). While these firms’ operations continue to expand in Rotterdam and other centres, the losses associated with Amsterdam’s temporary ban may be considerable (Echt Amsterdams Nieuws, 2017; Teuling, 2017) and their reach into regional cities, towns and rural areas is at present minimal, meaning that their contribution to mobility choice clusters around dense urban centres, where mobility choice, parking pressure and OV-Fiets availability are already high.

In contrast with the restrictions and oppositions experienced by these two groups of CaaS providers, non-bikeshare firms such as Swapfiets have achieved rapid upscaling and avoided controversy by closely mimicking the dynamics of the Dutch private cycling regime. As such, the legitimacy of Swapfiets users’ access to public bicycle parking capacity has not been significantly challenged in public discourse, even when these individually anonymous but collectively visually distinct bicycles saturate public spaces and public parking capacity, such as in student neighbourhoods or at railway stations. However, while Swapfiets’ bicycle fleet conforms closely to the traditional image of urban Dutch bicycles, its business model has the potential to disrupt the Dutch cycling regime. For example, acquiring a Swapfiets may remove a growing number of users from frequent contact with neighbourhood bicycle retailers and repair services, since these needs are met centrally. Since Swapfiets also faces no significant regulatory barriers, and since institutional tools for governing mobility services are largely limited to the lens of public space, its continued growth could also produce a situation in which a sizeable portion of a socially influential group, students, are habituated to ‘usership’ rather than ownership of bicycles. These attitudes may diffuse through society, further normalizing shared mobility (Parkes et al., 2013). When compared to the many small operators who reach a very limited number of users, and the limitation of even the large OV-Fiets system to a simple and consistent value proposition, this influence may be very significant.

The correlation between public space impact and CaaS business models has historical roots that may also account for certain second-order effects. For example, the Dutch state (with renewed focus since 1975) has undertaken to provide well-located capacity for parking private bicycles in Dutch cities, usually at great expense but almost always cost-free to users (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat [Netherlands], 2009; Turnheim et al., 2015, p. 37). The precedent of free bicycle parking meant that CaaS business models could not engage with an established method for determining fair financial compensation for use of a city’s public space. The OV-Fiets system and its parent company conformed to and thereby reinforced this aspect of the private cycling regime in a way that poses a significant barrier to the upscaling of later CaaS business models, especially dockless systems. For example, dockless operators are excluded from a wide area around Amsterdam’s central station in the city’s new draft bikeshare policy (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017), while other providers already find it prohibitively expensive to find private land in central Amsterdam from which to operate (Donkeybike interview, 07/02/2018). By occupying the most profitable urban locations (at railway stations) while other providers are subject to limited access, the OV-Fiets system may thus constitute more of a barrier to other providers than its ostensibly non-overlapping use case at first suggests. This is especially likely given the slim profit margins in bikesharing (OV-Fiets interview, 26/04/2018).

As of 2019, no Dutch CaaS provider has yet emerged that offers a city-wide bikeshare service of the kind long established as an integrated mode of public transport in Paris and London, or the ubiquitous free-floating systems of Singapore and Shanghai. Users who seek usership of a shared bicycle for last-mile connections from a bus stop, or to make a spontaneous trip between two peripheral points in a Dutch city, either face the absence of any CaaS service, or the need to register with many different CaaS providers, as all remain limited to single locations or a handful of smaller locations.

The transition potential of the CaaS niche as a whole has therefore not yet been realised, despite calls by experts for the state-led creation of common digital infrastructure platforms for shared mobility services (Panozzo, 2017; Stratta et al., 2017) and a recent memorandum of understanding between various operators resolved to work towards interoperability for users between these systems (Puylaert, 2018). Several interviewees party to this memorandum noted in interviews that they would only participate in such a platform, given the sensitive data exchange involved, if required to by local or national government. This is most true for firms in the Stretch-Stretch group, such as Obike and Mobike, which have already emerged in academic studies of their home markets as highly resistant to data sharing with local government, despite user bases numbering many millions (Shen et al., 2018; Spinney and Lin, 2018).

7. Conclusion

The Value Proposition/Technology Choice framework adapted from Hoogma (2002) suggests that growth of CaaS has been strongest where service providers have most closely conformed to aspects of the existing cycling regime, such as OV-Fiets and Swapfiets. However, the firms that departed furthest from the regime, the Stretch-Stretch dockless firms that launched at significant scale all at once, are the next most successful group, barring heavy losses for those present in Amsterdam. Considering that, with the exception of Flickbike, the other two Stretch-Stretch firms belong to parent companies with vast financial reserves and user bases, it is interesting to note that these firms did not significantly alter either their bicycle fleet (in size and specifications) or their value proposition to prepare for the shift from a low-cycling context to one in which (private) cycling itself constitutes a regime.

The four distinct patterns of change shown in the Value Proposition/Technology Choice framework better facilitate application to our empirical case than Bidmon & Knab’s (2018) model for the integration of business models and transitions perspectives, because all four patterns are directly comparable to each other, being defined in terms of both value propositions (and therefore business
models), and socio-technical transitions. In contrast, Bidmon & Knab’s three-part model conflates both novel and existing business models into one category in relation to the commercialisation of technological innovation; we find that the differences between novel (or ‘stretch’) and existing (or ‘fit’) business models, as expressed through value propositions, are both distinct and a significant influence on outcomes for niche actors.

Combined with a case study, this framework explains a degree of opposition to certain CaaS providers that exceeds that those providers seem to have anticipated themselves, to the extent that they did not alter either their value proposition or technology choice in moving from their home markets to the Dutch context. The dynamics of this opposition, and the prevalence within press reports on CaaS of images of negative outcomes from other CaaS markets, like the bicycle graveyards of Asian cities, also suggest that the business model’s communicative function has also served to shape public and media responses to CaaS to a significant extent.

More research is required into the exact means by which the cycling regime and local government have interacted, if at all, in order to bring about varying responses to the rapid arrival of CaaS firms in the Netherlands. Yet our findings suggest that the means by which common resources crucial to cycling are governed – most particularly public bicycle parking capacity, but also data infrastructure, common service standards, and other issues – are seldom articulated in a way that enables experimentation and innovation, especially at scale, and by private sector actors.

Our framework addresses the question of how using a strategy framework to compare value propositions and technology design choices developed by niche actors can contribute to both business models and transitions research.

A value propositions perspective reveals the very different commercial constraints facing actors that have made similar technology design choices, such as the firms that must position a bicycle every 200 m in order to deliver on a strategy first developed for Asian cities, versus another dockless operator’s geofencing agreement with local government that limits scale and profitability but provides regulatory cover. The more detailed business model aspects revealed in interviews on the subject of interoperability also clarify why firms have been slow to develop a common user platform, which is puzzling if seen from a transitions perspective alone. In turn, a transitions lens succeeds in explaining why firms with ostensibly similar value propositions, producing similar results in cities in terms of parking congestion and visual impact, have faced widely different outcomes, some succeeding in legitimising themselves as adjacent to the existing regime, and others branded as an alien presence.

The adapted fit-and-stretch framework used here could be extended through the substitution of many other dimensions, such as government policy and regulatory frameworks, to map the development of strategies within the niche. While this paper makes a contribution to the field of qualitative studies of business models from a transitions perspective, more research is needed in the burgeoning and fast-changing empirical field of shared mobility, particularly where the technologies deployed interact with incumbent mobility cultures, and particularly where those technologies are ‘new-old’, for which part of their promise lies precisely in their simplicity and technological stability.

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**Declaration of Competing Interest**

None.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>CaaS Provider</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>08/11/2017</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Hellobike, Studentbike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>08/11/2017</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>Keolibike (Keolis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>08/11/2017</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>EbikeToGo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>03/11/2017</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Obike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>03/11/2017</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Flickbike</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>03/11/2017</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>UwDeelfiets</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>08/12/2017</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Nextrbike</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<td>J</td>
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</tr>
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<td>NS/OV-Fiets</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>12/01/2018</td>
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<td>Cykl</td>
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Table A2
List of Interview Questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Could you briefly describe the service(s) you provide?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Who are your users?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Do you see your service as a complement to private bicycles, or a replacement for them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Do you work with partners to provide your services?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What activities do you undertake to provide and maintain your service?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. What factors determined the design of your system elements (bicycles, docks)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Could you describe your value proposition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. How do you engage with your users?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. What factors determined the design of your payments and costs structure?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Apart from fees for rides, do you have any other significant revenue streams?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Under what circumstances and in what areas would you be willing to cooperate with other CaaS providers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. What would need to happen for you to integrate your service with other mobility modes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Do you have any formal relationship with the public sector?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. What could the public sector do to improve your position as a firm?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Under what circumstances would you be willing to contribute financially for public goods/upkeep of public spaces that are necessary for cycling?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Do you think that your firm has a role to play in fighting transport poverty, or increasing access to mobility?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Do you trade user data with third parties?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. What factors determined the design of your network?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix A

References


Further Reading

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